Eddings on Behalf of Eddings v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1988
• Docket Number: 86-3103,Nos. 86-3068,86-3138 and 86-5258,s. 86-3068
• Citation: 835 F.2d 1369
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,650 Philip H. EDDINGS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Scott Philip Eddings, Deceased, on Behalf of Philip H. EDDINGS, and Virginia Rae Randt, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGENWERK, A.G., a/k/a Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, a foreign corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Patricia Ann GRIFFIN, By and Through her next friend and natural father, Larry D. GRIFFIN, and Larry D. Griffin, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Albert V. VERHINE, Jr., a minor, By A. Brennis VERHINE, his legal Guardian; and A. Brennis Verhine, and Glenda L. Verhine, his natural parents, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGENWERK, A.G., a foreign corporation and Volkswagen of America, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendants-Appellees. Dana C. LAMB, a minor, By and Through his mother and next friend, Jeanne F. DONALDSON, Jeanne F. Donaldson, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, a German Corporation, Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1369

835 F.2d 1369

56 USLW 2418, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,650

Philip H. EDDINGS, as Personal Representative of the Estate

of Scott Philip Eddings, Deceased, on Behalf of

Philip H. EDDINGS, and Virginia Rae

Randt, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGENWERK, A.G., a/k/a Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, a

foreign corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Patricia Ann GRIFFIN, By and Through her next friend and

natural father, Larry D. GRIFFIN, and Larry D.

Griffin, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Albert V. VERHINE, Jr., a minor, By A. Brennis VERHINE, his legal Guardian; and A. Brennis Verhine, and Glenda L. Verhine, his natural parents, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGENWERK, A.G., a foreign corporation and Volkswagen

of America, Inc., a foreign corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

Dana C. LAMB, a minor, By and Through his mother and next

friend, Jeanne F. DONALDSON, Jeanne F. Donaldson, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, a German Corporation,

Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey

corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 86-3068, 86-3103, 86-3138 and 86-5258.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 22, 1988.

Karen E. Roselli, Kevin A. Malone, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants in 86-3068.

Cathy Jackson Lerman, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for amicus curiae Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.

J. Richard Caldwell, Jr., Sharon Lee Stedman, Orlando, Fla., for defendants-appellees in 86-3068.

Edward T. O'Donnell, Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole, Miami, Fla., for amicus curiae Motor Vehicle & Product Liability.

Robert K. High, Jr., E.C. Deeno Kitchen, Brian S. Duffy, Robert M. Ervin, Jr., Tallahassee, Fla., Allen W. Lindsay, Jr., Milton, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants in 86-3103.

Patrick J. Farrell, Jr., Patricia Guilday, Tallahassee, Fla., John M. Thomas, Office of the General Counsel, Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Mich., for defendant-appellee in 86-3103.

John Stephen Derr, Field, Granger, Santry & Mitchell, Tallahassee, Fla., Michael Hoenig, Herzfeld & Rubin, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellants in 86-3138.

Sharon Lee Stedman, Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss & Burke, Orlando, Fla., for defendants-appellees in 86-3138.

Charles R. Stack, High, Stack, Lazenby & Palahach, Coral Gables, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Wendy F. Lumish, Rumberger, Wechsler & Kirk, Miami, Fla., Sharon Lee Stedman, Miami, Fla., for defendants-appellees in 86-5258.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT and HILL, Circuit Judges, and LYNNE ^*, Senior District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

These four consolidated diversity actions present two issues involving Florida's products liability statute of repose. The first issue concerns the effect of a decision by the Florida Supreme Court in which the court reversed a prior decision holding that the statute of repose was invalid as applied. We must decide whether application of the supreme court's later decision in the cases before us deprives the appellants of a vested property right, in violation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The second issue involves the question of whether Florida's statute of repose creates two classes of persons with different legal rights, in violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. In each of the four cases, the district court granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment. 635 F.Supp. 45, 631 F.Supp. 1144. We affirm.

I.

A.

