Economus v. City of S.F.
| Decision Date | 03 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-01071-HSG |
| Parties | ANTHONY ECONOMUS, Plaintiff, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants City and County of San Francisco (the "City") and Flint Paul ("Officer Paul," and collectively with the City, "Defendants"). Dkt. No. 99. The parties have also filed administrative motions to file under seal. Dkt. Nos. 100, 120. Although the Court finds that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Officer Paul's conduct violated the Constitution, it also finds that Officer Paul is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state claims, and DISMISSES those claims without prejudice to their reassertion in state court.1 The Court also GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion to file under seal in support of their motion for summary judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff's motion to file under seal in support of his opposition to summary judgment.
Plaintiff Anthony Economus commenced this action on February 20, 2018. Dkt. No. 1. He filed his second amended complaint on November 2, 2018, Dkt. No. 45 ("SAC"). Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 31, 2019. Dkt. No. 99 ("Mot."). Mr. Economus filed his opposition to the motion on February 14, 2019, Dkt. No. 128 (corrected) ("Opp."), and Defendants filed their reply on February 21, 2019, Dkt. No. 123 ("Reply"). The Court held a hearing on Defendants' motion on March 14, 2019. Dkt. No. 136.
The Court briefly recounts the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, as it must at the summary judgment stage. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ().
On July 11, 2017, Mr. Economus participated in an annual downhill skateboarding event at Dolores Park in San Francisco, California. SAC ¶ 11. Dolores Street is a hill next to Dolores Park that skateboarders like to "bomb" down, a term used when skateboarders go down a hill "too fast to stop [themselves]." Dkt. No. 128-10, Ex. 10 at 41:12-16. Dolores Street is a two-way street with a divider down the center. Dkt. No. 128-4, Ex. 4 at 37:13-20.
Officer Paul was also present at Dolores Park that day, responding to a dispatch requesting available units to assist with an incident at Dolores Park. Id. 33:8-14. A skateboarder had crashed, but because there was a large crowd gathered, paramedics were having difficulty transporting the injured individual out. Id. 33:15-23. By the time Officer Paul arrived at the scene, hundreds of people were on Dolores Street between 18th and 20th Streets. Id. 37:2-9. The crowd was not aggressive towards the police officers, just indifferent. Id. 39:8-14. Officer Paul stated that he wanted to contain the situation while attempting to figure out if the officers were going to shut down or facilitate the event. Id. 43:19-44:1.
When Mr. Economus arrived at the skateboarding event, he decided to bomb down the hill. Dkt. No. 128-10, Ex. 10 at 70:4-71:6. On his way down, he noticed a police car in the middle ofthe intersection at the bottom of the hill. Id. Mr. Economus was going too fast to stop and thought he could make it through the gap between the police car and the sidewalk. Id. Mr. Economus then saw Officer Paul step out into the middle of the intersection, blocking the gap that Mr. Economus was attempting to skate through. Id. 71:21-74:10. Officer Paul turned towards Mr. Economus, stopped, and collided with him, knocking Mr. Economus off his skateboard. Id. The left side of Officer Paul's body made contact with Mr. Economus's left shoulder. Dkt. No. 128-10, Ex. 10 at 72:1-15. No words were exchanged between the parties prior to the collision.2
Both parties sustained injuries as a result of the collision. Mr. Economus hit the hood of the police car and fell to the ground. Mot. at 5; Opp. at 8. He was initially nonresponsive and does not remember if he responded to the officers' offers to call an ambulance. See id. He was eventually helped out of the street by friends and strangers and taken to the hospital. See id. Mr. Economus alleges that as a result of the collision, he suffered torn ligaments, multiple fractures in his ankle, and a gash in his knee that required stiches. Opp. at 8. Officer Paul also suffered injuries and sought medical attention. Mot. at 4.
Summary judgment is proper when a "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. And a dispute is "genuine" if there is evidence in the record sufficientfor a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. But in deciding if a dispute is genuine, the court must view the inferences reasonably drawn from the materials in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986), and "may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations," Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). If a court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to only a single claim or defense or as to part of a claim or defense, it may enter partial summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
With respect to summary judgment procedure, the moving party always bears both the ultimate burden of persuasion and the initial burden of producing those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it "must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the moving party will bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must also show that no reasonable trier of fact could not find in its favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. In either case, the movant "may not require the nonmoving party to produce evidence supporting its claim or defense simply by saying that the nonmoving party has no such evidence." Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1105. "If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Id. at 1102-03.
"If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense." Id. at 1103. In doing so, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586. A nonmoving party must also "identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment," because the duty of the courts is not to "scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact." Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,1279 (9th Cir. 1996). If a nonmoving party fails to produce evidence that supports its claim or defense, courts must enter summary judgment in favor of the movant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The SAC alleges six causes of action against Defendants related to the collision. SAC ¶¶ 21-58. The claims remaining at issue are a Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Paul for excessive force, a negligence claim against Defendants, and a Bane Act violation against Defendants.3 Mr. Economus seeks general damages, as well as punitive damages and reasonable attorneys' fees. SAC ¶ 14.
The parties are reminded that this Order does not constitute findings of fact or a prediction of how a jury might assess the evidence at trial. Rather, because Defendants have moved for summary judgment, this order evaluates whether there are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude Defendants from obtaining judgment as a matter of law. See Tolan, 572 U.S. at 565 () (quotations omitted).
The Court first addresses the Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force. Under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff has the right to be free against "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is undisputed that there was no search here. The inquiry is whether, drawing all inferences in favor of Mr. Economus, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was a seizure and, if so, whether that seizure was unreasonable because it constituted a use of excessive force.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs "[w]henever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away." Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595 (1989) (citation and quotations omitted). Violation of the Fourth...
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