Eddmonds v. Peters

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before FLAUM, MANION, and ROVNER; MANION; FLAUM, Circuit Judge, with whom ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER
• Citation: Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1996)
• Decision Date: 23 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-2142,95-2142
• Parties: Durlyn EDDMONDS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Howard PETERS, III, Respondent-Appellee.

Page 1307

93 F.3d 1307

Durlyn EDDMONDS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Howard PETERS, III, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 95-2142.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued March 12, 1996.

Decided Aug. 23, 1996.

Richard E. Cunningham (argued), Anne E. Carlson, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Rita M. Novak, Terence Madsen, Office of Atty. Gen., Chicago, IL, Michael A. Hurst, Office of Atty. Gen., Crim. Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, Marie Quinlivan Czech (argued), Office of State's Atty. of Cook County, Crim. Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before FLAUM, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

Durlyn Eddmonds was found guilty of the deviate sexual assault and murder of a nine-year-old boy and sentenced to death. After his conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings, Eddmonds petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus alleging he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and due process at trial and sentencing and that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional. The district court denied the petition. Eddmonds appeals only the ruling on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm.

I.

The Illinois Supreme Court gave a detailed account of the evidence adduced at trial in People v. Eddmonds, 101 Ill.2d 44, 77 Ill.Dec. 724, 461 N.E.2d 347 (1984) ("Eddmonds I"). The following are excerpts from that opinion, supplemented at points with additional details from the record: ¹

In a statement taken by an assistant State's attorney and transcribed by a court reporter, defendant, age, 25, said that in the early morning of October 27, 1977, he called down to the alley below his apartment and asked Richard Miller, age 9, to come upstairs. He had seen the boy with two men, and when Richard came upstairs defendant noted that the boy was bleeding from his rectum. Defendant told Richard that he wanted to have anal intercourse with him as the other men had just done.

Id., 77 Ill.Dec. at 727, 461 N.E.2d at 350. Eddmonds told Richard to undress. Richard had blood and feces on him from the prior rape. Eddmonds cleaned him with a wet cloth and toilet paper. Eddmonds put a sheet of plastic on the bed, laid Richard on it, and began to sodomize him.

During the act of intercourse the boy started to cry and asked defendant to stop because he was hurting him. In an effort to silence Richard, defendant pushed the boy's body face down into a pillow. Defendant later told the police that he did not want the boy to awaken his grandmother in the next room. During the act of intercourse, Richard stopped breathing. When defendant completed the act, he noticed "that the boy wasn't breathing properly." Defendant tried to revive him and, failing that, looked for a place to conceal the body. He put the body in a garbage dumpster in the alley below his apartment and threw the boy's clothes and the materials he had used in cleaning him up into a yellow garbage bag. Defendant scattered the bag and its contents in a nearby alley.

A latent fingerprint examiner for the Chicago police department testified that there were in excess of 12 points of comparison between the impressions found on a newspaper lying near the yellow garbage bag and defendant's right palm print. It was his opinion that the print found on the newspaper was the same as defendant's right palm print. There was also testimony, from a microanalyst from the Chicago police department, that the garbage bag found in the alley and the bags retrieved from the defendant's apartment produced similar results when subjected to scientific analysis. The analyst also testified that a sock found in the bag had the same fiber content as one found on the landing of the porch directly in front of defendant's apartment and above the garbage dumpster. Dr. Robert Stein, chief medical examiner of Cook County, testified that he performed an autopsy and that the "cause of [Richard Miller's] death was suffocation in association with contusions and lacerations of the anus."

Eddmonds I, 77 Ill.Dec. at 727, 461 N.E.2d at 350.

Notwithstanding his recorded confession, at trial Eddmonds testified he did not rape Richard Miller:

Defendant testified that a friend of his, Jerome Williams, had come to his apartment in a nervous state. After using the bathroom to clean up, Williams asked if he could use some plastic bags which were lying on defendant's bed. He asked defendant to obtain some heroin and then left the apartment. Defendant also left the apartment, purchased a half ounce of heroin, and gave it to Williams. Williams returned to defendant's apartment shortly after midnight. He was carrying a shopping bag which he took into defendant's bedroom and left there. Both men left the apartment. Defendant returned home at approximately 2:15 a.m. and went to sleep.

