Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Iowa Loan & Trust Co.
Decision Date | 18 January 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 8456.,8456. |
Parties | ECLIPSE LUMBER CO. v. IOWA LOAN & TRUST CO. et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
E. L. Miller, of Clinton, Iowa, for appellant.
William E. Miller, of Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee Iowa Loan & Trust Co.
William M. McLaughlin and William E. Miller, both of Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee Southern Surety Co.
W. A. Smith and F. A. O'Connor, both of Dubuque, Iowa, for appellee City of Waukon.
Before BOOTH, Circuit Judge, and SANBORN and DEWEY, District Judges.
The City of Waukon, Iowa, in July, 1922, contracted with Thomas Carey & Sons for the construction of public improvements. The Eclipse Lumber Company furnished material to the contractor. The work was completed November 30, 1923, and accepted by the city December 14, 1923. At that time there was due the Lumber Company, for materials furnished, $11,462.15 with interest, no part of which has been paid.
Section 3102, 1897 Code of Iowa, gave to every person furnishing material for the construction of public improvements a claim against the municipality for the value of the material, not to exceed the contract price to be paid for the improvement. The law originally provided for the filing of the claim within thirty days from the completion of the improvement, and for priority of claims in the order filed.
The Lumber Company duly filed its claim. At the time its cause of action matured as against the city, the Iowa Code of 1897 was in effect. On October 28, 1924, the "Code of Iowa, 1924," became effective. On February 20, 1926, the Lumber Company, as plaintiff, filed its bill of complaint in the District Court of the United States for the Northern district of Iowa to enforce its claim against the city and to have determined the amount and priority of the claims filed against the city, as provided by section 3103 of the 1897 Code.
The city of Waukon, the Iowa Loan & Trust Company, assignee of the contractor, and the Southern Surety Company, the surety of the contractor, each filed separate answers, and each alleged, among other things, that the cause of action of the plaintiff, appellant here, was barred by the statute of limitations. The facts were stipulated
The District Court decided that the action was barred by the statute, saying:
From the decree of dismissal the plaintiff appeals.
Section 3103, Code of 1897, under which the action was brought, provided:
"Any party in interest may cause an adjudication of the amount, priority and mode and time of payment of such claim, by an equitable action in the district court of the proper county."
The only question which we are called upon to determine is, whether, under the laws of Iowa, the plaintiff's right to bring its action was barred.
Section 3447 of the 1897 Code provided:
The defendants claim that, when its cause of action accrued, the plaintiff had but two years to bring its suit, by virtue of paragraph 4 above, for the reason that this statutory action must be construed to be one to enforce a mechanic's lien. They argue that, while the original act to protect subcontractors on public works by giving them a claim against the municipality, to be enforced by an equitable action, was an independent act, it was thereafter carried forward and incorporated into Title 15, c. 8, of "Mechanics' Liens," §§ 3102 and 3103, Code of 1897; that the 38th General Assembly, c. 380 (approved April 25, 1919), having amended section 3102 (Code 1897) by enlarging the time for the filing of the claim by the subcontractor with the municipality from thirty to sixty days, the 39th General Assembly, in chapter 27 (approved March 8, 1921), amended paragraph 4, § 3447, Code 1897 ( ), by substituting the word "sixty" for the word "thirty" thus classifying the sections upon which the plaintiff relies as a part of the law relating to mechanics' liens.
If this is an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, it was barred by the statute.
With reference to causes of action arising under section 3102 of the 1897 Code, the Supreme Court of Iowa has said:
"When an enforceable claim arises, under section 3102, in relation to public corporations or public buildings, the idea of a lien either upon the building or on the fund is expressly excluded, and the demand is of a direct or personal nature against the corporation, which has been made liable by the compliance of the contractor with the provisions of the statute, before such corporation has paid the principal contractor according to the terms of the contract." Swearingen Lumber Co. v. Wash. School Township, 125 Iowa, 283, 288, 99 N. W. 730, 731.
Modern Steel Structural Co. v. Van Buren County, 126 Iowa, 606, 620, 102 N. W. 536, 540.
"But, when the subcontractor does avail himself of the provisions of this section and does comply with its formal requirements, then a...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Application of Foster
...majority's characterization of section 102(b) as presenting "a sort of statute of limitations," see Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Iowa Loan & Trust Co., 38 F.2d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 1930): "While the general rule is that statutes of limitation are to be given a liberal construction as statutes of rep......
-
Roberts v. Roberts
... ... 516, 179 P. 401; ... Wise v. Outtrim, 139 Iowa 192, 117 N.W. 264, 130 Am ... St. Rep. 301. The rule is ... Eclipse Lumber Co. v. Iowa Loan & Trust Co. (C. C. A ... 8th) 38 ... ...
-
Franz v. Buder, 8655-8657.
... ... BUDER et al ... MISSISSIPPI VALLEY TRUST CO ... Nos. 8655-8657 ... Circuit Court of Appeals, ... ...