Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries v. Outparcel

• Decision Date: 14 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 4254.,4254.
• Citation: 649 S.E.2d 494
• Parties: ECCLESIASTES PRODUCTION MINISTRIES, Appellant v. OUTPARCEL ASSOCIATES, LLC, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

649 S.E.2d 494

ECCLESIASTES PRODUCTION MINISTRIES, Appellant v. OUTPARCEL ASSOCIATES, LLC, Respondent.

No. 4254.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted June 1, 2007.

Decided June 14, 2007.

Rehearing Denied August 27, 2007.

S. Allan Hill, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Ralph Gleaton, of Greenville, for Respondent.

ANDERSON, J.:

Ecclesiastes Production Ministries ("EPM") appeals the grant of a directed verdict in regard to its third-party claims against Outparcel Associates, LLC ("Outparcel"). The trial judge granted Outparcel's motion based on a settlement agreement between EPM and JDL Holdings, LLC ("JDL") that he deemed to require Outparcel's release as well. We REVERSE.¹

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 18, 2001, EPM entered into an agreement with Outparcel for the lease of a building ("the Leased Property") in Greenville County. The lease contained a seven-page, handwritten addendum granting EPM the option to purchase the land and the right of first refusal.

On March 31, 2003, without EPM's knowledge, Outparcel entered into a bond for title agreement with JDL for the sale of a larger tract of land that included the Leased Property. JDL later filed suit against EPM to collect rent under the lease agreement between EPM and Outparcel.

EPM answered and brought Outparcel into the suit as a third-party defendant. EPM's pleadings asserted, inter alia, that Outparcel had failed to offer a right of first refusal to EPM before entering into the bond for title agreement with JDL. Additionally, EPM counterclaimed against JDL for fraud and tortious interference with its contractual right of first refusal.

Shortly before trial, on February 2, 2005, EPM and JDL settled their claims and released one another with a document they termed a "Mutual Settlement and Release" ("the Settlement Agreement"). The Settlement Agreement between EPM and JDL was conditioned upon EPM continuing to pursue its claims for damages against Outparcel. Under certain circumstances, EPM was to share an award from Outparcel. The document detailed how any recovered damages were to be divided between EPM and JDL.

EPM's third-party complaint against Outparcel came to trial on February 6, 2005. At the conclusion of EPM's case, Outparcel moved for a directed verdict, arguing the Settlement Agreement had the effect of releasing EPM's claim against Outparcel. The trial court granted the motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Hurd v. Williamsburg County, 363 S.C. 421, 611 S.E.2d 488 (2005); Hinkle v. Nat'l Cas. Ins. Co., 354 S.C. 92, 96, 579 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2003); Huffines Co. v. Lockhart, 365 S.C. 178, 187, 617 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Ct.App.2005); Lingard v. Carolina By-Products, 361 S.C. 442, 446, 605 S.E.2d 545, 547 (Ct.App.2004). The trial court must deny such a motion when the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt. Steinke v. South Carolina Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Reg., 336 S.C. 373, 386, 520 S.E.2d 142, 148 (1999); Collins Entertainment, Inc. v. White, 363 S.C. 546, 611 S.E.2d 262 (Ct.App.2005); Sims v. Giles, 343 S.C. 708, 714, 541 S.E.2d 857, 860 (Ct.App.2001). If the evidence as a whole is susceptible to more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should be denied. Jinks v. Richland County, 355 S.C. 341, 345, 585 S.E.2d 281, 283 (2003); Adams v. G.J. Creel & Sons, Inc., 320 S.C. 274, 277, 465 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1995); Huffines at 187, 617 S.E.2d at 129.

A motion for directed verdict goes to the entire case and may be granted only when the evidence raises no issue for the jury as to liability. Carolina Home Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong Furnace Co., 259 S.C. 346, 358, 191 S.E.2d 774, 779 (1972). "When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict in favor of the moving party is proper." Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 476-77, 514 S.E.2d 126, 130 (1999); accord Sims, at 714, 541 S.E.2d at 860; R & G Constr., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg'l. Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424, 540 S.E.2d 113 (Ct.App.2000). "The issue must be submitted to the jury whenever there is material evidence tending to establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror." Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 461, 494 S.E.2d 835, 841 (Ct. App.1997). However, if the evidence taken as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, the case must be submitted to the jury. Quesinberry v. Rouppasong, 331 S.C. 589, 594, 503 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1998); Getsinger v. Midlands Orthopaedic Profit Sharing Plan, 327 S.C. 424, 426, 489 S.E.2d 223, 223 (Ct.App.1997); see also Heyward v. Christmas, 352 S.C. 298, 573 S.E.2d 845 (Ct.App.2002) (if the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the court may not grant a directed verdict).

