Edens v. New Mexico Health and Social Services Dept.

• Citation: 89 N.M. 60,1976 NMSC 8,547 P.2d 65
• Decision Date: 16 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 10512,10512
• Parties: Boyce D. EDENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, a Department of the State of New Mexico, Employer, and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, a corporation, Insurer, Defendants-A
• Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico

Page 65

547 P.2d 65

89 N.M. 60

Boyce D. EDENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, a Department of the State of New Mexico, Employer and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, a corporation Insurer Defendants-A

No. 10512.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 16, 1976.

David W. Bonem, Clovis, Scott H. Mabry, David F. Boyd, Jr., Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.

Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, James A. Parker, Judy A. Fry, Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

MONTOYA, Justice.

This appeal arises from a denial of a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of Betty Jean Edens (Edens) who was fatally injured in a car accident in Albuquerque. At the time of the accident, Edens was employed in Albuquerque by defendant New Mexico Health and Social Services Department (HSSD).

The Bernalillo County District Court denied all relief sought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, §§ 59--10--1 to 37, N.M.S.A., 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 9, Pt. 1, 1974). The judgment of the District Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Serv. Dept., 88 N.M. 366, 540 P.2d 846 (Ct.App.1975). We granted certiorari.

At the time of the accident, Edens was employed by defendant HSSD as Director of its Bernalillo County North Valley Office in Albuquerque. The deceased and three other employees from Bernalillo County were ordered by the defendant-employer to attend a special two-day HSSD meeting in Santa Fe on October 3--4, 1973. They were requested by their respective supervisors to form a car pool and to return overnight to Albuquerque between the two sessions in order to save fuel and reduce travel costs. Consequently, on the morning of October 3, 1973, Edens and the three other employees met at the Gulf Mart parking lot on San Mateo Boulevard in Albuquerque and proceeded as a group to Santa Fe in Edens' car. At the close of the first day's session, the four returned to the Gulf Mart parking lot. After discharging her three colleagues from her car, Edens drove out of the parking lot and immediately thereafter was involved in the accident which resulted in her death.

Plaintiff-appellant contests the three findings of fact by the trial court, that (1) Edens had completed all the duties of her employment before the accident; (2) she was not performing any duties of her employment and was not acting within the scope and course of her employment at the time of the accident; and (3) the accident did not arise out of, nor was it incidental to, her employment.

The defendants-appellees, on the other hand, contend that the findings of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence. They contend that this case comes within the longstanding 'going and coming' rule which precludes compensation for injuries sustained on the way to work and on the way home from work.

The pertinent provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are §§ 59--10--2 and 59--10--12.12, supra, which declare in part:

(§ 59--10--2)

'The state * * * shall become liable to, and shall pay to any * * * workman injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment (with the state) * * * and, in case of his death being occasioned thereby, to such person as may be appointed by the court to receive the same for the benefit of his dependents, compensation in the manner and amount, at the times herein required.' (Emphasis added.)

(§ 59--10--12.12)

'As used in the Workmen's Compensation Act (59--10--1 to 59--10--37), unless the context otherwise requires, the words 'injuries sustained in extra-hazardous occupations or pursuit' shall include death resulting from injury, and injuries to workmen, as a result of their employment and while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer, and injuries occurring elsewhere while at work in any place where their employer's business requires their presence and subjects them to extrahazardous duties incident to the business, but shall not include injuries to any workman occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties, the approximate cause of which injury is not the employer's negligence.'

See also § 59--10--13.3, supra.

The question before us is whether the fatal injuries to Edens arose out of and in the course of her employment.

We now turn to the scope of review to be exercised in reviewing the District Court's decision. All cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, like the one before us, are tried to the court without a jury. Section 59--10--13.1, supra. The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to these cases except where the Act provides otherwise. Section 59--10--13.9, supra. Consequently, in workmen's compensation cases findings of fact are reviewable only to the extent of determining whether they are supported by substantial evidence, whereas conclusions of law are freely reviewable. Whitehurst v. Rainbo Baking Company, 70 N.M. 468, 374 P.2d 849 (1962).

Are the determinations of the District Court appealed from findings of fact or conclusions of law? The District Court concluded, and the parties and the Court of Appeals assumed, that they are findings of fact. This court is not bound, however, by the labels attached below to these determinations. In re McCain, 84 N.M. 657, 506 P.2d 1204 (1973); Houck v. Hinds, 215 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1954). The issue whether a determination is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law is itself a question of law and, therefore, freely reviewable in this court.

We have previously held that, where the historical facts of the case are undisputed, the question whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment is a question of law. Ward v. Halliburton Company,76 N.M. 463, 415 P.2d 847 (1966); Whitehurst v. Rainbo Baking Company,supra. See generally, 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 611, at 869--71 (1958); 58 Am.Jur. Workmen's Compensation § 461 at 872--73 (1948). There was no material dispute as to the historical facts of this case in the court below. Therefore, under our precedents, the District Court should have determined whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment as a matter of law, and such determination is freely reviewable on appeal.

Turning to the merits, we find no holding in this jurisdiction directly on point. However, in the case of Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 94, 227 P.2d 365, 373 (1950), this court said:

'We are committed to the doctrine that the Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed, and reasonable doubts resolved in favor of employees. (Citations omitted.) So construing the act, we conclude that when an employee is sent by his employer on a special mission away from his regular work; or by the terms of his contract of...