Edler v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 06 April 1908
• Docket Number: 1929
• Citation: 95 P. 367,34 Utah 13
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: EDLER v. EDWARDS, State Auditor

95 P. 367

34 Utah 13

EDLER v. EDWARDS, State Auditor

No. 1929

Supreme Court of Utah

April 6, 1908

APPEAL from District Court, Third District; M. L. Ritchie, Judge.

Proceedings by the state, on the relation of A. B. Edler, against J. A Edwards, as State Auditor, to determine the validity of a statute. Judgment for respondent, and relator appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Goodwin & Van Pelt for appellant.

APPELLANT'S POINTS.

"We cannot agree with the contention of some of respondent's counsel--apparently to some extent countenanced by a few authorities--that the provisions of the Constitution in question can be entirely avoided by the simple device of putting into the title of an act words which denote a subject broad' enough to cover everything. Under that view, the title An Act concerning the Laws of the State' would be good. The word subject' is used in the Constitution in its ordinary sense, and when it says that an act shall embrace but one subject,' it necessarily implies--what everybody knows--that there are numerous subjects of legislation, and declares that only one of these subjects shall be embraced in any one act. All subjects cannot be conjured into one subject by the mere magic of a word in a title." (State v. Nomland [N. D.], 57 N.W. 85.)

The following are some of the more recent cases in which similar laws have been declared invalid: State v. Stuart [La.], 38 So. 974; Jackson Square v. New Orleans, 112 La. 957; Farnia v. Frazer [Mich.], 104 N.W. 147; Beet Sugar Co. v. State [Neb.], 102 N.W. 80; Bell v. First Jud. Dist. Court [Nev.], 81 P. 875.

"For an act to stand against the objections of plurality, the connection between its various parts must be apparent and not dependent on subtle reasoning." (State v. Washoe Co., 22 Nev. 399.)

The Mich. Act of 1883, provided for the incorporation of merchant's insurance companies, and to regulate the business of insurance by merchants' and manufacturers' insurance companies, and was held obnoxious to the constitution because it embraced two subjects. (Skinner v. Wilhelm [Mich.], 30 N.W. 311.)

An act which gave power to toll and plank road companies to sell their road beds and franchises, is not germane to the general purpose of the act which was to enable cities and townships to acquire them for the purpose of making them free from taxation. (Grand Rapids v. Burlingame [Mich.], 53 N.W. 620.)

An act which, under the guise of fixing fees of clerks of the probate court, in fact imposes a tax for purposes of revenue is violative of the constitutional inhibition. (Cook v Fairbanks, 78 N.E. 895, 222 Ill. 678; State ex. rel. v. Hallock [Nev.], 12 P. 832; State ex. rel. v. McCann, 72 Tenn. [4 Lea], 1.)

M. A. Breeden, Atty. Gen., A. R. Barnes, Asst. Atty. Gen., E. A. Walton and S. R. Thurman for respondent.

RESPONDENT'S POINTS.

"The generality of the title is therefore no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having any necessary or proper connection." (Cooley, Const. Lim., 206.)

An act fixing the time for the opening and closing of saloons and gaming houses embraces only one subject. (Ex Parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, 21 P. 322.)

An act to regulate the jurisdiction, duties and compensation of Justices and Constables has only one subject. (Herbert v. Baltimore Co., 97 Md. 621.)

An act relating to the public roads of counties and the management of county work houses has but one subject. (Condon v. Maloney [Tenn.], 65 S.W. 871.)

"An act to amend certain sections, repeal certain sections, and to add new sections to a chapter of the code entitled oysters,' was held to embrace but one subject. (Commonwealth v. Brown, 21 S.E. 157.) And generally an amendatory act is not open to a charge of duplicity because it makes two or more amendments if the section amended relates to a common subject." (1 Lewis Sutherland Stat. Cons., 248.)

"To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects, that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other." (State v. Ranson, 73 Mo. 86; State v. Algood, 87 Tenn. 164; State v. Howard, 7 Mich. 10.)