"When considering directed verdict motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or evidence." Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C 303, 308, 566 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2002); accord Pond Place Partners v. Poole, 351 S.C. 1, 15, 567 S.E.2d 881, 888 (Ct.App.2002); Boddie-Noell Props., Inc. v. 42 Magnolia P'ship, 344 S.C. 474, 482, 544 S.E.2d 279, 283 (Ct.App. 2000), aff'd as modified by 352 S.C. 437, 574 S.E.2d 726 (2002). "The issue must be submitted to the jury whenever there is material evidence tending to establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror." Huffines, at 188, 617 S.E.2d at 129-30 (citing Hanahan v. Simpson, 326 S.C. 140, 149, 485 S.E.2d 903, 908 (1997)). However, this rule does not authorize the submission to the jury of speculative, theoretical, or hypothetical views. Small v. Pioneer Mach., Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 461, 494 S.E.2d 835, 842 (Ct.App.1997). Our courts have recognized that when only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the evidence, the question becomes one of law for the court to determine. Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 211 S.C. 167, 173, 44 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1947); Small, 329 S.C. at 461, 494 S.E.2d at 841-42. "A corollary of this rule is that verdicts may not be permitted to rest upon surmise, conjecture or speculation." Hanahan, 326 S.C. at 149, 485 S.E.2d at 908; Small, 329 S.C. at 461, 494 S.E.2d at 841-42. This does not mean the trial court should ignore facts unfavorable to the opposing party. Long v. Norris & Assocs., Ltd., 342 S.C. 561, 568, 538 S.E.2d 5, 9 (Ct.App.2000); Love v. Gamble, 316 S.C. 203, 208, 448 S.E.2d 876, 879 (Ct.App.1994). In deciding whether to grant or deny a directed verdict motion, the court is concerned only with the existence or nonexistence of evidence. Pond Place Partners, Inc., 351 S.C. at 15, 567 S.E.2d at 888.

An appellate court will reverse only where there is no evidence to support the trial judge's ruling, or where the ruling was controlled by an error of law. Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Public Safety, 362 S.C. 377, 382-83, 608 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2005); Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 386, 520 S.E.2d 142, 148 (1999); Abu-Shawareb v. S.C. State Univ., 364 S.C. 358, 613 S.E.2d 757 (Ct.App.2005); Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 300, 536 S.E.2d 408, 418 (Ct.App.2000). Essentially, this court must resolve whether it would be reasonably conceivable to have a verdict for a party opposing the motion under the facts as liberally construed in the opposing party's favor. Harvey, 350 S.C. at 309, 566 S.E.2d at 532; Hanahan, 326 S.C. at 149, 485 S.E.2d at 908.

LAW/ANALYSIS

EPM argues the trial judge erred in granting Outparcel's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the mutual release granted by EPM and JDL to one another had the effect of releasing Outparcel as well. EPM avers that viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the law of contract construction does not allow for finding that the Settlement Agreement provides for Outparcel's release from EPM's third-party claim. We agree.

A. The Extant Precedent

1. Settlement Agreements

The term "release" has been defined as the "relinquishment, concession, or giving up of a right, claim, or privilege, by the person in whom it exists or to whom it accrues, to the person against whom it might have been demanded or enforced." 76 C.J.S. Release § 2 (1994). A release is an agreement providing that a duty owed to the maker of the release is discharged immediately. Id.; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1315-16 (6th ed. 1990) (a release is the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced). Whether a particular agreement constitutes a release is to be determined from the intent of the parties. Id.

Under the common law, the release of one of multiple joint tortfeasors, unavoidably resulted in the release of all. Bartholomew v. McCartha, 255 S.C. 489, 179 S.E.2d 912 (1971). In response to the obvious quandaries caused by this rule, South Carolina jurisprudence adopted documents in lieu of a general release: (1) a covenant not to sue; and (2) a covenant not to execute. A covenant not to sue was recognized and approved in Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967). A covenant not to execute received the imprimatur and approbation of our supreme court in Poston by Poston v. Barnes, 294 S.C. 261, 363 S.E.2d 888 (1987).

In Ackerman v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 318 S.C. 137, 456 S.E.2d 408 (Ct.App.1995), this court discussed the genesis of the covenant not to sue:

At common law, a valid release of one joint tort-feasor was usually a release of all the joint wrongdoers and was a bar to a suit against any of them for the same wrong. At the base of this rule was the theory that there could be but one compensation for the joint wrong. If the injured party was paid by one of the...