Eddy v. Casey's General Store, Inc.

Decision Date13 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 90-1661,90-1661
Citation485 N.W.2d 633
PartiesLarry EDDY, Cheryl Eddy, and Alyssa Eddy, a Minor by Her Parent and Next Friend, Cheryl Eddy, Appellants, v. CASEY'S GENERAL STORE, INC., an Iowa Corporation, Jack Dean Johnson, and Dennis Hobbs, Defendants, and Risco, Inc., Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Steven H. Shindler, Thomas T. Tarbox, and William B. Serangeli of Smith, Schneider, Stiles, Mumford, Schrage, Zurek, Wimer, and Hudson, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.

Jeffrey A. Boehlert and Douglas A. Haag of Patterson, Lorentzen, Duffield, Timmons, Irish, Becker, and Ordway, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

The main question here is whether we should allow a new common law claim against a liquor licensee that sold beer to an adult for off-premises consumption. The beer ultimately was consumed by a third person who drove a motor vehicle and injured plaintiffs. We affirm the district court's ruling that denied plaintiffs' claims against the licensee.

I. Background facts and proceedings. Plaintiffs Larry Eddy, his wife Cheryl Eddy, and their daughter Alyssa Eddy (Eddys) appeal from the district court's ruling which sustained a motion for summary judgment by defendant Risco, Inc., the liquor licensee. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 237. The parties agreed in the district court, for purposes of the summary judgment motion, that the facts in substance are as follows. Jack Johnson and Dennis Hobbs were roommates. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on October 14, 1989, Johnson came home and found Hobbs drinking beer while watching football on television. Hobbs remained in the house drinking beer while Johnson went out into the back yard to work. At about 3:00 or 4:00 in the afternoon, Johnson came back inside and drank some of Hobbs' beers. After the two finished the beers, they proceeded to Casey's General Store, Inc., in Ames, which was owned by defendant Risco, Inc.

Upon arrival at the Casey's store, Hobbs went inside the store to purchase more beer. Johnson remained outside in his truck. Hobbs proceeded immediately to the cooler where he obtained a twelve-pack of beer. He did not open or consume any of the beer while in the store. After he paid for the beer, Hobbs and Johnson left the store area. They then opened the beer and began to drink it while they were traveling to Story City. The two apparently stopped at a brother-in-law's farm while driving to Story City and had some beer while at the farm. Shortly after they resumed their trip, with Johnson driving, the vehicle ran through a stop sign striking the Eddy car. Larry Eddy sustained personal injuries from the collision.

After the accident, Johnson was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol and for driving under a suspended license. At his trial for these charges, an expert estimated that Johnson's blood alcohol content at the time of the accident was .135. Johnson was convicted of these charges. Plaintiffs Eddy thereafter brought this action for personal injuries and loss of consortium against Casey's General Store, Inc., Jack Johnson, Dennis Hobbs, and Risco, Inc. Only plaintiffs' claims against Risco are involved in this appeal.

Plaintiffs' claims against defendant Risco were based upon Iowa's Dramshop Act, Iowa Code section 123.92 (1989), and common law negligence. The district court thereafter sustained Risco's summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiffs' petition as to Risco. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c). Eddys appealed, and we now consider the issues raised.

II. Dramshop claim. Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to recover money damages from defendant Risco pursuant to our dramshop act, which provides, in pertinent part:

Any person who is injured in person or property or means of support by an intoxicated person or resulting from the intoxication of a person, has a right of action for all damages actually sustained, severally or jointly, against any licensee or permittee, who sold and served any beer, wine, or intoxicating liquor to the intoxicated person when the licensee or permittee knew or should have known the person was intoxicated....

Iowa Code § 123.92 (emphasis supplied).

We have previously held that before a permittee or licensee may be exposed to liability under the dramshop act, a plaintiff must prove that the permittee or licensee both sold and served alcohol to an intoxicated person with the intent that the alcohol be consumed on the premises. Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 476 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Iowa 1991); see also Thorp v. Casey's General Stores, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1989). It is undisputed that Risco never "served" any beer or other alcohol to Hobbs or Johnson for on-premises consumption. Also, none of the purchased beer was actually consumed on Risco's premises by Hobbs or Johnson. Accordingly, it was proper for the district court to sustain Risco's summary judgment motion as to this assignment of error.

