Eden Stone Co., Inc. v. Oakfield Stone Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 December 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-0332,91-0332 |
| Citation | 479 N.W.2d 557,166 Wis.2d 105 |
| Parties | EDEN STONE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. OAKFIELD STONE COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellant. d |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Steven P. Sager and John R. Emery of Sager, Pavlick & Wirtz, S.C., Fond du Lac, for plaintiff-respondent.
Before NETTESHEIM, P.J., and ANDERSON and SNYDER, JJ.
Oakfield Stone Company, Inc. (Oakfield) appeals from a judgment awarding Eden Stone Company, Inc. (Eden) $347,401. The judgment resulted from a jury determination that Oakfield tortiously converted a quantity of Niagara Dolomite stone located on the property of Daniel and Wendy Schraufnagel. Eden had previously acquired the right to quarry this stone by a lease agreement with the Schraufnagels. We affirm the judgment.
Eden and Oakfield are competitors in the quarrying and sale of various types of building stone. They operate adjacent quarries on separate parcels in Fond du Lac county. Both companies quarry and market a unique and valuable form of Niagara Dolomite stone known as "holey boulders." These boulders are found on a large ledge known as the Niagara Escarpment which runs through the area of Fond du Lac county where both Eden and Oakfield conduct their quarrying operations.
Oakfield originally quarried holey boulders on the Schraufnagel farm during the 1960's and 1970's. Thereafter, Oakfield ceased this operation, and, in 1975, Eden began quarrying these boulders on the Schraufnagel farm under a lease agreement which gave Eden exclusive quarrying rights. 1 In 1983, Eden and the Schraufnagels renewed this lease arrangement. This lease carried a five-year term with renewal option provisions. This lease was in effect when Oakfield quarried and removed the holey boulders at issue in this case from the Schraufnagel farm.
In May 1987, Eden and Oakfield were competing for the award of a contract on an Illinois construction contract. Oakfield was awarded the contract. In June 1987, Dan Rademann, an Oakfield representative, approached Daniel Schraufnagel and advised that Oakfield had an order for holey boulders which it could not satisfy from its existing quarrying operations. Rademann asked if Oakfield could quarry holey boulders from the Schraufnagel farm. As a result, Schraufnagel and Rademann orally agreed that Oakfield could do so and Oakfield began its operations on the Schraufnagel site in July 1987. Schraufnagel testified that at the time this agreement was struck, Rademann knew of Eden's prior quarrying rights under the 1983 lease between Eden and the Schraufnagels.
Eden learned of Oakfield's quarrying operation on the Schraufnagel site in October 1987. Eden contacted the Fond du Lac County Sheriff's Department which instructed Oakfield to stay off the Schraufnagel property. In November 1987, Eden commenced this action for tortious conversion against Oakfield. 2 We will recite additional facts as we discuss the issues.
Oakfield contends that the trial court erred when it refused to address certain pretrial motions on the merits. Instead, the court rejected Oakfield's motions as untimely. 3
Eden commenced this action in November 1987. On April 18, 1988, the trial court entered a scheduling order setting the case for jury trial on August 8, 1988. The court, however, adjourned this trial date upon stipulation of the parties, rescheduling the jury trial for January 2, 1990. However, due to Oakfield's counsel's illness, the trial date was twice rescheduled--once to May 21, 1990 and again to October 15, 1990. This last trial date was fixed by the court's scheduling order of June 4, 1990.
On September 26, 1990, nineteen days before this latest scheduled trial date, Oakfield filed various motions seeking dismissal of Eden's complaint on numerous legal grounds. 4 Oakfield contended that these motions were dispositive of Eden's entire case against Oakfield. The hearing on the motions was held on September 28, giving Eden only two days advance notice. Because sec. 801.15(4), Stats., prescribes five days advance notice, Oakfield asked the trial court to shorten the statute's notice requirements. The court denied this request and declined to substantively address Oakfield's motions.
Section 801.15(4), Stats., provides in part:
A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by statute or by order of the court....
The trial court's decision to shorten the statute's five-day notice requirement is a matter addressed to the court's discretion. See Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis.2d 461, 467, 326 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1982).
Viewed in isolation, Oakfield's request to shorten the statute's notice requirement by a few days does not have an unreasonable ring. However, the trial court considered the "ripple" effect of Oakfield's request: Eden had not been provided sufficient opportunity to respond to Oakfield's motions and supporting brief; 5 thus, the motion hearing would likely have to be adjourned to allow Eden time to prepare a response; this, in turn, would put the scheduled trial date (only seventeen days away) at risk. 6 Recalling that this was the fourth trial date, the court aptly observed that at some point "the expeditious trial of this matter becomes a paramount question." These reasons well support the court's decision not to shorten the statute's notice requirements.
