Ecker v. U.S., Civil Action No. 01-11310-NMG.

Decision Date21 November 2007
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 01-11310-NMG.
Citation527 F.Supp.2d 199
PartiesJohn Leonard ECKER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Roberto M. Braceras, Joseph F. Savage, Jr., Neil Thomas Smith, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

Mary Elizabeth Carmody, U.S. Attorneys Office, Boston, MA, Mary Jo Madigan, United States Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

The plaintiff, John Leonard Eckel. ("Ecker") was originally arrested as a felon in possession of a firearm in 1989. The indictment against him was dismissed in March, 2006, presenting this Court with the vexatious problem of how to terminate his incarceration in a manner that is safe, prudent and lawful.

I. Background

Upon Ecker's arrest in 1989, he was found to be incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4246. In March, 2006, more than 16 years later, this Court noted that he had been incarcerated for longer than the likely sentence that would have been imposed if he had been found guilty. Accordingly, this Court dismissed the indictment against him. Since that time, Ecker has applied for a transfer to Massachusetts, where he would be closer to his family or, in the alternative, for an outright release. This Court has ordered the Attorney General to exert all reasonable efforts to arrange for the transfer of Ecker to the custody of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts but those efforts have, to date, been unsuccessful.

In the meantime, Ecker remains in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") at the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners ("MCFP") in Springfield, Missouri. He is evaluated periodically by the medical staff at Springfield which produces a Risk Assessment Report ("RAR") after each such evaluation. The most recent RAR (dated October 2, 2007) was submitted to this Court with a cover letter from the Warden of MCFP Springfield dated October 25, 2007, in which the Warden recommended Ecker for "conditional release". In his letter the Warden informed this Court that the social services staff at Springfield was working to create a plan for Ecker's conditional release which plan would be submitted upon completion.

Because Ecker has not been convicted of any crime and there is no charge pending against him, his custodial status with the BOP is troublesome from both a statutory and a constitutional perspective. This Court is sensitive to the problem and to the danger that Ecker may pose to himself and to others if he is released unconditionally into the community. In an effort to resolve the conundrum, this Court has been patient with the government's attempts to secure state custody for Ecker but, in light of its unsuccessful and apparently ambivalent pursuit of such a transfer and particularly the recommendation arising from Ecker's latest RAR, the time has come for his release, conditional or otherwise.

II. Analysis
A. Legal Standards

The statutes that govern Ecker's confinement are 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246(e) and 4246(g). The particular circumstances of this case produce an unusual interaction between the two subsections, which will be addressed after they are analyzed individually.

1. Section 4246(g): Release to state of certain other persons.

Section 4246(g) governs the treatment of prisoners against whom all charges have been dismissed, but who remain a substantial danger to the community if they are released. It provides that:

"If the director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized pursuant to this chapter certifies to the Attorney General that a person, against whom all charges have been dismissed for reasons not related to the mental condition of the person, is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, the Attorney General shall release the person to the appropriate official of the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried for the purpose of institution of State proceedings for civil commitment. If neither such State will assume such responsibility, the Attorney General shall release the person upon receipt of notice from the State that it will not assume such responsibility, but not later than ten days after certification by the director of the facility."

18 U.S.C. § 4246(g).

As a preliminary matter, it is significant that there is no state in which Ecker was "tried", because he was never tried for the offense with which he was charged in 1989. Thus, the only state implicated by the subject statute is the state of his domicile, Massachusetts.

The questions as to whether, and how, this statute applies to Ecker's case are: (1) were the reasons for the dismissal of his indictment "not related to [his] mental condition" and (2) is he "presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk".

a. Dismissal of Ecker's Indictment

For the reasons discussed herein, this Court concludes that Ecker's indictment was dismissed for reasons "not related to [his] mental condition". The facts warranting dismissal of the charge against Ecker are that (1) the sentence that would have been imposed by this Court had he been convicted of the charge would not have exceeded 15 years and (2) Ecker has been incarcerated for more than 16 years. In the event that a competent defendant were detained before trial on charges similar to those facing Ecker (felony possession as an armed career criminal) for a period longer than his likely sentence, this Court would dismiss that indictment as well.

This Court's Order entered March 17, 2006, dismissing the indictment, did refer to Ecker's "persistently incompetent state". 424 F.Supp.2d 267, 270 (D.Mass. 2006). It emphasized, however, the extraordinary duration of his pre-trial detention and the looming prospect of indefinite detention without trial in violation of Ecker's Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). It was for the latter reasons (and not the former) that the indictment was dismissed.

b. Legislative History of § 4246(g)

Although the drafters of § 4246(g) clearly did not contemplate sixteen years of "pretrial" confinement followed by a potentially indefinite period of federal civil commitment, the legislative history of the statute is, nonetheless, instructive. The prototypical case that the statute was intended to address is one in which the indictment was dismissed for lack of evidence but the defendant was, in any event, found to be dangerous. In such a case, the Senate Report notes that the prisoner must be released because

the federal government would not have enough contacts with the person to justify continued federal hospitalization of a person if there were no federal offense involved to justify such hospitalization.

S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 250, 253, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3433. That statement reminds the Court that the "contacts" that may justify a prisoner's detention by the federal government must be related to the crime he is alleged to have committed. They cannot be arbitrarily expanded into concern for the general welfare in the event that the prisoner is released, however reasonable such concern may be.

In Ecker's case, even if the Court were to assume a conviction for the crime with which he was charged, it would not have imposed a sentence in excess of the time he has already served (now 18 years). The government thus has no penal interest in his continued confinement. As in a case of insufficient evidence, the government's desire to protect the general welfare does not justify maintaining custody over a prisoner who is otherwise entitled to be released.

It is a standard canon of statutory construction that surplusage is to be avoided and thus the limitation of the reach of § 4246(g) to cases in which the indictment was "dismissed for reasons not related to the mental condition of [the prisoner]" must serve some purpose. Although this Court has concluded that the subject statute is applicable to Ecker, it may not reach all prisoners against whom charges have been dropped. The plain meaning of that phrase suggests that for a prisoner against whom criminal charges have been dismissed by reason of the prisoner's mental condition is not within its purview....

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2 cases
  • Ecker v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • August 3, 2009
    ...United States v. Ecker, 424 F.Supp.2d 267 (D.Mass.2006); United States v. Ecker, 489 F.Supp.2d 130 (D.Mass.2007); Ecker v. United States, 527 F.Supp.2d 199 (D.Mass.2007); Ecker v. United States, 538 F.Supp.2d 331 (D.Mass. 2008); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966 (8th Cir.1994); United Sta......
  • United States v. Spessard
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • November 13, 2019
    ...later than ten days after certification by the director of the facility.18 U.S.C. § 4246(g) (emphasis added). In Ecker v. United States, 527 F.Supp.2d 199 (D. Mass. 2007), the court discussed the legislative history of § 4246(g) and noted that the prototypical case that the statute was inte......

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