Eddey v. Eddey

• Decision Date: 29 April 2020
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-2112-18T4
• Citation: Eddey v. Eddey, DOCKET NO. A-2112-18T4 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Apr 29, 2020)
• Parties: GARY EDDEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ILENE EDDEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

GARY EDDEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ILENE EDDEY, Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NO. A-2112-18T4

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Submitted March 17, 2020

April 29, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

Before Judges Hoffman, Currier and Firko.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FM-14-0795-02.

Simon, O'Brien & Knapp, attorneys for appellant (John T. Knapp, of counsel and on the briefs; Sarah E. Kapitko, on the brief).

Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis LLP, attorneys for respondent (Mark H. Sobel and Barry Scott Sobel, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Ilene Eddey appeals from a December 11, 2018 Family Part order that granted plaintiff Gary Eddey's motion to terminate his alimony and life insurance obligations. Applying N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3), the Family Part judge concluded the factors weighed in favor of terminating plaintiff's alimony and life insurance obligations, and his retirement was undertaken in good faith. We affirm.

I.

The following factual history is derived from the motion record. After almost twenty-seven years of marriage, plaintiff and defendant divorced in 2003. The final judgment of divorce (JOD) incorporated their property settlement agreement (PSA). It required plaintiff to "pay [defendant] permanent alimony in the sum of $40,000 per year. Said payments shall be paid weekly at the rate of $770 per week." The PSA also provided that plaintiff maintain life insurance for the benefit of defendant "for so long as his alimony obligation lasts." The PSA did not address the consequences of plaintiff's retirement.

Both parties were actively employed when they divorced. Plaintiff worked as a medical doctor and defendant was employed as a teacher. Their three children are now emancipated.

Under the JOD, defendant kept the marital residence, although she was required to refinance the existing mortgages and buy-out plaintiff's equity interest in the home. The parties equitably divided their retirement accounts and two defined benefit plans, including defendant's pension. They evenly divided their $5700 credit card debt, and plaintiff agreed to pay the $11,000 IRS debt for the 2001 tax year.

In January 2017, defendant retired from her teaching position. Later that year, in October, plaintiff advised defendant he planned to retire at the end of the year, when he turned sixty-six years old. At the time, plaintiff worked as an "on call" physician for a special education hospital for individuals with developmental disabilities. Plaintiff chose to retire partly because of the "stressful and physically and mentally demanding schedule" his position entailed. In April 2016, plaintiff was terminated from a different position and found it difficult to become re-employed. After obtaining the new position for the one-and-a-half-year period, he decided to retire.

In an effort to avoid litigation upon plaintiff's imminent retirement, the parties exchanged financial information in December 2017. No agreement was reached. On January 5, 2018, plaintiff retired at the age of sixty-six. Whileplaintiff presently has no known health conditions, defendant has significant medical issues.

On May 30, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion to permanently terminate his alimony and life insurance obligations and for an award of counsel fees. In his moving certification, plaintiff contended he was entitled to relief because he reached a good faith retirement age and met the statutory factors required by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3). He also was eligible for social security benefits.

Defendant opposed plaintiff's motion on the basis that he failed to completely disclose his income information and she cross-moved for counsel fees. On August 9, 2018, the prior Family Part judge denied plaintiff's motion "due to the lack of information provided by [p]laintiff, which . . . prevents the [c]ourt from determining if a prima facie case of changed circumstances has been established." Specifically, the judge noted that plaintiff failed to include a current case information statement (CIS) with his motion.

On September 27, 2018, plaintiff re-filed his motion and included an updated CIS and documents pertaining to his social security benefits. Defendant again opposed the motion, contending that plaintiff failed to disclose all of his assets and anticipated income streams from his annuities and other sources, andcross-moved for counsel fees. In reply, plaintiff certified that his only current source of income is his social security payments.

On December 7, 2018, the subsequent Family Part judge heard oral argument on the motions. In his statement of reasons, the judge concluded that "the totality of the factors . . . weigh in favor of terminating alimony and no factor, either individually or cumulatively, weighs against terminating [p]laintiff's alimony obligation."

In reaching his decision, the judge considered the factors under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3) in holding that plaintiff's alimony and life insurance obligation be terminated. Notably, the judge found plaintiff's desire to retire after facing termination from his previous job and upon attaining retirement age was reasonable and did not reflect an improper motive. Defendant's expectation that plaintiff would continue to work in perpetuity was deemed unreasonable by the judge.

The judge based his decision on a number of findings. Post-retirement, plaintiff's income is $2545 per month from social security benefits. Excluding real estate, plaintiff has liquid assets of $1,770,467, including his retirement annuity of $683,931, which does not vest for another five years. While defendant claims plaintiff should have included his New York condominium inhis list of assets, the judge did not find the omission fatal because "it is clear that over the proximate years [p]laintiff's [s]ocial [s]ecurity income will be inadequate to cover his alimony obligation . . . requir[ing] [him] to deplete his liquid assets in order to subsidize . . . payments alone (before paying any of his own monthly expenses)."

The judge found plaintiff spends $13,914 per month, including $3333 in alimony payments and $688 in life insurance premiums. The judge noted that "[p]laintiff will be unable to afford his current lifestyle" if his alimony obligations continued post-retirement.

The judge found that defendant continued to work until her retirement in January 2017. During the latter stages of her career, defendant earned $143,244 in 2015 and $136,402 in 2016, and has total assets of $1,222,959.¹ The judge noted that defendant's monthly net pension and social security benefits totaled $4072. With estimated monthly expenses of $6206.35, like plaintiff, defendant's income will not sufficiently cover her current lifestyle without depleting her retirement assets.

Given those facts, the judge concluded:

Overall, while there is a disparity in the parties' assets, and [p]laintiff could liquidate assets to continuealimony payments, the court finds that both parties have sufficient assets to supplement their own monthly incomes to support and maintain their own lifestyles for the indefinite future.

. . . Based upon [d]efendant's current income from her pension and social security as well as the assets she has amassed, the court does not find that she is financially dependent upon [p]laintiff or that the retirement and termination of alimony will be materially detrimental to [d]efendant. Rather, the court finds that she has adequate assets to supplement her retirement income so as to sustain her lifestyle.

. . . [T]he court does note that [p]laintiff has paid [d]efendant alimony for more than [seventeen-and-a-half years], which equates to a[t] least $700,000 in non-taxable payments to [d]efendant. The court finds that based upon [d]efendant's continued employment following the parties' 2003 divorce until January 2017 and the alimony she received, [d]efendant had the opportunity to adequately save for retirement. While perhaps [d]efendant could have save[d] more for retirement, the court finds that she has adequate assets to supplement her retirement income so as to sustain her lifestyle.

The judge granted plaintiff's motion thereby terminating his alimony and life insurance obligations, and denied both parties' motions for counsel fees.

On appeal, defendant contends the judge improperly concluded that: (1) plaintiff established changed circumstances warranting termination of his alimony and life insurance obligations; (2) discovery and a plenary hearing were unnecessary; (3) plaintiff could no longer afford to pay alimony and defendantno longer needed alimony; (4) plaintiff could terminate life insurance for defendant; (5) alimony received by defendant was tax-free; and (6) plaintiff had disclosed all relevant sources of income.

II.

We accord "great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges," Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012), in recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). We are bound by the trial court's factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J....