Eckert v. Green Mountain Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 30 October 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 7980,7980 |
| Citation | 118 N.H. 701,394 A.2d 55 |
| Parties | Terry L. ECKERT et al. v. The GREEN MOUNTAIN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
James J. Kalled, Wolfeboro by brief and orally for plaintiffs.
Burns, Bryant, Hinchey, Cox & Shea, Dover (Paul R. Cox, Dover, orally), for defendant.
This is an action in assumpsit in which the plaintiffs seek to recover under an insurance policy issued to them by the defendant. The case was transferred to this court without ruling by Batchelder, J., upon an agreed statement of facts with exhibits. The question presented is whether an insured can recover the sum of the medical payments coverage provided for each of four automobiles. Stated in common parlance, the issue is whether the plaintiff can "stack" the medical payments coverage of a single policy that covers four automobiles. We hold that the plaintiff cannot stack the medical payments coverage of this policy.
Plaintiff Arla Lea Eckert was injured when the automobile she was driving, a 1965 Corvair, collided with another automobile. As a result of the accident she incurred medical expenses in excess of $6,000. At the time of the accident, Arla Eckert was an insured driver under a Family Combination Automobile Policy issued by the defendant to plaintiff Terry L. Eckert. This policy covered four automobiles: a 1964 Buick, a 1965 Jeep, a 1968 Buick, and the 1965 Corvair that was involved in the accident. The declarations page of the policy indicates the amount of medical payments coverage and the premium charged for each car as follows:
Coverages and Limits of Liability Vehicle # Full Term
------------------------------------- ---------------- ----------------
Covered Premiums
---------------- ----------------
. . . . . . . .
Medical Payments: $1,000 each person 1 1.25
$1,000 each person 2 1.25
. . . . . . . .
Medical Payments: $1,000 each person 3 1.25
$1,000 each person 4 1.25
Other pertinent provisions of the policy include the following.
PART II EXPENSES FOR MEDICAL SERVICES
Coverage C Medical Payments: To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services:
(b) while occupying a non-owned automobile, but only if such person has, or reasonably believes he has, the permission of the owner to use the automobile and the use is within the scope of such permission, or
(c) through being struck by an automobile or trailer of any type;
Definitions: The definitions under Part I apply to Part II, and under Part II:
(From Part I) "owned automobile" means
(a) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile described in this policy for which a specific premium charge indicates that coverage is afforded . . .
"non-owned automobile" means an automobile or trailer not owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, other than a temporary substitute automobile;
Limit of Liability: The limit of liability for medical payments stated in the declarations as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's liability for all expenses incurred by or on behalf of each person who sustains bodily injury as the result any one accident.
4. Two or More Automobiles Parts I, II and III: When two or more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each . . .
The defendant has offered to pay the plaintiffs $1,000 under the medical payments provision of the policy. The plaintiffs, however, claim that the defendant is liable for $4,000, the sum of the medical payments coverage for all the automobiles listed in the policy. The plaintiffs argue three reasons for stacking the medical payments coverage: (1) the terms of the policy are ambiguous and should be construed to allow the larger recovery; (2) unless we allow the plaintiff the larger recovery he will have paid extra premiums for the additional automobiles but will not receive any extra coverage for those premiums; (3) the courts of other jurisdictions allow recovery under similar circumstances.
The plaintiffs' arguments are essentially those used by courts of other jurisdictions that have allowed stacking of medical payments coverage. See Kansas City Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Epperson, 234 Ark. 1100, 356 S.W.2d 613 (1962); Government Empl. Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So.2d 95, 21 A.L.R.3d 895 (Fla.App.1966); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson, 111 Ga.App. 98, 140 S.E.2d 505 (Ct.App.1965); Southwestern Fire and Cas. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Civ.App.1961); Harlow v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 439 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Civ.App.1969). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 900 (1968). These cases, however, involve medical payments provisions that are different from the provision involved in this case. The Georgia case (Watson ) illustrates this point.
The Watson case involved an insurance policy that covered two automobiles. The limit of liability clause and the separability (two or more automobiles) clause in Watson are identical to the clauses in the present case. Division 1 of the medical payments provision read: "To or for the named insured and each relative who sustains bodily injury, caused by accident, while occupying or through being struck by An automobile." (Emphasis added). The court first noted that the separability clause required that the policy be applied as if there were a separate and independent policy on each of the two cars. When the policy was applied in this manner, the insured was covered under each policy regardless of which car he was occupying at the time of the accident because the medical payments provision covers the insured while he is in "an automobile," and not any specific automobile. This vague wording of the medical payments provision has led the above courts to find that the coverage is unrelated to any particular vehicle, hence, the courts permit stacking under the terms of the policy. These courts also allow stacking because, with the ambiguous policy covering the insured while he is in any car, he is no better off for having paid premiums on all his cars rather than on only one car. If the court did not allow stacking, the insurance company would receive a windfall and the insured would be paying an additional premium without receiving any additional coverage. E. g., Government Empl. Ins. Co. v. Sweet supra.
At some point in the development of the law concerning stacking of medical payments coverage, the insurance companies "honed" the language of these provisions, See also Storms v. U. S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 118 N.H. ---, 388 A.2d 578 (1978), for the language was changed from "an automobile," which is unrelated to any specific vehicle, to "the owned automobile," which links the coverage to a specific vehicle. The import of the changed language becomes...
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