In 1974, the Florida legislature enacted a twelve-year products liability statute of repose. ¹ That statute terminated manufacturer liability with respect to suits brought more than twelve years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser. In other words, the Florida legislature determined that independent of whether the applicable statute of limitations had run, an injury caused by a product that had been delivered to its original purchaser more than twelve years prior to the filing of the plaintiff's lawsuit would give rise to no cause of action against the manufacturer or designer. ²

In December 1980, in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980) (per curiam), the Florida Supreme Court held that the twelve-year statute of repose, as it applied to a plaintiff whose injury occurred more than twelve years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser, worked a denial of access to courts in violation of the Florida Constitution. ³ In August 1985, the Florida Supreme Court, in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla.1985), overruled Battilla and held that the statute of repose is "not unconstitutionally violative of [the right of access] of the Florida Constitution." Although the supreme court did not state in Pullum whether the rule announced in that case would apply to cases involving injuries occurring after the Battilla decision but before the Pullum decision, it has since held that Pullum does apply to such cases. See Pait v. Ford Motor Co., 515 So.2d 1278, 1279 (Fla.1987); Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So.2d 735, 737 (Fla.1987).

B.

Each of the present lawsuits arose out of an accident occurring in Florida and involving an automobile that had been delivered to the original purchaser more than twelve years before the accident. ⁴ In three of the cases, the accident occurred after the supreme court's decision in Battilla; in the fourth case, the accident occurred before Battilla was decided. All of the accidents occurred before the supreme court reversed itself in Pullum. In each case, someone injured in the accident, or a representative of his estate, filed suit in the district court against the manufacturer of the automobile, invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332 (1982). ⁵ In three of the cases, suit was filed after the supreme court decided Battilla but before it decided Pullum. In the fourth case, suit was filed eleven days after the supreme court decided Pullum.

In each of the four cases, the defendant manufacturer moved the court for summary judgment, contending that because the twelve-year statute of repose had run its course, the plaintiff had no cause of action. In each case, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs have appealed to this court.

II.

The district court correctly interpreted Florida law in holding that the decision in Pullum controls these cases and leaves appellants with no cause of action rooted in products liability. ⁶ Appellants argue, however, that application of the statute of repose to their suits would, as a matter of federal law, deprive them of a vested property right in violation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.

We note preliminarily that appellants' facial attack on the constitutionality of the Florida statute of repose is without merit. The United States Supreme Court, in cases raising the constitutionality of similar statutes, has found no violation of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Woodward v. Burnham City Hosp., 449 U.S. 807, 101 S.Ct. 54, 66 L.Ed.2d 11 (1980), dismissing appeal from Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill.2d 295, 37 Ill.Dec. 558, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) (no due process violation from legislative action "establishing the four-year outer limit within which to file a complaint for medical malpractice") (appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question; see 49 U.S.L.W. 3065 for summary of questions presented on appeal); Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 459 U.S. 802, 103 S.Ct. 24, 74 L.Ed.2d 39 (1982), dismissing appeal from 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Civ.App.1981) (due process of law not denied plaintiff by virtue of statute prohibiting suits against licensed engineers or architects for damages arising out of unsafe condition of real property that was improved more than ten years earlier) (appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question; see 51 U.S.L.W. 3146 for summary of questions presented on appeal). ⁷

Appellants argue in the alternative that the statute of repose is unconstitutional as applied. Their argument, reduced to its essentials, is as follows. They begin with the premise that a products liability cause of action accrues at the time the injury occurs. Appellants' injuries occurred after the Florida Supreme Court decided Battilla but before it decided Pullum. Since their injuries therefore occurred at a time when Florida decisional law held that application of the statute of repose to cases such as theirs would violate the Florida Constitution, appellants reason that nothing in Florida law prevented the accrual of their causes of action at that time. Appellants argue that an accrued cause of action is a vested property right, and that application of the statute of repose now would deprive them of that right in violation of the due process clause. ⁸

We reject appellants' arguments that the Pullum decision should be analyzed as if it were a legislative reenactment of a repealed statute. Battilla did not invalidate the statute of repose; during the interim between the Battilla and the Pullum decisions, the statute continued to bar causes of action in cases factually distinguishable from Battilla. Appellants therefore cannot assert that the statute was repealed at the time their injuries occurred. Although at that time the supreme court had held that application of the statute to cases such as theirs violated the Florida Constitution, the supreme court was free to change its interpretation, and appellants had no vested right in the former interpretation. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198, 37 S.Ct. 247, 250, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917) ("No person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit."); see also Duke Power...