Eddington v. State

Decision Date17 May 2019
Docket NumberDocket No. 45803
PartiesRONALD EDDINGTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF IDAHO, Respondent.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.

Order denying petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Ronald Eddington, Eagle Pass, Texas, pro se appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

____________________

BRAILSFORD, Judge

Ronald Eddington appeals pro se from the district court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Eddington's appeal follows this Court's remand for an evidentiary hearing on several factual issues raised in Eddington's petition for post-conviction relief. This Court previously set forth the following factual background:

On August 9, 2013, Eddington broke into his ex-wife's home, held her at gunpoint, and threatened to kill both himself and his ex-wife. Once Eddington left the house, the ex-wife called her father, who then called the police. The State charged Eddington with second degree kidnapping pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-4503, burglary pursuant to I.C. § 18-1401, aggravated assault pursuant to I.C. § 18-905(a), and using a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520. Eddington retained private counsel. Soon afterEddington was charged, his mother was charged with witness intimidation, I.C. § 18-2604. The charge stemmed from a letter Eddington's mother wrote to her ex-daughter-in-law about Eddington's charges. Eddington's trial counsel then agreed to represent Eddington's mother.

Eddington v. State, 162 Idaho 812, 816-17, 405 P.3d 597, 601-02 (Ct. App. 2017).

Eddington pled guilty to second degree kidnapping and aggravated assault. During the sentencing hearing, the State called several witnesses, including Eddington's ex-wife. At sentencing, Eddington's trial counsel neither objected to the testimony of Eddington's ex-wife nor cross-examined her. The day after Eddington pled guilty, the State dismissed the witness intimidation charge against Eddington's mother. Id. at 817, 405 P.3d at 602.

Eddington filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal of the petition in its entirety. Id. Eddington appealed, and this Court concluded the district court erred in summarily dismissing several of Eddington's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 824, 405 P.3d at 609. Specifically, this Court concluded there were genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) whether trial counsel's representation of both Eddington and his mother created an actual conflict of interest; (2) whether trial counsel pressured Eddington to plead guilty; (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine or to object to the testimony of Eddington's ex-wife at sentencing; and (4) whether trial counsel was ineffective for not listening to police audiotapes. Id. This Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on these claims.

On remand, the parties conducted discovery and then the district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing during which Eddington, his mother, his current wife, and trial counsel testified. Thereafter, in a written decision, the district court denied Eddington's four remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Eddington timely appeals this denial.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct. App. 2009). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burdenof showing that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). Where, as here, the petitioner was convicted on a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006).

This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254 P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011). There is a strong presumption trial counsel's performance was within the acceptable range particularly as to the lack of objections, which are generally considered to fall within the realm of tactical or strategic decisions. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994). "Choosing not to bring additional attention to statements . . . does not equate to inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings." State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 834, 419 P.3d 1042, 1132 (2018).

In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 861, 243 P.3d 675, 677 (Ct. App. 2010). When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, this Court will not disturb the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the district court's province. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 382; Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). We exercise free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Baxter, 149 Idaho at 862, 243 P.3d at 678.

III.ANALYSIS
A. Trial Counsel Did Not Have an Actual Conflict of Interest

Trial counsel jointly represented both Eddington and Eddington's mother. Eddington argues this joint representation compromised his representation. Whether trial counsel's joint representation was ineffective turns on whether there was an actual conflict of interest. Joint representation is not a per se violation of a defendant's constitutional right to legal representation unburdened by conflicts of interest. State v. Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 371, 883 P.3d 726, 729 (Ct. App. 1994). "[J]oint representation of defendants does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless [an] actual conflict is demonstrated." Giles, 125 Idaho at 923, 877 P.2d at 367.

An actual conflict of interest will not be presumed; rather, the petitioner must show an actual conflict. Guzman, 126 Idaho at 371, 883 P.3d at 729. Actual conflicts may include, for example, trial counsel's failure to present a defense or important evidence on the petitioner's behalf to benefit or avoid harming the jointly represented defendant. Giles, 125 Idaho at 923, 877 P.2d at 367. Once a petitioner demonstrates an actual conflict of interest, prejudice may be presumed. Guzman, 126 Idaho at 371, 883 P.3d at 729. Prejudice, however, is only presumed if trial counsel actively represented conflicting interests and an actual conflict of interest adversely affected trial counsel's performance. Id. Such a showing of an actual conflict satisfies both prongs of the Strickland standard, but in the absence of an actual conflict, there can be no ineffective assistance of counsel.

In support of Eddington's argument that trial counsel's joint representation created an actual conflict, Eddington points to numerous, diffuse facts including that his parents were paying for his defense; trial counsel expressed concern that the State might claim Eddington had aided and abetted his mother's witness intimidation; his presentence investigation report detailed his mother's conduct giving rise to her charge; the prosecutors communicated about the status of Eddington's case and his mother's case; his mother attended his sentencing hearing despite the existence of a "no contact order" prohibiting her from being near his ex-wife, who also attended the hearing; and his mother's charge was only dismissed after he pled guilty. Eddington argues the inferences from these facts clearly establish that his and his mother's cases were "linked," making his guilty plea a condition of the dismissal of his mother's charge and adversely impacting his representation.

We disagree. The district court correctly concluded that Eddington had failed to show an actual conflict of interest by a preponderance of the evidence. Among other things, the district court correctly found that there were never any discussions between the prosecutors and trial counsel about Eddington's case being linked to his mother's case; there were never any plea offers made linking the two cases together; there were no discussions between Eddington and his mother to support his claim that their cases were "linked"; and Eddington never stated during sentencing that he was pleading guilty so the prosecution would dismiss his mother's case. Further, there is no...

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