"An act to amend several sections of a code which are cognate or related to each other, is not open to the objection that it embraces a plurality of subjects." (1 Lewis Sutherland Stat. Cons. 238; Commonwealth v. Brown [Va.], 21 S.E. 257; Rowley v. Shepard, 42 W.Va. 286; Airy v. People [Colo.], 40 P. 262; Northern Counties v. Sears [Ore.], 41 P. 931; Coal Co. v. Partenheimer [Ind.], 55 N.E. 751; Isenhour v. State [Ind.], 62 N.E. 40; State v. Nomland, 67 N.W. 85.)

FRICK, J. McCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

This is a proceeding to determine the validity of chapter 28, p. 30, Laws Utah 1907. Chapter 28, p. 30, Laws 1907, aforesaid, is an act which is amendatory of section 2583, Rev. St. 1898, as amended by chapter 65, p. 66, Laws Utah. 1901, and section 2050, Rev. St. 1898. The principal change effected by the amendment of section 2583 was the increase of the salaries of the several members constituting the State Board of Equalization, and, so far as it related to sec. 2050, the increase of the salaries of some of the state officers and the reduction of the salary of the appellant as reporter of the decisions of this court. Appellant, as such reporter, and the respondent, as State Auditor, presented to the district court an agreed statement of facts from which that court was asked to determine the constitutionality of chapter 28, p. 30, Laws 1907, aforesaid, the appellant contending that the amendment of section 2050 was invalid, and that therefore he was entitled to receive a warrant for his salary from respondent at the old rate, while respondent contended that appellant was only entitled to a warrant for salary as fixed by the section as amended. The district court found for and entered judgment in favor of the respondent, and the matter is now presented to this court on appeal.

Appellant's sole contention is that chapter 28, p. 30, Laws Utah 1907, in so far as it affects his salary, is invalid because the act covers more than one subject. In other words, it is contended that the subject-matter of section 2583 constitutes one subject, while section 2050 constitutes another subject, and that the two subjects are not correlated, but are incongruous, and cannot legally be united in one act without violating the provisions of section 23, art. 6, of the Constitution of this state, which, so far as material to this contention, provides: "No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." In this case we are dealing entirely with an act by which it was sought to amend permanently numbered sections of the Revised Statutes of this state. Section 2583 was originally adopted in 1896 (Laws 1896, p. 446, c. 129, sec. 81), and was amended by an act known as chapter 65, p. 66, Laws 1901. In 1898 it was carried into the Revised Statutes as section 2583, and since then has retained its original number. Section 2050 was also originally passed in 1896, and incorporated into the Revised Statutes in 1898, and was also in some respects thereafter amended, but by implication merely in that such amendment was accomplished by separate, distinct, and independent acts by which the salaries of some of the officers mentioned therein, but not now in question, were changed. The question of titles to original acts, therefore, is not directly involved. Upon the question of titles to amendatory acts the cases are very numerous, but not always in strict harmony. The courts are, however, unanimous with respect to the following general rules to be observed: (1) That the constitutional provision now under consideration should be liberally construed; (2) that the provision should be applied so as not to hamper the lawmaking power in framing and adopting comprehensive measures covering a whole subject, the branches of which may be numerous, but where all have some direct connection with or relation to the principal subject treated; (3) that the constitutional provision should be so applied as to guard against the real evil which it was intended to meet; (4) that no hard and fast rule can be formulated which is applicable to all cases, but each must to a very large extent be determined in accordance with the peculiar circumstances and conditions thereof, and that the decisions of the courts are valuable merely as illustrations or guides in applying these general rules. Moreover, it is now established beyond question that unless the invalidity of a particular law in question is clearly and manifestly established the law must prevail as against such an objection. If, therefore, by any reasonable construction, the title of the act can be made to conform to the constitutional requirement, it is the duty of the courts to adopt this construction rather than another (if the title be open to more than one construction) which will defeat the act. (1 Lewis' Suth. Stat. Const. [2d Ed.], secs. 115-127, and cases there cited.) In case of doubt it must be assumed that the Legislature understood and applied the title so as to comply with the constitutional provision, and not contrary thereto. If, after applying such a reasonable construction the title is insufficient, or the subject is plural, then the law must fail. The provision is mandatory, and may not be ignored.

With these general rules in mind we will now proceed to an examination of the act in question, and briefly review the law applicable. As we have pointed out, the act which is assailed is amendatory merely of permanently numbered sectio...