Echols v. Select Beverages, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 August 1998 |
| Docket Number | NO. IP 97-0211-C-Y/S.,IP 97-0211-C-Y/S. |
| Citation | 64 F.Supp.2d 807 |
| Parties | Willie ECHOLS, Plaintiff, v. SELECT BEVERAGES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Denise Larue, Haskin Lauter Cohen & Larue, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.
James D. Witchger, Rocap Witchger & Threlkeld, Indianapolis, IN, Robert L. Jackson, III, Seyfarth Shaw Fairweather & Geraldso, Chicago, IL, for defendant.
ENTRY
On February 10, 1997, plaintiff Willie Echols ("Echols") filed his complaint against defendant Select Beverages, Inc., ("Select"), alleging employment discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (the Civil Rights Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII Claim), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (the Age Discrimination in Employment Act) and 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, "ERISA").1 Select filed a motion for summary judgment and a brief in support on November 17, 1997. Echols filed a brief in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment on January 12, 1998. Select filed a reply brief on January 30, 1998. Additionally, Echols filed a request for oral argument on defendants' motion for summary judgment on June 24, 1998.
The court having considered all the evidence, including affidavits, depositions and other supporting documentation, now enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Pursuant to Trial Rule 56(c), a party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ. P.56(c). A fact is material if it is outcome determinative. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is genuine where the evidence "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id.
In determining whether a genuine issue exists, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. National Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc. v. Superior Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1996). While the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the "absence of evidence on an essential element of the non-moving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the non-moving party may not simply rest on the pleadings, but "must affirmatively demonstrate by specific factual allegations that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial." Id. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an issue to which he has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ripberger v. Western Ohio Pizza, Inc., 908 F.Supp. 614, 617 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). "If, however, doubts remain as to the existence of a material fact, then those doubts should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party and summary judgment denied." Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989). Palucki v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir.1989).
In the context of employment discrimination cases, the court applies the summary judgment standard with added rigor "where intent and credibility are crucial issues," Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir.1995), keeping in mind, of course, that the non-moving party is not merely pointing to self-serving allegations with no evidentiary support. Cliff v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir.1994).
1. Echols, an African-American, worked as a merchandiser for Select from 1990 until he was terminated on March 23, 1996. (Complaint ¶¶ 7, 18).
2. Echols was assigned to the "Set Group" as a merchandiser, along with his Caucasian counterpart Steve Capes ("Capes"). Both Capes and Echols were
supervised by a Select regional manager, Bill Murray ("Murray"), who is also a Caucasian. (Complaint ¶ 9).
3. On Monday March 18, 1996, Echols and Capes were assigned to set up a display rack at a Kroger store in Franklin, Indiana. Upon completing that job, they were to proceed back to Indianapolis to set up a 2-liter bottle display in a McClure oil station. ("McClure") (Complaint ¶ 15; Echols Deposition, at 92-93, 99-100). The McClure job was not a mandatory assignment that day; it could have been completed at any time. (Echols Deposition, at 100-01).
4. Although there are no set hours and no set scheduling requirements, merchandisers are generally expected to work between 8-10 hours a day. (Echols Deposition, at 54-55; Defendant's Answer to First Interrogatories ¶ 17).
5. Capes was the lead merchandiser and would direct what jobs would be done first and how they would be done. He was the person everyone went to to find out what was going on and what needed to be done. He always set the schedule for the day and Echols would follow Capes' lead. (Echols Deposition, at 59-62, 99).
6. After the Kroger job Capes indicated to Echols that his shoulder hurt due to his recent surgery and that he was going home. He also told Echols to go home and not to worry about the McClure job; that it could get done at a later time. (Echols Deposition, at 92-93). Then they left in their respective company vehicles. (Echols Deposition, at 90-93).
7. On Wednesday, March 20, 1996, Murray questioned both Capes and Echols individually about the McClure site. First Echols told Murray that they had gone to the McClure site and set up the requested display. Capes told Murray that Echols had not gone to the McClure site, but that he had.2 Murray then questioned both of them at the same time. Echols admitted that he lied about going to the McClure site. Capes continued to claim that he went to the McClure job site. Echols admitted that lying was sufficient reason to justify his termination. Murray suspended Capes and Echols pending an investigation. (Murray Deposition, at 92).3
8. Murray asked for Echols' key to the company truck and requested that Capes drive Echols home. (Echols Deposition, at 119). Murray did not request Capes to turn over his keys. (Murray Deposition, at 94).
9. Murray, along with another Select representative, went to McClure to verify that Capes had spoke with a McClure employee while visiting the store on that Monday. (Murray Deposition, at 97-104; See also Supra fn. 2) 10. Murray spoke with two McClure employees, Bass and Phillips, who were working on that Monday in question. (Murray Deposition, at 97-104). Both of these employees stated that no one from Select had been in the store that day. (Bass Deposition, at 17-20, Phillips Deposition, at 35). Upon learning that no one from Select had been to the McClure store on that day, Murray responded with the statement "I got him." (Bass Deposition, at 31).
11. After 23 years of service to Select, (Echols Deposition, at 8), Echols, an African-American, was terminated. (Murray Deposition, at 80-81). Capes, a Caucasian, was not disciplined for his role in this incident. (Murray Deposition, at 105-106). Echols was replaced by a Caucasian employee, Steve Robertson. (Murray Deposition, at 113).
12. Echols received only a 2.5% merit increase in his recent evaluation despite "fully satisfactory" remarks in Murray's evaluation. (plaintiffs materials, exh. 4). Murray delayed Echols' evaluation for 7 months because he was too busy and he had not been there long enough to be sufficiently familiar with Echols' performance. (Murray Deposition, at 52-53; Letter to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Dated June 27, 1996). Echols normally received his performance evaluation in May, the anniversary of his start date. (Murray Deposition, at 50; Echols Deposition, at 79-80). However, Murray delayed this evaluation until December. Additionally, Murray made Echols' merit increase of 2.5% retroactive for 90 days only, not back to May when he was scheduled to have his evaluation. (Murray Deposition, at 52-53). Murray felt that this delay from May to December was "unfair" to Echols. (Murray Deposition, at 61).
13. Murray had been too busy and was not familiar enough with Capes' performance as well. However, instead of continuing to delay Capes' evaluation Murray had another manager, Andy Downtown, perform Capes' evaluation. (Murray Deposition, at 68). This was the "fair" thing to do for the employee. (Murray Deposition pp.68-69). Capes was given a 3% merit increase retroactive to the date when his evaluation should have taken place. (Murray Deposition, at 66-71).
14. Echols' 2.5% increase was based on Murray evaluating him at the level of "fully satisfactory," which according to Murray was the equivalent to average. Murray referred to "satisfactory" as below average. (Murray Deposition, at 57-58). Capes received his 3% merit increase based on a "fully satisfactory" rating despite being on a medical leave of absence for a period of time. (Murray Deposition, at 70-71).
15. Echols' evaluation reflected his leadership while Capes was out on disability: (Murray Deposition, at 54). When Capes was there, he was the lead merchandiser, not Echols. (Murray Deposition, at 71).
Any other facts not cited above may be addressed and cited below.
There are two methods utilized to prove discrimination under Title VII: 1) by direct evidence; or 2) by the indirect burden shifting method articulated in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Kralman v. Illinois Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 23 F.3d 150 (7th Cir.1994). Since Echols has articulated his...
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