Edgar v. United States, 197-57.
Decision Date | 11 February 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 197-57.,197-57. |
Citation | 171 F. Supp. 243,145 Ct. Cl. 9 |
Parties | Priscilla P. EDGAR v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Arthur E. Fay, Washington, D. C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. George Cochran Doub, for defendant.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 9, 1954, she was served with notice of her proposed separation from her position as Postmaster at Langston, Oklahoma, and that on November 1, 1954, she received a memorandum from the Assistant Postmaster General stating, ; and that her successor took physical possession of her office on or about January 1, 1955. She alleges that she has been deprived of her rights under 5 U.S.C.A. § 652, and the Civil Service Regulations, in that charges 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 lack the requisite specificity, and that the memorandum of dismissal did not contain the reasons for the action nor the effective date thereof.
She further alleges that on January 22, 1955, she appealed to the Eighth Regional Office of the United States Civil Service Commission, but that her appeal was denied on March 11, 1955, on the ground that it was not filed within ten days, and on appeal to the Civil Service Commission the action of the Regional Office was affirmed.
Plaintiff on March 7, 1956, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Postmaster General and the members of the Civil Service Commission asking for a declaratory judgment holding that she had been wrongfully dismissed, as she alleges. Her petition was dismissed on motion for summary judgment, on the ground that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedy.
In her petition in this court she asks us to hold that she had been wrongfully dismissed and to give her a judgment for the salary of which she alleges she has been illegally deprived. Thus, we are the second court to which she has appealed asking for a judgment holding that she had been wrongfully discharged.
As it did in the district court, defendant interposes the defense that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedy. Defendant says further that the district court has already determined that she did fail to exhaust her administrative remedy, and that that fact is not now open to question in this court.
The question presented, then, is whether the plaintiff is estopped in this court by the judgment of the district court to deny that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedy, and that such failure deprives her of the right to seek redress in the courts.
In two previous cases in this court we have held that a judgment of a district court on the question of whether an employee had been wrongfully discharged was not conclusive in a suit in this court, inasmuch as the relief sought in the two courts was not the same, although the basis of the action was the same in both suits; O'Brien v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 655, and Levy v. United States, 118 Ct.Cl. 106.
In this case, however, we are of opinion that she is estopped by the decision of the district court. She cannot secure a money judgment from us unless we hold, contrary to the holding of the district court, that she did exhaust her administrative remedy or that she is excused for some reason for not having done so. Since the question has been decided adversely to her by a court of competent jurisdiction, a forum selected by her, public policy precludes her from relitigating the same question here. She has already had her day in court. Defendant is entitled to be protected from the harassment of having to defend a question already decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Dignity and respect for judicial proceedings require it; tranquility and repose, an end to strife, demand it; the interest of other litigants seeking to be heard necessitates it.
This is a rule prevailing in all civilized countries; it is ingrained in our own jurisdiction from the beginning of our government. The rule is discussed at length by the Supreme Court in the case of Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-52, 18 S.Ct. 18, 27, 42 L.Ed. 855. There the Court said:
This case has been cited many times, most recently by the Supreme Court in United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36, which quoted the first sentence in the quotation set out above.
It is said, however, that the case at bar comes within the modification of the general rule set out in section 71 of the Restatement of the Law on Judgments. The Restatement, in section 68, recognizes the conclusiveness of determinations of fact in prior litigation. This section reads:
§ 68. Questions of Fact.
(1) Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action, except as stated in §§ 69, 71 and 72.
In section 71 it is said:
Four illustrations of the rule are given: first, title to land in another state; second, suits in state and federal courts; third, suits in courts of limited jurisdiction; and, fourth, matters affecting status. The case at bar is said to come within the third illustration, that of courts of limited...
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...proceeding by the same plaintiffs against high federal officials (acting in their official capacity). See, e. g., Edgar v. United States, 171 F.Supp. 243, 145 Ct.Cl. 9 (1959); McGinty v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 399, 403 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 867, 82 S.Ct. 115, 7 L.Ed.2d 63 (1961)......
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