Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell

Decision Date24 April 1978
Docket NumberNo. 144,144
Citation384 A.2d 748,282 Md. 422
PartiesEDGEWOOD NURSING HOME et al. v. Dionne Renna MAXWELL.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Raymond A. Richards, Baltimore, for appellants.

A. Gus Mastracci, Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE, ORTH and COLE, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

In this workmen's compensation appeal, 1 the employer and insurer (the appellants) contend that the lower court's interpretation of § 67(6) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol. 1975 Cum.Supp.), Art. 101 deprived them of due process of law in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. Section 67(6), 2 as interpreted in Giant Food, et al. v. Gooch, 245 Md. 160, 225 A.2d 431 (1967), provides in effect that to be compensable under the Act an injury caused to an employee by the wilful or negligent act of a third person need not arise out of, but only in the course of employment.

The pertinent facts are as follows: Brenda Higgins, an employee of the Edgewood Nursing Home, was shot and killed by her estranged paramour while she was at work. A workmen's compensation claim for dependency benefits was filed on behalf of Brenda's infant daughter, Dionne. The commission concluded that Brenda's death was compensable under the Act and that Dionne was totally dependent upon Brenda at the time of her death.

An appeal was thereafter taken to the Superior Court of Baltimore City and heard on the record. In a memorandum filed with the court, the appellants claimed that to interpret § 67(6) to permit recovery in the absence of a causal connection between the death and the employment, other than mere occurrence in the course of employment, would be repugnant to the fourteenth amendment because it would make the employer "an involuntary insurer of the life and health of his employees under circumstances where such liability would not rest upon the employer-employee relationship." The court affirmed the commission; it held, relying upon Gooch, that Brenda's death was compensable under § 67(6) of the Act and that the evidence established that Dionne was totally dependent upon her mother at the time of her death. It did not address the constitutional issue raised by the appellants.

In reasserting their constitutional argument before us appellants contend that Brenda's death was not causally connected with her employment, and was in no sense due to inherent conditions of her work. Consequently, they argue, the lower court's interpretation of § 67(6) requires an employer gratuitously to insure the life of its employees against non-work related hazards and therefore unconstitutionally interferes with the employer's right freely to contract with its employees. No authority is cited in support of the appellants' argument; indeed, the appellee is so unimpressed with the argument that she totally ignores it in her brief.

In Gooch, as here, the assault upon the employee did not arise out of the employment but occurred in the course of it for a reason not causally connected with the employment. Gooch was shot on the employer's parking lot by a person who mistakenly believed that he was romantically involved with his wife. The Court traced the history underlying § 67(6) and, interpreting that section in light of § 15, concluded that the legislature intended to create a special classification for employees injured by the wilful or negligent act of a third person; as to that classification of compensable injuries, there was no requirement that the injury arise out of the employment but only that it be "directed against an employee in the course of his employment." The Court reviewed a spate of its earlier cases involving injuries inflicted upon employees, either wilfully or negligently, by third parties and noted that some confusion existed in determining whether the injuries arose out of the employment. It said that prior to 1951, when § 67(6) was amended to its present form, an injury to an employee inflicted by a third person in the course of the employment, either wilfully or negligently, was compensable if the danger of such injury was an incident of the special conditions of the employment that is, if it arose out of the employment but that such an injury was not compensable if it was not attributable to the working environment that is, did not arise out of the employment. The Court concluded that by enacting § 67(6) the legislature "intended to broaden the scope of the compensation statute to include as compensable an injury not attributable to the working environment provided it was incurred in the course of employment." 3 245 Md. at 165, 225 A.2d at 434. The constitutionality of § 67(6) was not challenged in Gooch.

The Workmen's Compensation Act was passed in the exercise of the police power of the State to protect workers and their families from the hardships inflicted by work-related injuries. Mazor v. State, Dep't of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 369 A.2d 82 (1977); Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710 (1917). Whether the exercise of that power violates the due process clause depends on whether the particular statute under consideration provides a real and substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety and welfare of the citizens of this State. Westchester West No. 2 v. Mont. Co., 276 Md. 448, 348 A.2d 856 (1975); Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973). A large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine what the welfare of the public requires and what measures are necessary to promote it. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek, 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974); Md. Coal etc. Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 69 A.2d 471 (1949). The wisdom or expediency of a law adopted in the exercise of the State's police power is not subject to judicial review and such a statute will not be held void if there are any considerations relating to the public welfare by which it can be supported. Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679 (1975); Salisbury Beauty Schools v. St. Bd., 268 Md. 32, 300 A.2d 367 (1973). In other words, to be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity; it may seem unjust, yet be free from judicial interference. Matter of Trader, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974).

In the exercise of the police power the State may lawfully impose such burdens and restraints on private rights as may be reasonably necessary and proper to secure the general welfare. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek, supra; Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, supra; LaRoque v. Co. Commissioners, 233 Md. 329, 196 A.2d 902 (1964). The due process clause does not, therefore, inhibit a State from insisting that all contract and property rights are held subject to the constitutional exercise of the police power. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs v. Colgan, 274 Md. 193, 334 A.2d 89 (1975); Bruce v. Dir., Chesapeake Bay Aff., 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944). Thus, freedom of contract is subject to legislative regulation in the interest of the public welfare so long as it does not violate constitutional guarantees or invade fundamental liberties. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937); Md. Medical Service v. Carver, 238 Md. 466, 209 A.2d 582 (1965); Blum v. Engleman, 190 Md. 109, 57 A.2d 421 (1948).

A statute enacted under the police power carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality and the party attacking it has the burden of affirmatively and clearly establishing its invalidity; a reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality is sufficient to sustain it. Gino's v. Baltimore City, 250 Md. 621, 244 A.2d 218 (1968); Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Miedzinski v. Landman, 218 Md. 3, 145 A.2d 220 (1958). In other words, the legislature is presumed to have acted within constitutional limits so that if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the constitutionality of the statute, the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the law must be assumed. Salisbury Beauty Schools v. St. Bd., supra. These principles are applicable in testing the constitutionality of workmen's compensation laws. King Furniture v. Thompson, 248 Md. 682, 238 A.2d 231 (1968); Celanese Corporation v. Davis, 186 Md. 463, 47 A.2d 379 (1946).

The appellants recognize that freedom to contract in connection with the employer-employee relationship is not absolute; that it may be restricted consistent with due process requirements; and that the legislature has a wide field of discretion in legislating to promote the public interest. They simply suggest that a workmen's compensation law imposing liability upon an employer which does not rest upon the employer-employee relationship constitutes an unconstitutional interference with the employer's right of freedom to contract. They also suggest that § 67(6) is unconstitutional as applied because it requires the employer to pay compensation for an injury inflicted by a third person unrelated to the employee's work, presumably for the reason that it takes their property without due process of law. In support of these arguments, the appellants place total reliance on the vintage Supreme Court cases of Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer,250 U.S. 400, 39 S.Ct. 553, 63 L.Ed. 1058 (1919), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937). Neither case is apposite.

In Arizona Copper, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an early workmen's compensation law covering injuries to employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and due to inherent conditions of the work. In holding that the law was a permissible exercise of the State's police power, the Court found no violation of an employer's right to contract with respect to the terms and conditions of...

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