Ector v. State, 49S02-9409-CR-856
| Citation | 639 N.E.2d 1014 |
| Decision Date | 08 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S02-9409-CR-856,49S02-9409-CR-856 |
| Parties | Edward ECTOR, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Nancy L. Broyles, McClure, McClure & Kammen, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen., Deana McIntire Smith, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
After appellant-defendant Edward Ector entered a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter, the trial court imposed an enhanced sentence of twenty years rather than the presumptive ten-year sentence. In a memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court erred in basing a sentence enhancement solely upon the "depreciate the seriousness of the crime" aggravator set forth in Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(4).
On September 30, 1991, the defendant, then enrolled at Indianapolis Arlington High School, fatally stabbed fellow-student Bertram Bowman in the school cafeteria shortly after an altercation between the two. Initially charged with murder, the defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter, a class B felony. The plea agreement provided for a minimum sentence of ten years with the parties free to seek or resist a sentence enhancement. The trial court, finding two mitigating factors but believing them to be outweighed, imposed a ten-year enhancement, sentencing the defendant to a term of twenty years. Although discussing multiple aggravating factors, the trial court's sentencing statement used the phrase "aggravating factor" in the singular, finding that imposition of a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. 1
The defendant asserts that it was error for the trial court to base its sentence enhancement upon what it stated to be a single aggravating factor after recognizing the existence of two mitigating factors. The defendant also argues that because "knowingly" and "acting under sudden heat" are the elements distinguishing murder, the greater crime with which he was originally charged, from voluntary manslaughter, the lesser crime to which he entered a plea, his intent, premeditation, and manner of use of a knife may not be utilized to support sentence enhancement.
The State counters that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the enhanced sentence and maintains that the trial court, after considering the two mitigating factors, properly based the enhanced sentence upon the defendant's premeditation in bringing a knife to school and the fact that the victim was essentially in a defenseless position when fatally wounded. The State contends that these factors support the trial court's finding that a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime.
It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the sentence to be imposed upon a defendant, and such a determination will be reversed only upon a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion. Duvall v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 34, 36. The trial court's discretion includes the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors to impose an appropriate sentence. Markham v. State (1985), Ind., 484 N.E.2d 573, 575. Additionally, although a material element of a crime may not also constitute an aggravating circumstance to support an enhanced sentence, the particularized individual circumstances of the criminal act may constitute a separate aggravating circumstance. Townsend v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 1198, 1201.
The "depreciate seriousness" aggravator is seen in two different variations. The most common version is the one expressly designated as a possible aggravating circumstance by the felony sentencing statute, Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(4), that "[i]mposition of a reduced sentence ... would depreciate the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sweeney v. State
...671, 679 (Ind.1997) (quoting Jones, 675 N.E.2d at 1088; Gregory-Bey v. State, 669 N.E.2d 154, 159 (Ind.1996) (quoting Ector v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1014, 1015 (Ind.1994))). This factor may not be used, as it appears to have been here, as the basis for enhancing a sentence. Because there is not......
-
Williams v. State
...whether a sentence will be increased or decreased and whether multiple sentences are to be concurrent or consecutive. Ector v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1014, 1015 (Ind.1994). The trial court will be reversed only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. In the sentencing statement, th......
-
Willsey v. State
...the appropriate sentence and the trial court will be reversed only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Ector v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1014, 1015 (Ind.1994). The trial court's list of aggravating circumstances, including its emphasis on Willsey's manipulative and calculating behavi......
-
Miller v. State
...sentence. Hollins v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (Ind.1997); Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Ind.1996); Ector v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1014, 1015 (Ind.1994); Evans v. State, 497 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Ind.1986). There is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court was considering......