III. Equal protection claim. The next issue plaintiffs raise is whether a construction of the dramshop act, section 123.92, which precludes liability against licensees and permittees that only sell alcohol violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. For the same reasons discussed at length in our recent decision in Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 347-48, we hold that such a construction of the dramshop act does not violate the equal protection rights of the plaintiffs.

IV. Common law claim. Plaintiffs Eddy alternatively claim that they are entitled to recover from defendant Risco based upon common law negligence. More specifically, Eddys assert that Risco breached a duty of care to them by selling beer to Hobbs when it knew or should have known that he was intoxicated. Defendant Risco argues that plaintiffs may not maintain a common law claim because the dramshop act, section 123.92, preempts the field of liquor vendor liability and provides the exclusive remedy against liquor licensees and permittees for alcohol sales to adults. We agree.

A. This court has addressed on several previous occasions the general question of whether the dramshop act preempts common law claims against licensees and permittees. See Nutting v. Zieser, 482 N.W.2d 424 (Iowa 1992); Thorp, 446 N.W.2d at 465; Slager v. HWA Corp., 435 N.W.2d 349 (Iowa 1989); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1988); Fuhrman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 807 (Iowa 1987); Connolly v. Conlan, 371 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1985); Golden v. O'Neill, 366 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1985); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984); Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). We have repeatedly said that the dramshop act provides the exclusive remedy against those covered by the act: licensees and permittees. See, e.g., Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 352; Bauer, 428 N.W.2d at 660; Blesz v. Weisbrod, 424 N.W.2d 451, 452 (Iowa 1988); Fuhrman, 398 N.W.2d at 809; Connolly, 371 N.W.2d at 833. More importantly, we have consistently maintained that the dramshop act, section 123.92, preempts common law negligence actions against licensees and permittees grounded on the sale of intoxicants to an intoxicated person. See, e.g., Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227 (dramshop act usurps a common law negligence action against a licensee grounded on the sale of intoxicants to an intoxicated person in violation of Iowa Code section 123.49(1)); see also Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 349 n. 2; Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 352; Fuhrman, 398 N.W.2d at 809; Connolly, 371 N.W.2d at 833.

We adhere to this line of precedent and conclude that a common law negligence action may not be maintained against a licensee or permittee. Stated another way, section 123.92 provides the exclusive remedy against a licensee or permittee that provides intoxicating liquor or beer to an intoxicated adult person.

We note that, in addition to our own cases, this conclusion is supported by cases from other jurisdictions holding that a dramshop act provides the exclusive remedy against licensees and permittees. See, e.g., Parker v. Miller Brewing Co., 560 So.2d 1030, 1034 (Ala.1990) (although plaintiff's complaint stated no claim under civil damages or dramshop acts, common law negligence claim would not be adopted to impose liability upon permittee); Keaton v. Kroger Co., 143 Ga.App. 23, 29-30, 237 S.E.2d 443, 448 (1977) (act providing a civil remedy for a parent against any person who wrongfully sells liquor to his or her child preempted the field of civil liability and actions for negligence per se); Stevens v. Lou's Lemon Tree, Ltd, 187 Ill.App.3d 458, 135 Ill.Dec. 58, 543 N.E.2d 293 (1989) (liquor control act provides the only remedy against tavern operators and owners); Plamondon v. Matthews, 148 Mich.App. 737, 743, 385 N.W.2d 273, 276 (1985) (exclusive remedy for ordinary negligence in supplying person with alcoholic beverages is provided by dramshop act); Rowan v. Southland Corp., 90 Mich.App. 61, 68, 282 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1979) (dramshop act is exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of unlawful sales of alcohol by licensed retailers); Leimkuehler v. Myers, 780 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Mo.App.1989) (plaintiff had no claim against package liquor store operator under common law nor under statute that was limited to tavern owners who dispensed alcoholic beverages by the drink); accord Winney v. Ransom & Hastings, Inc., 149 Vt. 213, 542 A.2d 269 (1988) (dramshop act provides exclusive remedy where facts of case fall within scope of act).

B. Our conclusion that section 123.92 provides the exclusive remedy against licensees and permittees is further supported by its history and language. Prior to enactment of the dramshop act, no common law negligence claim was allowed against a permittee or licensee arising out of the mere sale of intoxicating liquor. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 226. See generally Comment Beyond the Dram Shop...

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