Eddins v. City of Lewiston, an Idaho Mun. Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 37209.,37209. |
| Citation | 150 Idaho 30,244 P.3d 174 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | Steven Lee EDDINS, Petitioner–Appellant, v. CITY OF LEWISTON, an Idaho municipal corporation, Respondent. |
John C. Mitchell, Lewiston, for appellant.
Don L. Roberts, Lewiston, for respondent.
Steven Lee Eddins appeals the district court's decision upholding the City of Lewiston's determination that he is prohibited from replacing recreational vehicles currently located in his manufactured home park. We reverse.
Steven Lee Eddins has owned and operated a manufactured home park in Lewiston, Idaho, since 2000. Eddins has continuously rented out a combination of standard mobile home spaces and recreational vehicle spaces to various tenants.1 Eddins has a license to operate a manufactured home park, but does not have a license to operate a recreational vehicle park. In 2006, the City of Lewiston passed Ordinance 4398, which for safety reasons,2 prohibits recreational vehicles from being located in manufactured home parks. More specifically, section 23–14(b) of the Lewiston City Code was amended to read:
Lewiston City Code section 23–14(b). Pursuant to the new regulations, recreational vehicles are not among the types of units permitted in manufactured home parks, as they are not considered Class A or Class B manufactured homes.
However, the new regulations provide a grandfather right for manufactured home parks that existed prior to the enactment of the ordinance in 2006. Section 23–17(a) provides:
Manufactured home parks in existence or under development as of the effective date of this ordinance shall be permitted to continue as an established land use regardless of zone but shall be exempt from the standards of 23–14, except as stated in this section.
Lewiston City Code section 23–17(a). Section 23–17(d) of the code then goes on to specify the type of replacement units allowed under the grandfather right:
Replacement units in manufactured home parks developed prior to the effective date [of the ordinance] may be Class A or Class B units, except that the mix of Class A and B units existing as of the effective date may not move further from compliance with Section 23–14(b).
Lewiston City Code section 23–17(d).
In 2008, Eddins applied for a permit from the Lewiston Community Development Department to allow one of his current tenants, who had been renting the same space for several years, to replace an existing recreational vehicle with a newer recreational vehicle. The Department subsequently sent Eddins a letter informing him that his permit had been denied, and that he was prohibited from placing additional recreational vehicles in his park under the new ordinance.
Eddins appealed the Department's decision to the Lewiston Planning and Zoning Commission, arguing that he has a grandfather right to replace existing recreational vehicles with new or substitute recreational vehicles. After an informal hearing, the Commission upheld the Department's decision, concluding that Eddins' grandfather right under the new regulations only permits him to keep existing recreational vehicles in the park, but does not allow him to bring in additional or substitute recreational vehicles. Thereafter, Eddins appealed to the Lewiston City Council, where the Commission's decision was upheld. Eddins then filed a petition for judicial review with the district court, arguing that he has a due process right to continue using his park in the same way in which he did prior to the passage of the ordinance as long as he does not improperly expand the use. The district court upheld the Commission's decision, finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's interpretation of the grandfather provision in the city code.3 Eddins timely appealed the decision to this Court.
Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an applicant who has been denied a land use application by a governing board to seek judicial review under the procedures provided in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA), after exhausting all remedies under the local ordinance. I.C. § 67–6519. When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity under the APA, this Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. Price v. Payette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs., 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67–5279(1). Instead, we defer to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Price, 131 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586. "In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record." Id.
The agency's decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67–5279(3). The party contesting a governing board's decision must first demonstrate that the board erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67–5279(3), and then the party must also demonstrate that a substantial right has been prejudiced. I.C. § 67–5279(4).
Eddins' sole argument on appeal is that his due process rights have been violated by the City's action. Eddins argues that he has a due process right to continue operating his park in the same manner in which he did prior to the passage of the new city ordinance. Specifically, Eddins asserts that this due process protection applies not only to existing recreational vehicles in the park, but also applies to the overall use of the property, including the replacement of recreational vehicles. The City, on the other hand, argues that Eddins does not have a right to substitute new recreational vehicles because the grandfather right in the Lewiston Ordinance only allows existing vehicles to be replaced with Class A or Class B manufactured homes. Further, the City argues that Eddins' due process right attaches only to the recreational vehicles that were on the property at the time the ordinance was passed and does not attach generally to the placement of recreational vehicles on the property.
This Court has previously recognized that the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution and our State Constitution protect an individual's right to continue a "nonconforming use." O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42–43, 202 P.2d 401, 404–05 (1949). A "nonconforming use" is defined as "a use of land which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and which is maintained after the effective date of the ordinance even though not in compliance with use restrictions." Baxter v. City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608–09, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341–42 (1989). As a general rule, due process requires that a nonconforming use be allowed to continue after a new zoning ordinance is enacted. Id.
However, the right to continue a nonconforming use is not without limitation. As the Court has previously noted, this right Id. (quoting Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 309, 658 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct.App.1983) ). The general concept underlying this zoning policy is that "nonconforming uses should not be allowed to expand and eventually should be eliminated." Ada County v. Schemm, 96 Idaho 396, 398, 529 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1974). As such, a protected nonconforming use may be lost if it is enlarged or expanded in violation of a valid zoning ordinance. Baxter, 115 Idaho at 609, 768 P.2d at 1342. In determining whether a nonconforming use has been enlarged or expanded, this Court has adopted a flexible approach that focuses on the character of the alleged enlargement or expansion on a case-by-case basis. Id. When conducting this analysis, we focus on the particular character of the nonconforming use and whether the use was the same before and after the passage of the zoning ordinance. Id. While it is impermissible to expand or enlarge a nonconforming use, the "mere intensification of a nonconforming use does not render it unlawful." Id. Because the parties agree that Eddins has a protected nonconforming use,4 the sole issue before this Court is whether the act of replacing an existing recreational vehicle with a new recreational vehicle in Eddins' manufactured home park constitutes a continuation of the nonconforming use that is protected by due process, or alternatively, constitutes an enlargement or expansion of that use that is not protected by due process.
Due process protects the fundamental or primary use of the property prior to the enactment of a new zoning ordinance; therefore, a nonconforming use is not impermissibly enlarged or expanded until there has been some change in the fundamental or...
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