Echelon Homes, LLC v. Carter Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 125994,Docket No. 125995.
• Parties: ECHELON HOMES, L.L.C., Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellee, v. CARTER LUMBER COMPANY, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

694 N.W.2d 544

472 Mich. 192

ECHELON HOMES, L.L.C., Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellee, v. CARTER LUMBER COMPANY, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 125994, 125995.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 12, 2005.

Kickham Hanley P.C. (by Timothy O. McMahon), Royal Oak, MI, for the plaintiff.

Russell & Stoychoff, P.C. (by Paul M. Stoychoff), Troy, MI, for the defendant.

Warner Norcross & Judd L.L.P. (by Jeffrey O. Birkhold and Matthew T. Nelson), Grand Rapids, MI, for amicus curiae Michigan Bankers Association.

WEAVER, J.

MCL 600.2919a provides that a person who buys, receives, or aids in concealing stolen, embezzled, or converted property can be held liable for treble damages if he knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted. The sole issue before this Court is whether constructive knowledge that property is stolen, embezzled, or converted is sufficient to impose liability under MCL 600.2919a. We hold that under the plain language of the statute, constructive knowledge is not sufficient to impose liability under MCL 600.2919a.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that the statute requires exactly what it says — that the person knew that the property had been stolen, embezzled, or converted.

We remand this case to the trial court for a hearing on whether there is a material issue of fact regarding whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that defendant knew the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Echelon Homes, L.L.C., employed Carmella Wood as its bookkeeper and office manager from 1997 to 2000. During her employment, Wood engaged in fraudulent schemes against Echelon, including, but not limited to, forging company checks to herself, opening company credit cards in her name, and opening lines of credit to herself in Echelon's name. During this time, Wood opened an unauthorized account with defendant Carter Lumber Company and purchased approximately $87,000 in materials used to remodel her home and her brother's home. Echelon did not discover Wood's fraudulent activity until June 2000, when it learned that Wood had embezzled over $500,000. When Wood's embezzlement was discovered, Echelon had an outstanding invoice from Carter for approximately $27,000.

Carter had extended a line of credit to Wood under Echelon's company name. Wood forged the credit application to initially obtain the account. Subsequently, Carter continued to increase the line of credit to Wood, to the point that Echelon became one of its largest credit customers. Carter never verified that Echelon had in fact authorized the credit account, nor did it ever verify that Wood had the authority to receive credit increases. Carter delivered goods to Wood's relatives and allowed her relatives to pick up goods without verifying that they were authorized by Echelon. Carter signed lien waivers for goods purportedly delivered to Echelon for specific jobs when Carter knew it had never delivered goods for those jobs. Wood has testified that she was not working with Carter, or any of Carter's agents, and that she was "scamming" Carter as well.

Echelon filed suit against Carter under various theories, including MCL 600.2919a, aiding and abetting conversion. Carter filed a counterclaim against Echelon for the $27,000 outstanding invoice. The trial court granted both parties' motions for summary disposition. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal of Carter's claims against Echelon, but reversed the summary dismissal of two of Echelon's claims against Carter. Echelon Homes, L.L.C. v. Carter Lumber Co., 261 Mich.App. 424, 683 N.W.2d 171 (2004).

Carter filed an application for leave to appeal with this Court. This Court scheduled oral argument on the application for leave to appeal, limited to whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that constructive knowledge was sufficient to impose liability under MCL 600.2919a. Echelon Homes, L.L.C. v. Carter Lumber Co., 471 Mich. 916, 688 N.W.2d 510 (2004).

ANALYSIS

The issue before us is whether constructive knowledge is sufficient to impose liability under MCL 600.2919a, which requires that a person "knew" that property was stolen, embezzled, or converted in order to be held liable for aiding and abetting.

This is a question of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo. Stozicki v. Allied Paper Co., Inc., 464 Mich. 257, 263, 627 N.W.2d 293 (2001). In reviewing questions of statutory construction, our purpose is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 329-330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). "We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed — no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written." Id. at 330, 603 N.W.2d 250. "We must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning...." Id. The plain and ordinary meaning of words can be ascertained by looking at dictionary definitions. Koontz v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002).

A

MCL 600.2919a states:

A person damaged as a result of another person's buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted property when the person buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees. [Emphasis added.]

A plain reading of this statute indicates that a person must know that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted in order to be held liable. That the person "should have known" is not sufficient to impose liability under the statute.

The term "know" does not encompass constructive knowledge, that one "should have known." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed) defines "knowledge" as "[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact." "Constructive knowledge," on the other hand, is defined as "[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person." Id.

Constructive knowledge is a distinct concept from knowledge, and cannot replace the requirement of knowledge in a statute. The Legislature uses the terms "knew" and "should have known" to indicate a difference between knowledge and constructive knowledge.¹ We found thirty-eight statutes that refer to constructive knowledge, using a variation of the phrase "knew or should have known." See MCL 205.14(2)(d) (a tobacco seller or distributor can be held liable for illegally selling tobacco products if it "knew or should have known that the manufacturer intended the tobacco product to be sold or distributed" outside the prescribed area); MCL 691.1417(3)(c) (to receive compensation for property damage or physical injury from a governmental agency the claimant must show that "[t]e governmental agency knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, about the defect"); MCL 565.831(4) (a person who provides a statement used in an application for registration or property report is liable only for false statements and omissions in his statement and only "if it is proved he knew or reasonably should have known of the existence of the true facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist"); MCL 445.1902(b)(ii)(B) (misappropriation of a trade secret includes one who disclosed or used a trade secret of another when, at the time of disclosure or use, the person "knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret was derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it").

Relying on People v. Tantenella, 212 Mich. 614, 180 N.W. 474 (1920), Echelon argues that this Court has historically used constructive knowledge to impose liability under a criminal aiding and abetting statute.

In Tantenella, the defendant was charged with receiving a stolen car. The defendant claimed that he did not know that the car was stolen. However, the Court determined that the defendant had sufficient guilty knowledge to be guilty of the crime. Id. at 620, 180 N.W. 474. The Tantenella Court stated, "Guilty knowledge means not only actual knowledge, but constructive knowledge, through notice of facts and circumstances from which guilty knowledge may fairly be inferred." Id. at 621, 180 N.W. 474. The Court went on to list facts that implied the guilty knowledge of the defendant: receiving possession of the car hours after it had been stolen, driving to Chicago with the suspected thief, changing the motor number and license number, claiming ownership, producing a fraudulent bill of sale, and giving authorities conflicting names. Id. All these facts were used by the Court to determine that the defendant was guilty of receiving stolen property.

Although the Tantenella Court characterized its analysis of these facts as examining the defendant's constructive knowledge, the Court was, in fact, determining that the defendant had knowledge, proven by circumstantial evidence, that the car was stolen. This is shown by the Court's extensive analysis of the facts that led it to believe that the defendant had knowledge. The Tantenella Court used the term "constructive knowledge" synonymously with knowledge proven through circumstantial evidence. Thus, the Court's use of the term "constructive knowledge" is a misnomer; what the Court really meant was knowledge proven by circumstantial evidence.

The Tantenella Court's holding regarding "constructive knowledge" has correctly been interpreted by subsequent courts to mean actual knowledge proven by...