When he awoke the next morning he discovered the shopping bag contained a child's clothing, shoes and a yellow plastic bag. His grandmother then told him about the body of the boy which had been found in the alley. Knowing that there was a child's clothing in the shopping bag and that Williams had been arrested for molesting children, defendant quickly left with the shopping bag. He met Williams, and Williams said he would get rid of the bag. They walked to an alley, and Williams dumped the bag.

Defendant also related a conversation with Williams in which Williams told of having sex with the dead boy and then drowning him in a bathtub so that he could not carry out his threat to tell his mother. He also testified to an episode in which Williams had prepared two syringes of heroin, one for himself and one for defendant. He noted that the one intended for him was darker and, while Williams was otherwise engaged, he switched syringes. Thereafter, Williams "shot the heroin" and in a short period of time began to shake. Williams died the following day, apparently of an overdose of heroin.

Defendant testified that the statements he made concerning the sexual assault and the death of the boy were false and were made because the police "would not let him leave and told him what to say." He denied each of the charges against him.

Id. at 727-28, 461 N.E.2d at 350-51.

Eddmonds waived his right to a jury trial. After a bench trial before the Honorable Judge John Crowley of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Eddmonds was found guilty of deviate sexual assault and murder. Pursuant to section 9-1(d) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(d); now 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d)), the State requested a death penalty hearing and Eddmonds waived his right to be sentenced by a jury. The court made initial findings that Eddmonds was over 18, that the murder occurred during the commission of the felony of deviate sexual assault, and that Eddmonds was eligible for the death penalty under § 9-1(b)(6). The court then heard evidence of mitigation and aggravation. Eddmonds I, 77 Ill.Dec. at 728, 461 N.E.2d at 351.

In aggravation, the State presented testimony that Eddmonds had committed four other rapes, three resulting in convictions. In mitigation the defense presented Dr. Robert Reifman, director of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Dr. Reifman testified that, based on his examination of Eddmonds in December 1977 to determine fitness for trial, he had concluded that Eddmonds suffered from schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, which in his opinion caused him to be out of contact with reality and thus unfit for trial. His diagnosis was based on Eddmonds' report of hearing voices and his emotional withdrawal, lethargy, depression, and inappropriate smiling. During a lengthy cross-examination, Dr. Reifman stated he was unable to render a definitive opinion whether, at the time the offense was committed, Eddmonds was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Eddmonds I, 77 Ill.Dec. at 728, 461 N.E.2d at 351. The court also reviewed the presentence investigation but found no mitigating factors sufficient to outweigh those in aggravation. Id. The court then sentenced Eddmonds to death for the murder and to 40 to 80 years' incarceration for the deviate sexual assault. Id.

On direct appeal the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Id. at 737, 461 N.E.2d at 360. The United States Supreme Court denied Eddmonds' petition for writ of certiorari. Eddmonds v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 894, 105 S.Ct. 271, 83 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984). On May 28, 1985, Eddmonds filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging he was denied his right to competent counsel because his attorney (1) failed to investigate his fitness to stand trial and failed to request a fitness hearing, and (2) failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d 501, 161 Ill.Dec. 306, 578 N.E.2d 952, 955 (1991) ("Eddmonds II"). The State moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the fitness issue had been resolved on direct appeal and that Eddmonds' attorney was not ineffective at sentencing. Id. Following an evidentiary hearing the judge at first denied relief but later vacated the sentence and ordered a hearing to determine whether Eddmonds was fit at the capital sentencing hearing. Id. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the death sentence, holding that Eddmonds was not deprived of his right to competent counsel or to a fair post-conviction proceeding. Id., 161 Ill.Dec. at 323, 578 N.E.2d at 969.

On August 24, 1992, Eddmonds petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, again alleging that (1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to request a fitness hearing prior to trial; (2) he was denied due process because his fitness was not adjudicated; (3) counsel was ineffective at sentencing in his presentation of evidence and argument in mitigation; (4) he was denied due...