Eckford-El v. Toombs

• Decision Date: 27 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 1:90cv 794.,1:90cv 794.
• Citation: 760 F. Supp. 1267
• Parties: Daren ECKFORD-EL, Plaintiff, v. Raymond TOOMBS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

760 F. Supp. 1267

Daren ECKFORD-EL, Plaintiff, v.Raymond TOOMBS, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:90cv 794.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, S.D.

March 27, 1991.

Daren Eckford-El, pro se.

Deborah K. Isom, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

OPINION

HILLMAN, Senior District Judge.

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility (IMCF).Defendants are six officials of IMCF.Plaintiff's pro se complaint alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated when defendants rejected written materials sent to plaintiff by another inmate.Defendants rejected the materials as being in violation of policy directive PD-BCF-63.03, which prohibits inmates from entering into certain contractual arrangements.Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, supporting the motion with their affidavits.Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to defendants' motion.As the Sixth Circuit has noted, the federal courts have entered a "new era" in summary judgment practice.Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,886 F.2d 1472, 1478-81(6th Cir.1989).While preserving the constitutional right of civil litigants to a trial on meritorious claims, the courts are now vigilant to weed out fanciful, malicious, and unsupported claims before trial.Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);Sims v. Memphis Processors, Inc.,926 F.2d 524, 526(6th Cir.1991)(citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986), andAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986)).The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."SeeBooker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,879 F.2d 1304, 1310(6th Cir.1989)(quotingAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12).

The moving party bears the burden of clearly and convincingly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.Sims,at 526.The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.SeeMatsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538(1986).If the moving party carries his burden, the nonmoving party must present significant probative evidence showing that genuine, material factual disputes remain to defeat summary judgment.Sims,at 526.The judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.Id. at 526.Applying these standards, the court determines that defendants' motion will be granted in part, but that judgment will be entered for plaintiff on one aspect of his claim.

Facts

The following facts are undisputed.On February 12, 1990, plaintiff, an inmate at IMCF, received an envelope of material from Morris Martin, an inmate at another institution.The material was entitled "How To Prepare For Your Paralegal Career" and described in detail the opportunities and advantages of a particular correspondence school.The brochure, a copy of which is attached to the Martin affidavit (docket # 13), is published by the School of Paralegal Studies and appears directed to the general public.The brochure was merely passed on to plaintiff by Martin after Martin had received it in the mail himself.

The brochure submitted to the court does not contain any application form or other proposed form of contract.Both plaintiff and Martin aver that the material sent to plaintiff did not contain any contractual or application forms for the correspondence school, but only information about the school.Defendants have not disputed this point.However, when the material arrived at IMCF on February 12, 1990, defendant Letts rejected the material on the grounds that "contractual agreements are not allowed per PD-BCF-63.03"(Letter Rejection, docket # 10).After an administrative hearing, defendant Kinney determined that the materials had to be rejected because plaintiff"cannot make contractual agreements per PD-BCF-63.03."For disposition, plaintiff opted to have the materials returned to Martin (Hearing Report, docket # 10).This lawsuit followed.

Discussion

I.

Defendants have raised the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity.The Eleventh Amendment bars damage suits against state officers in their official capacities.SeeBrandon v. Holt,469 U.S. 464, 471, 105 S.Ct. 873, 877, 83 L.Ed.2d 878(1985).Recently, this court issued an opinion recognizing the Sixth Circuit decisions holding that suits that challenge an action taken by an individual in his capacity as a state official constitute "official capacity" suits.Lawson v. Bouck,747 F.Supp. 376(W.D.Mich.1990).As in Lawson,plaintiff in the instant case seeks to hold defendants responsible for the actions taken while they were working as employees of IMCF.Despite the fact that plaintiff claims to be suing defendants in their individual capacities, controlling Sixth Circuit decisions require that this case be deemed an official-capacity action.SeeCowan v. University of Louisville School of Medicine,900 F.2d 936, 942(6th Cir.1990)(quotingRice v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation,887 F.2d 716(6th Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds,___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3232, 111 L.Ed.2d 744(1990)("The record does not suggest in any way that the defendant's actions were somehow unofficial.The capacity in which the individual defendants were in fact acting is what matters, not the capacity in which they were sued....")).Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for monetary damages is subject to dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds, without prejudice to maintenance of an action in the state courts.

The same cannot be said for plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief.In an injunctive or declaratory action grounded on federal law, the state's immunity can be overcome by naming state officials as defendants.Kentucky v. Graham,473 U.S. 159, 169 n. 18, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3107 n. 18, 87 L.Ed.2d 114(1985);seePennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67(1984).An action against a state official sued in his official capacity for injunctive relief is not treated as an action against the state.SeeWill v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 n. 10, 105 L.Ed.2d 45(1989);Ex parte Young,209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 453-54, 52 L.Ed. 714(1908).Therefore, while the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff's claim for monetary relief, it does not prevent plaintiff from maintaining a claim for injunctive relief in this official-capacity action.Will,109 S.Ct. at 2311 n. 10.

Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff's damage claims.For the reasons outlined below, though, defendants' motion will be denied as to plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief.

II.

Rights secured by the First Amendment are fundamental, and convicted prisoners retain all First Amendment rights not incompatible with their status as prisoners.SeeBurton v. Nault,902 F.2d 4(6th Cir.), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 198, 112 L.Ed.2d 160(1990).The Supreme Court has recently noted that "prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution."Thornburgh v. Abbott,490 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1878, 104 L.Ed.2d 459(1989).However, even fundamental constitutional rights must be exercised with due regard for the inordinately difficult undertaking of running a modern prison.Consequently, the Supreme Court holds that prison regulations affecting a prisoner's First Amendment rights must be analyzed under the familiar Turner analysis; namely, such regulations are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.Thornburgh,490 U.S. at 413, 109 S.Ct. at 1881(citingTurner v. Safley,482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64(1987));seeWashington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1037, 108 L.Ed.2d 178(1990).

The brochure mailed to plaintiff is presumptively within the First Amendment's protection.The freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment extend to a prisoner's incoming mail.Thornburgh,490 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. at 1878;Brooks v. Seiter,779 F.2d 1177, 1180(6th Cir.1985).The particular brochure at issue here is not pornographic or obscene, does not contain escape plans, incitement to violence, or any other matter obviously inimical to prison order or safety.State interference with the brochure outside the prison walls would be virtually unthinkable under First Amendment doctrine.The question before the court is whether, because of plaintiff's status as a prisoner, his First Amendment right to receive the brochure must yield to a countervailing, legitimate penological interest.The court answers this question in the negative.

Defendants' motion and brief make a half-hearted attempt to assert a legitimate penological justification for depriving plaintiff of this clearly innocuous brochure.Defendants say, first of all, that correspondence between prisoners is limited to those prisoners who have entered into a valid legal assistance agreement.This is plainly incorrect.Michigan Administrative Rule R791.6603 regulates receipt of mail by prisoners and generally allows prisoners to receive unlimited amounts of first-class...