Echols v. Yukon Telephone Co., Inc., 91-35953
Decision Date | 12 August 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 91-35953,91-35953 |
Citation | 972 F.2d 1338 |
Parties | NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. William L. ECHOLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YUKON TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC.; the National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc.; the Board of Directors of the National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc., individually and as members, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before BRUNETTI, RYMER and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
William L. Echols appeals pro se the Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of his action against Yukon Telephone Company (Yukon), the National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc. (NECA), and the NECA Board of Directors (Board). Echols claimed below that he was wrongfully terminated and falsely arrested. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred by finding that (1) he did not state a claim under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 105, 106, and 108, the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, or the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; (2) it lacked diversity jurisdiction to consider state law claims; and (3) the Board did not have the capacity to be sued. Echols also contends that the district court should have considered his claims under federal common law, and that it violated his constitutional rights by refusing to order discovery before dismissing the action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim. Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam), amended, 962 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.1992). We must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Dismissal is appropriate only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Id.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, which limits injunctive interference with labor union activities, does not apply to Echols's case. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Echols's first, second, and third causes of action.
Echols did not state an antitrust claim. See Les Shockley Racing, Inc. v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 884 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir.1989) ( ); Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.1988) ( ). Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Echols's fourth cause of action.
In Echols's complaint he alleged that he was a resident of Alaska, Yukon's principal place of business was in Alaska, NECA's principal place of business was in New Jersey, and the Board chairman's residence and principal place of business were in Arizona. We therefore affirm the district court's finding that it lacked diversity jurisdiction to consider any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) ( ).
We also affirm the district court's finding that the Board did not have the capacity to be sued. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b); Alaska Stat. § 10.06.010(2) ( ).
Because Echols did not raise a claim under federal common law below, the district court properly did not consider any such claim. See Jovanovich v. United States, 813 F.2d 1035, 1037-38 (9th Cir.1987) (...
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