Echavarria v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 17349.

• Decision Date: 13 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 17349.,17349.
• Citation: 880 A.2d 882,275 Conn. 408
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Sergio ECHAVARRIA et al. v. NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

880 A.2d 882

275 Conn. 408

Sergio ECHAVARRIA et al. v. NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 17349.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 16, 2005.

Decided September 13, 2005.

Todd W. Whitford, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Michael P. Regan, Danbury, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

NORCOTT, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the certificate of mailing log procedure utilized by the defendant, the National Grange Mutual Insurance Company, to send a notice of cancellation of automobile insurance for the nonpayment of a premium to the plaintiffs, Sergio Echavarria and Altagracia¹ Echavarria, satisfies General Statutes § 38a-343(a).² The defendant appeals³ from the judgment of the trial court declaring that it had failed to prove that the notice of cancellation was sent, pursuant to § 38a-343(a), because its mailing procedure was inadequate to show the chain of custody of the letter and it had failed to supplement a copy of the certificate of mailing with testimonial evidence that the notice was actually handed over to the post office. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant is an insurance company located in Keene, New Hampshire, which writes insurance policies in Connecticut with the assistance of independent brokers. On June 28, 2000, Sergio Echavarria applied to the defendant for automobile insurance coverage for the plaintiffs for the period of June 29, 2000, to June 29, 2001, through their broker, Alliance Insurance Agency, LLC (Alliance). On the basis of the information set forth in the application, the broker initially generated a premium quote of $1685, which the plaintiffs paid to the defendant. The defendant subsequently refunded $17 to the plaintiffs after it determined that the actual price of the policy was only $1668.

The defendant thereafter contacted a vendor, DataRep Associates, to investigate further the plaintiffs' application because the defendant realized that there was a discrepancy between the number of vehicles and drivers listed thereon. A representative of the vendor contacted the insureds directly and determined that one of the vehicles listed on the plaintiffs' application as driven for pleasure actually was being used for the purpose of commuting to work. This resulted in an adjustment to the premium of $36, which increased the total premium on the plaintiffs' policy to $1704. The defendant sent the plaintiffs a revised declarations page notifying them of the adjustment via mail on September 17, 2000, followed by a bill requesting payment on October 9, 2000. The plaintiffs failed to pay the remaining $36 of the premium by the October 29, 2000 deadline, and the defendant charged them a late fee of $10. Notice of the late fee was accompanied by a notice of cancellation letter, sent via mail evidenced by a certificate of mailing on November 9, 2000. The notice of cancellation warned the plaintiffs that their policy would be canceled on November 27, 2000, if they failed to pay by that date. The plaintiffs made no further payments and the defendant thereafter returned the prorated balance of their premium to them by sending it to Alliance, their broker.⁴ Subsequently, on June 18, 2001, Altagracia Echavarria was involved in a motor vehicle accident for which she sought coverage from the defendant. The defendant denied her coverage request on the basis that the plaintiffs' insurance had been canceled many months earlier for failure to pay the premium.

The defendant uses a certificate of mailing when it sends notices of cancellation to insureds located within the state of Connecticut. Its mailroom routinely generates a log page listing all of the cancellation notices received from the production area that are supposed to be mailed out. Each listing is assigned a log number, which also appears above the insured's name and address, along with the date of mailing on the cancellation notice itself. These notices are then placed into double window envelopes through which the log numbers are clearly visible. The stuffed envelopes are thereafter brought to a post office where a postal worker checks them against the log page. After the postal worker verifies that all of the envelopes being deposited match the ones listed on the log page and that the appropriate postage has been paid, the worker places a bull's-eye postmark stamp on the log page to indicate that the mail listed thereon was mailed on that particular date, and returns the log page to the defendant. The name Sergio Echavarria is listed on the log page that was stamped November 9, 2000, the date on which the notice of cancellation was sent by the defendant to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs subsequently brought this action to determine the respective rights of the parties pursuant to the policy of insurance,⁵ and the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. The trial court noted the defendant's failure to provide firsthand testimony verifying that all of the cancellation notices listed actually had been delivered to the post office, and concluded that it could not determine whether the plaintiffs' notice actually had been delivered based upon the evidence that had been presented. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that its certificate of mailing log procedure satisfied the requirements of § 38a-343(a) because: (1) the statute expressly permits the use of certificates of mailing as proof of mailing for insurance cancellation notices; (2) the statute does not require that the plaintiffs receive actual notice; and (3) there is no evidence that the plaintiffs failed to receive the notice of cancellation sent by the defendant on November 9, 2000. The plaintiffs contend, in response, that: (1) the defendant failed to show that its log procedure qualified as a "certificate of mailing" within the meaning of § 38a-343(a); and (2) the trial court's conclusion that the defendant failed to prove that the notice of cancellation was placed in the custody of the post office is supported by the record. Additionally, as an alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the trial court, the plaintiffs contend that: (1) § 38a-343(a) requires actual notice of cancellation; and (2) there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the plaintiffs never actually received the notice of cancellation. We agree with the defendant.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review. "The defendant's claim raises a question of statutory interpretation, over which our review is plenary. . . . Relevant legislation and precedent guide the process of statutory interpretation. [General Statutes § 1-2z] provides that, `[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.'" (Citation omitted.) State v. Boyd, 272 Conn. 72, 76, 861 A.2d 1155 (2004).

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that its certificate of mailing log procedure failed to satisfy § 38a-343(a) because the statute specifies certificates of mailing as one of the four acceptable means of providing insureds with notice of cancellation, and it does not provide for the additional requirement of witness testimony about the chain of custody of the notice that was imposed by the trial court in the present case. We agree.

Section 38a-343(a) expressly provides that "[n]o notice of cancellation of a policy. . . may be effective unless sent, by registered or certified mail or by mail evidenced by a certificate of mailing. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The plain language of § 38a-343(a) clearly and unambiguously indicates that sending a notice of cancellation by mail evidenced by a certificate of mailing satisfies the obligation imposed by the statute. Moreover, there is no reference in the statute to any additional evidentiary requirement beyond the certificate itself as proof of mailing or any indication that the determination of the adequacy of any of the methods listed might be reserved to the judgment of the trial court. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 119, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003) ("[w]e are not permitted to supply statutory language that the legislature may have chosen to omit" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Moreover, as the defendant points out, imposing a requirement of testimony from a depositing witness eliminates the very need for a certificate of mailing that, by definition, serves as proof that the United States Postal Service received and sent a particular piece of mail.⁶ "[I]t is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions. . . . [I]n construing statutes, we presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering, Inc., 265 Conn. 525, 536-37, 829 A.2d 818 (2003). Moreover, in the present case, the plaintiffs' counsel conceded at trial that "in fact, it appears that the [defendant] sent the notice of cancellation to [Sergio] Echavarria. The question as to whether or not that—the certification and the page that they presented is adequate to satisfy the requirements of the statute, is up to the trier of fact to find." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the trial court's concern about the lack of testimony as to whether the post office ever received custody of the notice is unfounded.

Indeed, the trial court concluded that the defendant's log...