Edghill v. Mankey

• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Edghill v. Mankey, 79 Neb. 347, 112 N.W. 570 (Neb. 1907)
• Decision Date: 07 June 1907
• Docket Number: No. 14,855.,14,855.
• Parties: EDGHILL v. MANKEY.

79 Neb. 347

112 N.W. 570

EDGHILL

v.MANKEY.

No. 14,855.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

June 7, 1907.

Syllabus by the Court.

The death of a life tenant terminates the right of possession of his lessee.

Where the lessee of a life tenant plants crops before the death of the life tenant and consequent termination of his lease, he is entitled to re-enter to cultivate, harvest, and remove such crops; but this right of entry is not inconsistent with the right of possession of the reversioner.

Commissioners' Opinion. Department No. 2. Appeal from District Court, Franklin County; Adams, Judge.

Action by Alice M. Edghill against Herman Mankey. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.Dorsey & McGrew, for appellant.

H. W. Short, for appellee.

CALKINS, C.

John Dopke was seised of a life estate in a quarter section farm in Franklin county, which the defendant occupied as his tenant under a lease expiring March 1, 1905. In August, 1904, Dopke made an oral agreement to let the land to the defendant for a term of one year, to begin March 1, 1905; and following this agreement the defendant sowed a portion of the land to wheat, and prepared some additional ground for spring planting. In December, 1904, Dopke died. In March, 1905, the plaintiff, who was seised of the fee in the land in question, brought proceedings under the forcible entry and detainer statute to recover the possession thereof. The defendant claimed that by virtue of the oral agreement made in August, 1904, and by the fact of his sowing the wheat, he was at the time of the commencement of this action entitled to the possession of the premises. The plaintiff requested the court to direct a verdict in his favor, which request was denied, and the case submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict for the defendant; and from the judgment rendered upon such verdict the plaintiff appeals.

1. It is clear that the lessee of a tenant for life is charged with notice of the extent of his landlord's title, and that on the termination of the life estate his estate also ends. Guthmann v. Vallery, 51 Neb. 824, 71 N. W. 734, 66 Am. St. Rep. 475.

2. It is equally clear that, if the sublessee of a life tenant plants a crop before the death of his landlord, he is entitled, under the doctrine of emblements, to reap the same. To avail himself of this right, it is obvious that the sublessee must have some right of entry upon the land itself; and, if the tenancy is determined by death soon after the planting of a crop, this right may of necessity be continued for some months. The extent of this right is said to be that the lessee may enter upon the land, cultivate the crop, if a growing one, cut and harvest it when fit, and, if interfered with in the reasonable exercise of these privileges by the reversioner, or if the crop be injured by him, he may have an action for such injury. 1 Washburn on Real Property (5th Ed.) p. 143, § 105. This does not give him a right to the possession of the land, but merely the right of ingress and egress for the purpose above mentioned. For all other purposes the owner of the reversion has the right to the exclusive possession. Id.; Collins v. Crownover (Tenn. Ch. App.) 57 S. W. 357. It follows that the right to emblements does not extend the term of the...