Eden Envtl. Citizen's Grp. v. Cal. Cascade Bldg. Materials, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:19-cv-01936-TLN-KJN |
| Parties | EDEN ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN'S GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA CASCADE BUILDING MATERIALS, INC.; AMAR S. DOMAN; and JAMES CODE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on the following: Defendant California Cascade Building Materials, Inc.'s (“California Cascade”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No 20); Defendants Amar S. Doman (“Doman”) and James Code's (“Code”) Motion to Dismiss[1] (ECF No. 22); California Cascade's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45); and Plaintiff Eden Environmental Citizen's Group, LLC's (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Reconsideration of the magistrate judge's order granting California Cascade's motion to stay discovery. (ECF Nos. 55 and 53). All pending motions are fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DENIES California Cascade's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20), GRANTS Doman and Code's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22), DENIES California Cascade's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45), and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration as moot (ECF No. 55).
This case arises from California Cascade's allegedly unlawful failure to obtain a permit for the discharge of pollutants from its facility into the Sacramento River. (See ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff is an environmental membership group with a mission to enforce the provisions of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the requirements of California's Industrial General Permit Order 2014-0057 DWQ, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) Order No. CAS000001 (the “General Permit”). (Id. at 3-4.) Some of Plaintiff's members reside and work near Morrison Creek and the Sacramento River and use those waters and their watersheds for various recreational activities and scientific study. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges its members' “use and enjoyment of these natural resources have been and continue to be adversely impaired by Defendants' failure to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of the General Permit and the CWA.” (Id.)
California Cascade's facility in Sacramento, California (the “Facility”), is a 20-acre wood products manufacturing and distribution plant. (Id. at 2 16.) Using on-site equipment, the Facility saws, cuts, trims, planes, molds, and treats the raw wood and timber into various end products it sells to retail lumber companies and businesses. (Id. at 16.) End products include: pressure-treated lumber and plywood; decking; fence panels, pickets, posts, and rails; siding; finishing and landscaping products; and wooden stakes. (Id.) California Cascade also operates an interstate trucking operation for the transport of logs, poles, beams, lumber, and building materials. (Id. at 17.) It is licensed under the U.S. Department of Transportation and provides on-site maintenance and repair for its trucks. (Id.)
Pursuant to the CWA, the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has authorized the California State Water Resources Control Board (the “State Water Board”) to issue NPDES permits for industrial storm water discharges. (Id. at 7.) Facilities that either discharge or have the potential to discharge storm water associated with industrial activity and have not obtained a NPDES permit must apply for coverage under the General Permit. (Id. At 8.) Based on the Fact Sheet accompanying the General Permit that discusses how to classify a facility with multiple activities, Plaintiff alleges California Cascade conducts distinct and separate economic activities at the Facility to which different Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) Codes[2] apply. (Id. at 18-21.) California Cascade previously believed SIC Code 2499 (wood products, not elsewhere classified) applied to the Facility and had therefore obtained coverage under the General Permit on July 7, 2015. (Id. at 17, 21.) However, California Cascade filed paperwork with the State Water Board on August 1, 2019 to terminate its General Permit coverage, taking the position that SIC Code 5031 (warehousing and wholesale distribution of lumber) applies, which does not require coverage. (Id. at 21.) California Cascade terminated its General Permit coverage on September 17, 2019. (Id. at 22.)
Plaintiff alleges the Facility engages in “at least three distinct and separate economic activities, ” two of which require Defendants to maintain NPDES coverage under the General Permit. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the Facility's operations include: “(a) warehousing and wholesale distribution of lumber and construction building materials, which fall under SIC Code 5031; (b) wood products manufacturing, which fall under SIC Codes 2421, 2431, 2491, and 2499; and (c) local trucking operations with on-site maintenance and fueling, which fall under SIC Codes 4213 and 7538.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants are currently discharging storm water into Morrison Creek and the Sacramento River from the Facility without a General Permit - thereby in violation of the CWA. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed the instant action on September 23, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges seven claims for violations of the CWA. (See ECF No. 7.) The first six claims allege violations of the terms of the General Permit and the seventh claim alleges a violation of the CWA by failing to have coverage under the General Permit. (See Id. at 30-39.) On January 21, 2020, Defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 20, 22.) On February 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed oppositions. (ECF Nos. 24, 27.) On February 13, 2020, Defendants filed replies. (ECF Nos. 30, 32.) On October 15, 2020, California Cascade filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 45.) This matter is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 46, 47.) On December 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 55.) This matter is also fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 57, 59.) The Court will first consider Defendants' motions to dismiss, [3] then California Cascade's motion for summary judgment, and finally Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege “‘specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may only consider the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district...
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