Eder v. Appeal from Probate
| Decision Date | 02 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | CV146045533S |
| Court | Superior Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | David Eder v. Appeal From Probate |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This matter involves an appeal from a decision of the New Haven Probate Court which held that the remainder beneficiaries under a Trust set up in 1991 included not only the biological child of the settlor of the Trust, John Eder, but also two adult children adopted by John Eder in 2010.
The court will first discuss the language of the Trust which is important to the decision to be made by the court. It will then briefly set forth the claims made by David Eder and the factual background of those claims and the relevant state statutes that have a bearing on this case and possibly the issues raised.
The Trust was set up in October 1991 with John Eder as its grantor or settlor. The Trust was to terminate " upon the twentieth (20th) anniversary of the date on which the property described in Schedule A (attached to Trust document) is transferred to this Trust." The terms of the Trust provided that John Eder was to receive $114, 000 per year and after 20 years the Trust was to be terminated and trust assets were to be distributed per Article I paragraph 6 which in relevant part stated:
Article XIII of the trust is entitled " Definitions" and in subsection (1) it states:
(1) Lineal Descendants: The term " lineal descendants" used anywhere in this Trust Indenture shall mean child, grandchild, great grandchild, etc., whether so related by blood or legal adoption, including any of the aforesaid born or adopted after the signing of this Trust Indenture. The grantor's only living child is David Eric Eder.
Although Article XIII, as noted, in subsection (1) wherein " lineal descendants" is defined states that at the time of the trust's creation David Eder is the Grantor's " only living child, " other sections of the trust contemplate the Grantor, John Eder may have other children at the time of the termination of the trust twenty years hence--see previously quoted language of Article I subsection 6. There it says upon termination distribution shall be made " for each child the grantor then living." Article XII states that " This trust is irrevocable and the Grantor shall have no right whatsoever to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust created hereunder, in whole or in part." It then goes on to say that the trust and the distributions provided for therein shall not be deemed " to discharge or relieve the grantor, his children or such children's spouses, from their obligation to support any dependent of theirs."
Another provision of the Trust that should be noted is set forth in the first sentence of Article X which states, after the heading " Governing Law, " " this Trust Indenture has been accepted by the Trustees and its validity construction, and all rights thereunder shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut."
The operative facts which engendered this appeal will now be briefly discussed. The court will discuss the facts in more detail when it addresses legal issues raised in the appeal. The trust was to be terminated on October 11, 2011. The settlor, John Eder, had one biological child, David Eder, but on June 30, 2010 John Eder, in the state of Massachusetts adopted two adults, Sacha and Mischa Richter. On November 3 2011 the trustees brought an application to Probate Court for determination of the Trust's beneficiaries. Probate Judge Keyes said in his opinion: " At issue is whether the settlor's adopted children fall within the Trust's class of beneficiaries and may thus benefit from the distribution of trust assets as remainder beneficiaries, or are disqualified outside of such trust by fraud or otherwise." Judge Keyes found that the remainder beneficiaries of the trust were both the biological child and the adopted children of the settlor John Eder and the Trustees were thus ordered " to distribute the trust, having been terminated on October 21, 2011, in equal shares to David Eric Eder, Sacha Armand Richter, and Mischa Benjamin Richter.
This appeal was then filed in Superior Court. The court will discuss these issues in more detail but will now briefly outline the positions of the parties to this appeal. The appellant, David Eder argues that in 2009 the settlor John Eder became very angry with his son David Eder. To satisfy this anger he adopted Sacha and Mischa Richter for the sole purpose of reducing the distribution David Eder was to receive under the trust distribution. It is argued that these adoptions were sham adoptions " that does great violence to the intent and purpose of our trust laws and should not be permitted" (post-trial brief). It is also suggested that the trust was the " idea of John Eder's father, Arthur Eder." Arthur Eder wanted the trust distribution upon termination to go to David Eder, his grandson. It is claimed John Eder did not even read the 1991 Annuity Trust before signing it. It is also maintained that a fair reading of the trust document in its entirety suggests that the word child of John Eder only refers to his biological child David Eder and was not meant to include adopted children as beneficiaries of the trust.
The defendants to this appeal point to the fact that per the Joint Trial Management Report David Eder does not contest that Sacha's and Mischa's adoptions were sanctioned by Massachusetts court of state and are considered legal and binding in Massachusetts. These decrees are entitled to full faith and credit in our state. Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 356, 2 A.3d 902 (2010). A federal imprimatur, however, is not a prerequisite for the defendant's position. The prefatory language to § 45a-731 states that " A final decree of adoption whether issued by a court of this state or a court of any other jurisdiction shall have the following effect in this state." Subsection (4) goes on to provide:
The adopted person shall . . . be treated as if such adopted person were the biological child of the adoptive parent for purposes of the applicability of all documents and instruments, whether executed before or after the adoption decree is issued, which do not expressly exclude an adopted person in their operation or effect. The words 'child, ' 'children, 'issue, ' 'descendants, ' 'heir, ' 'heirs, ' 'lawful heirs, ' 'grandchild' and 'grandchildren, ' when used in any will or trust instrument shall include legally adopted persons, unless such document clearly indicates a contrary intention.
Section 45a-734(b), our " Adoption of Adults" statute provides " Upon the court's approval of the adoption agreement, the adopted person shall become the legal child of the adoptive parent and the adoptive parent shall become the legal parent of the adopted person and the provisions of Section 45a-731, as amended by this act, shall apply."
The court will now try to address the legal issues raised in this case.
This case raises in the first instance the issue of the proper interpretation of the trust agreement. In Sections 28 and 29 of 76 Am.Jur.2d pp. 61-62 " Trusts, " the general law on this subject is set forth with citations to cases from more than twenty jurisdictions. In Section 28 it states " In general, the rules for construction of written instruments apply to the interpretation of trusts, so that the meaning of a trust instrument is determined by the same rules that govern the interpretations of contracts, deeds, or wills."
As said in State v. Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 363 N.C. 623, 685 S.E.2d 85, 90 (2009) " interpreting the terms of an express trust " is a case of contract interpretation, " Waters v. Peaks Philips, 685 S.E.2d 85, 90 (2009). Section 29 focuses on how trusts in particular must be interpreted and the rules of interpretation a court should follow in ascertaining the meaning of the language used in them. Section 29 states that
Comment (a) to Section 4 of the Restatement (3d) Trusts says that: " The intention of the settlor that determines the terms of the trust is the intention at the time of the creation of the trust and not a subsequent intention."
Judge Peck in the 2011 case of Heath v. Heath, CV 09-04044709, Hartford J.D....
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