Echon v. Sackett, Civil Action No. 14-cv-03420-PAB-NYW

Decision Date20 September 2017
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 14-cv-03420-PAB-NYW
PartiesESMERALDO VILLANUEVA ECHON, JR., MARIBEL ECHON, and JUSTIN ECHON, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAM SACKETT, and LEONIDA SACKETT, Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado

ESMERALDO VILLANUEVA ECHON, JR., MARIBEL ECHON, and JUSTIN ECHON, Plaintiffs,
v.
WILLIAM SACKETT, and LEONIDA SACKETT, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14-cv-03420-PAB-NYW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

September 20, 2017


RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang

This civil action comes before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [#106, filed May 1, 2017]. The Motion was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Amended Order Referring Case dated August 28, 2015 [#46], and the memorandum dated May 2, 2017 [#107]. For the reasons set forth herein, this court respectfully RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Esmeraldo Villanueva Echon, Jr., Maribel Echon, and Justin Echon (collectively, "Plaintiffs") assert the following claims against Defendants William Sackett ("Mr. Sackett") and Leonida Sackett ("Ms. Sackett")1 (collectively "Defendants" or "the Sacketts"): (1) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); (2) violation of the Colorado Minimum

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Wage of Workers; (3) violation of the Colorado Wage Claim Act; (4) Breach of Contract; (5) Breach of Contract—Third Party Beneficiary Claim; and (6) Unjust Enrichment. [#1]. Additionally, Esmeraldo Echon, Jr. ("Esmeraldo Echon")2 and Justin Echon assert a claim against the Sacketts for violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, who operate several businesses and manage a farm in Rocky Ford, Colorado, held them without pay in "debt bondage, requiring them to work on their crops and in their market, clean and maintain their rental properties, and perform various other jobs from 2011-2014." [#1 at ¶ 2]. The Sacketts, who are proceeding pro se, filed an Answer on March 18, 2015. [#11].

On April 23, 2015, the undersigned presided over a Scheduling Conference, [#16], and subsequently entered a Scheduling Order. [#17]. As discussed in previous orders, discovery in this action has been wrought with difficulties, including multiple discovery motions and conferences that resulted in attendant delays and orders compelling discovery and awarding fees. See, e.g., [#73, #90]. The final version of the Scheduling Order set April 22, 2016 as the deadline to complete discovery, and May 20, 2016 as the deadline by which to file dispositive motions. See [#55]. The Parties then embarked on discovery.

As early as August 2015, Plaintiffs alerted the court that Defendants were not responding to any discovery requests in a substantive fashion. [#23, #27]. In response, Defendants insisted, "I have given them all that I have, any employment record that he keeps wanting does not exist. There was not any employment [sic] I did not employ any of them at any time." [#31 at 2]. Defendants also asserted that they did not have employees, and had not had any employees since approximately 2012. [Id. at 3]. On August 19, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their first Motion to Compel

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Discovery. [#32]. The court extended the deadline for Defendants to respond to no later than September 14, 2015, and reminded Defendants that they were required to follow the same rules of procedure that bind represented parties. See [#39]. On September 11, 2015, Defendants filed a document entitled, "Discovery," which appeared to be additional responses to some or all of Plaintiffs' Requests for Production. Compare [#32-2] with [#50]. At a hearing held October 1, 2017, this court granted the first Motion to Compel Discovery and ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories and Requests for Production no later than October 22, 2015. See [#52]. Defendants did not file an objection to this Order to the presiding judge, the Honorable Philip A. Brimmer.

On November 30, 2015, this court held a telephonic discovery conference to discuss the status of discovery responses. See [#59]. The court again advised Defendants of their duties to follow applicable rules regarding discovery, and that failure to do so could result in sanctions, including but not limited to default judgment. See [id.]. On December 4, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a second Motion to Compel Discovery, [#60], to which Defendants filed no response. By Order dated January 27, 2016, this court granted the second Motion to Compel Discovery in part, ordering Plaintiffs to respond to Interrogatory Nos. 1 (as limited) - 5, 7-16 and Requests for Production No. 2-4, 6, 8, 10, and 11, no later than February 9, 2016. See [#62]. Counsel for Plaintiffs took the depositions of Mr. Sackett and Mrs. Sackett while the Second Motion to Compel Discovery was pending. See [#104-21, #104-22].

Plaintiffs then filed a third Motion to Compel and for Sanctions on February 23, 2016. [#64]. On March 7, 2016, Defendants filed a response, docketed as a letter. See [#68]. On May 2, 2016, this court compelled Defendants to respond to the outstanding Interrogatories in narrative form. See [#73 at 7]. This court also granted sanctions in the amount of 50 percent of

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the reasonable expenses associated with the third Motion to Compel, which resulted in an Order awarding $1,552.50. [Id.; #90].

The Parties' difficulties with respect to discovery culminated with Plaintiffs' fourth Motion to Compel Discovery, filed July 19, 2016, which sought a variety of sanctions including default judgment against Defendants, a request that the court designate certain matters and facts as established for the purpose of this action, and a request that the court preclude Defendants from introducing certain matters and facts at a later time in this litigation. See [#83]. On January 23, 2017, the undersigned recommended that the Motion be granted as to the court designating certain facts as established and precluding Defendants from introducing certain facts (to be determined in the context of summary judgment), and denied as to the request for default judgment. See [#91]. This court also recommended that the court set a new deadline for Plaintiffs to file a motion for summary judgment. [Id.] On February 24, 2017, Judge Brimmer accepted the recommendation and ordered Plaintiffs to file a motion for summary judgment on or before April 10, 2017. [#92]. Judge Brimmer specified that the court would address in further detail at a later date the matters to be established and precluded. [Id.] On March 23, 2017, Plaintiffs sought and received an extension of the new dispositive motion deadline. See [#94, #97]. Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on May 1, 2017. See [#106]. Defendants filed a Response on May 15, 2017, [#110], and Plaintiffs filed a Reply on May 24, 2017. [#111]. On June 6, 2017, Defendants filed what appears to be a surreply. [#112].3 The Motion for Summary Judgment is

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thus ripe for disposition, and the undersigned finds that oral argument would not materially assist in the resolution of this matter.

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may be entitled to summary judgment prior to trial if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). "A 'judge's function' at summary judgment is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000); Carey v. U.S. Postal Service, 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Com, 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment the court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2002). Where, as here, the moving parties will bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, they must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

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than for the moving party. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-movant "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of [the] pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Conclusory statements based merely on speculation, conjecture, or subjective belief are not competent summary judgment evidence. Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party's evidence must be more than "mere reargument of [its] case or a denial of an opponent's allegation," or it will be disregarded. See 10B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 at 356 (3d ed.1998). However, even where a non-moving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot automatically grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. See Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1993). Rather, the court may enter summary judgment only if Plaintiffs...

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