The trial court's ruling was all the more correct given that the motions were, in part, for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment. A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be brought "within time so as not to delay the trial." Section 802.06(3), Stats. As we have already held, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Oakfield's motion put the trial date at risk. Section 802.08, Stats., the summary judgment statute, provides that such a motion shall be brought within eight months of the filing of the action or within the time set out in the scheduling order. In addition, this statute provides that a summary judgment motion shall be served at least twenty days before the time fixed for hearing. Section 802.08(2). Oakfield's motion violated all three of these summary judgment time or notice requirements.
Oakfield contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the motions were dispositive of the case and would have avoided the necessity for trial. While again this is an argument with some facial appeal, it too loses luster under closer scrutiny. First, as some of the trial court's later rulings demonstrated, the motions did not prove to be dispositive.
Second, and more importantly, the trial court was not required to accept Oakfield's representations that the motions were dispositive of the entire case. Rather, the court was first required to address Eden's claim that the motions were untimely, and, if so, then to consider whether sufficient cause existed to deviate from the statute's notice requirements. Only then could the court address the motions on their merits. The court scrupulously followed this procedure. And, as we have already held, the court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 7
Continuances and delay are the bane of the judicial system. The adoption of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure represented a significant change from prior practice which permitted the attorneys to largely control the movement of cases through the judicial system. Under these new rules, this responsibility shifted principally to the trial courts. See Judicial Council Committee Note, 1974, sec. 802.10, Stats. (67 Wis.2d 585, 637). In their judicial education programs, Wisconsin judges are now regularly instructed on the principles and techniques of efficient case management so as to avoid the disruptive and costly effect of repeated continuances and delay.
Perhaps in earlier and more leisurely times, the type of adjournment sought in this case would have been routinely granted. However, given the volume of litigation burdening the trial courts, the bar and litigants must understand that Wisconsin trial judges will monitor their calendars to avoid the damaging effects of unwarranted delay. In this case, the trial court properly exercised its responsibilities in this regard.
Oakfield contends that the 1983 lease agreement between Eden and the Schraufnagels did not vest Eden with an exclusive right to quarry holey boulders on the Schraufnagel property nor with rights sufficient to permit a cause of action for conversion as to the holey boulders which Oakfield quarried. We disagree.
The lease reads in relevant part, "Schraufnagel has agreed with Eden Stone to grant to Eden Stone exclusive right to quarry and remove stone from Schraufnagel's premises...." (Emphasis added.) The trial court determined that this language was clear and unambiguous, entitling Eden to the exclusive right to quarry stone--including holey boulders--on the Schraufnagel farm.
The construction of a written contract is normally a matter of law for the court. Ondrasek v. Tenneson, 158 Wis.2d 690, 694, 462 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Ct.App.1990). We owe no deference to the trial court's construction of a contract. See Hoeft v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 153 Wis.2d 135, 140, 450 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Ct.App.1989). When the terms of a contract are plain and unambiguous, we will construe the contract as it stands. Borchardt v. Wilk, 156 Wis.2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Ct.App.1990).
Oakfield attempts to build ambiguity into this lease on a number of fronts. First, Oakfield contends that because the lease does not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Abbott Labs.
...which prevents recovery is uncertainty as to the fact of the damage and not to its amount.” Eden Stone Co. v. Oakfield Stone Co., 166 Wis.2d 105, 125, 479 N.W.2d 557 (Ct.App.1991) (emphasis altered) (citing Cutler Cranberry Co. v. Oakdale Elec. Co-op., 78 Wis.2d 222, 233, 254 N.W.2d 234 (19......
-
Estate of Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc.
...the plaintiff and any other co-tortfeasors. Id. [342 Wis.2d 62]¶ 54 In contrast, E & B relies on Eden Stone Co., Inc. v. Oakfield Stone Co., Inc., 166 Wis.2d 105, 479 N.W.2d 557 (Ct.App.1991), to support its argument that the principles of Pierringer are simply inapplicable here because Exc......
-
EState Kriefall v. Sizzler U.S. Franchise Inc.
...have Excel's contractual undertaking to indemnify E & B for harm caused by Excel. Thus, as Eden Stone Co., Inc. v. Oakfield Stone Co., Inc., 166 Wis.2d 105, 120, 479 N.W.2d 557, 563–564 (Ct.App.1991) recognized: It is axiomatic that a Pierringer release can only function in a setting involv......
-
Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C.
...are clear and unambiguous, we construe the contract according to its literal terms. See Eden Stone Co., Inc. v. Oakfield Stone Co., Inc., 166 Wis.2d 105, 115, 479 N.W.2d 557 (Ct.App.1991). However, when the contractual terms are "reasonably ... susceptible to more than one construction," th......