Edgar v. Reeser
Decision Date | 02 January 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 313.,313. |
Parties | EDGAR v. REESER. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Edmund Lashley, of Tulsa, Okl. (Hal F. Rambo and Russell B. James, both of Tulsa, Okl., on the brief), for appellant.
Thos. J. Casey, of Tulsa, Okl., and Foster V. Phipps, of Muskogee, Okl., for appellee.
Before COTTERAL, PHILLIPS, and McDERMOTT, Circuit Judges.
Joe Edgar brought this suit against Edwin I. Reeser for specific performance of an alleged contract.
The bill alleged that on December 8 and 9, 1927, Edgar entered into a contract with Reeser, the latter acting through F. N. Hunt as his agent, whereby Edgar agreed to sell and convey and Reeser agreed to purchase for $19,000 an undivided one-sixteenth interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in and under 3,040 acres of land in Crockett County, Texas; that on March 2, 1928, Edgar tendered performance of such contract to Reeser and demanded that the latter pay $18,990, the balance of the purchase price; and that Reeser refused to accept performance and refused to pay the balance of such purchase price.
The answer denied the agency of Hunt, alleged that Hunt did not have written authority to act as the agent of Reeser and pleaded the statute of frauds of Oklahoma.
The trial court found that Reeser had not by any writing authorized Hunt to act as his agent, concluded it was unnecessary to decide the other issues, and entered a decree for Reeser. Edgar has appealed.
It is admitted by both parties that Hunt had no written authority to act as the agent of Reeser and that the contract provided it should be governed by the laws of Oklahoma.
Section 5034, C. O. S. 1921, in part reads as follows:
Counsel for Edgar contend that the phrase, "the party sought to be charged," means the vendor, that there was a sufficient memorandum signed by the vendor, and that the signature of the vendee or his agent, duly authorized in writing, was not required. On the other hand, counsel for Reeser contend that the phrase, "the party sought to be charged," refers to neither the vendor nor the vendee but to the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced by a judicial proceeding.
There are no Oklahoma decisions directly in point on the question. However, in the case of Kingfisher M. & E. Co. v. Westbrook, 79 Okl. 188, 192 P. 209, at page 212, in construing the section of the Oklahoma statute of frauds relating to the sale of personal property, the court held that the phrase means "the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced." The Oklahoma statute was copied from the statute of Dakota Territory.
In McPherson v. Fargo, 10 S. D. 611, 74 N. W. 1057, 1059, 66 Am. St. Rep. 723, the court, referring to the statute of frauds of South Dakota, said:
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...out of the operation of the statute of frauds." Harris v. Arthur, 36 Okla. 33, 127 P. 695. ¶16 To the same effect is the case of Edgar v. Reeser, 46 F.2d 277. ¶17 An early case on the questions involved in this suit is that of Halsell v. Renfro, 14 Okla. 674, 78 P. 118, in which the court s......
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Strouhal v. Allied Development Co., 4959.
...Boylan, 186 Okl. 124, 96 P.2d 532; Oakes v. Trumbo, 201 Okl. 102, 201 P.2d 916; Hawkins v. Wright, 204 Okl. 55, 226 P.2d 957; Edgar v. Reeser, 10 Cir., 46 F.2d 277. So far as the record before us indicates, the only writing which the defendant signed in connection with the transaction in qu......
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