Echlin v. LeCureux

Decision Date31 July 1992
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 90-CV-71694-DT.
Citation800 F. Supp. 515
PartiesRaymond Joseph ECHLIN, Petitioner, v. Robert LECUREUX, Respondent. Ronald Richard BISHOP, Petitioner, v. Henry GRAYSON, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Carl Ziemba, Detroit, Mich., for Echlin.

Frederick D. Doherty, Jr. Lansing, Mich., for Bishop.

K. Davison Hunter, Lansing, Mich., for respondents.

OPINION AND ORDER

COHN, District Judge.

Petitioners Raymond Joseph Echlin and Ronald Richard Bishop, who are presently confined in Michigan state correctional facilities, have filed petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 1982, petitioners and one other codefendant were convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and associated criminal acts.

Petitioners allege that, during trial, they were deprived of their rights to an impartial jury and to equal protection of the law under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. More specifically, petitioners, who are white, complain that the prosecution exercised nineteen (19) of twenty-one (21) peremptory challenges against white venire-persons. Additionally, petitioners allege that their rights to due process, a fair trial, and an impartial jury were violated when the jury venire was exposed to prejudicial newspaper articles about them. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant writs of habeas corpus unless the State retries petitioners.

I. State Court Procedural History

Petitioners were convicted by a jury in Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit, Michigan. Their convictions arose from two shootings directed at George Lester Stewart, a black man. One shooting occurred at the Sky Club Bar; the other shooting occurred at Stewart's home where he lived with a white woman and her child. The Wayne County assistant prosecutor who prosecuted the case claimed at trial that petitioners were somehow affiliated with the Klu Klux Klan (KKK).

The trial court sentenced petitioners to imprisonment as follows: mandatory life without parole for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder;1 six (6) years and eight (8) months to ten (10) years for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder; and twenty-five (25) to forty (40) years for assault with intent to commit murder. Petitioners also received a consecutive term of two (2) years for their felony firearm convictions.

In an unreported decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals consolidated petitioners' direct appeals and affirmed the convictions. People v. Echlin, No. 81885, People v. Bishop, No. 82407 (July 3, 1986). The Michigan Supreme Court in an unreported decision vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) and Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). People v. Echlin, No. 79109, People v. Bishop, No. 79119 (February 24, 1987). The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on whether petitioners could establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the prosecution in its use of peremptory strikes to eliminate white jurors. People v. Echlin, No. 98791, People v. Bishop, No. 98789 (on remand) (June 17, 1987).

The trial court held oral arguments and, on August 12, 1988, issued a decision. The trial court found, in part, that the venire and the jury reflected a cross section of the population of the City of Detroit. See Trial Court's Findings and Determinations Pursuant to Court of Appeals Order of Remand (Trial Court's Findings) at 2. The trial court concluded that petitioners had been unable to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude white jurors. See id. at 5.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge and once again affirmed the convictions in an unreported decision. People v. Echlin, No. 98791, People v. Bishop, No. 98789 (after remand) (February 15, 1989). The Michigan Supreme Court in a standard order denied petitioner's requests for further review. People v. Echlin, No. 86179, People v. Bishop, No. 85607 (January 9, 1990).

On June 15, 1990, and June 25, 1991, petitioners filed their respective applications for habeas relief in this Court. State court remedies concerning the issues raised in the habeas petitions have been exhausted. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971).

II. Federal Court Procedural History

This Court held oral arguments in petitioner Echlin's case on July 3, 1991. The Court concluded that Echlin had established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson. See Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 6, 1991 (Appendix A). Accordingly, on August 6, 1991, the Court began an evidentiary hearing to provide the State with an opportunity to establish neutral reasons for the assistant prosecutor's peremptory challenges against the white venirepersons listed in the August 6, 1991, memorandum opinion and order.

Subsequently, the Court consolidated petitioners' cases and appointed counsel to represent Bishop. The Court resumed the evidentiary hearing on February 19, 20, and 24, 1992, and on April 8 and 9, 1992. Following the evidentiary hearing, respondents moved to dismiss the petitions for lack of standing. The Court determined that petitioners have standing under Batson and denied the motion to dismiss. See Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 10, 1992 (Appendix B). The case is now ready for final disposition.

III. Use of Peremptory Challenges

Petitioners' first claim is that they were deprived of their federal constitutional rights when the assistant prosecutor exercised nineteen (19) of twenty-one (21) peremptory challenges against white venirepersons. Petitioners rely on their rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

A. Sixth Amendment Claim

To support their first claim, petitioners rely on their right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that "the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement for jury composition does not govern the use of peremptory challenges." United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1178 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 110 S.Ct. 803, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990)). Holland did not establish a new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1074-75, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and therefore may be applied retroactively. Bell v. Baker, 954 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.1992). Accordingly, petitioners' claim under the Sixth Amendment fails.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim2

Petitioners also rely on their right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to support their Batson claim.3 "The Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race...." Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719.

In Batson, the Supreme Court

outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection Clause.... First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.

Hernandez v. New York, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1865-1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723).

1. Review of State Court Findings

The trial court took the first step in analyzing petitioners' claim, finding that they had not made a prima facie showing of race discrimination under Batson. Ordinarily a reviewing court will accord great deference to state court findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Hernandez v. New York, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1869; Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21. The Court declines to do so here for the following reasons.

First, there is no support in the record for the conclusions of the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals regarding the racial mix of the City of Detroit. The trial court relied on the representations of the parties and found that the venire and the jury reflected a cross section of the population of the City of Detroit. See Trial Court's Findings at 2. The Court of Appeals on remand likewise found that, if seventy (70%) to eighty (80%) percent of jury venires in the City of Detroit were black, the impaneled jury apparently mirrored the racial composition of the venire. The Court of Appeals also concluded that three (3) white jurors in an initial panel of fourteen (14) jurors was not disproportionate to the racial composition of the venire. See People v. Echlin, No. 98791, People v. Bishop, No. 98789 (on remand) (June 17, 1987).

As this Court has previously noted,4 however: (1) the racial mix of the City of Detroit in 1982 was approximately sixty-three percent (63%) black and thirty-seven percent (37%) white;5 (2) the racial composition of the jury as impaneled consisted of eleven (11) blacks and three (3) whites, or seventy-eight and one-half percent (78.5%) blacks and twenty-one and one-half percent (21.5%) whites;6 and (3) the assistant prosecutor exercised nineteen (19) or ninety percent (90%) of his challenges against whites and two (2) or ten percent (10%) of his challenges against blacks.

The percentage of whites in the City of Detroit in 1982 was greater than the state courts recognized. The state courts therefore...

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