Edmond v. State
Decision Date | 26 June 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 25155.,25155. |
Citation | 341 S.C. 340,534 S.E.2d 682 |
Parties | Mark Wesley EDMOND, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Clay T. Allen of Greenville, for petitioner.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Teresa A. Knox, all of Columbia, and Assistant Attorney General Kevin Patrick Tierney of Greenville, for respondent.
A jury convicted Mark Wesley Edmond (petitioner) of first degree burglary and grand larceny. He was sentenced to life in prison for burglary and four years, consecutive, for larceny. We dismissed his direct appeal following an Anders1 review. State v. Edmond, Op. No. 96-MO-086 (S.C.Sup.Ct. filed April 10, 1996).
The circuit court denied petitioner's application for post-conviction relief (PCR). Counsel for petitioner filed a Johnson2 petition for a writ of certiorari. We ordered the parties to fully brief the issue raised in the Johnson petition.
The State accused petitioner of breaking into the home of Elizabeth S. Goldsmith and stealing a television, a videocassette recorder, jewelry, and other household items on August 31, 1994. The State presented no direct or physical evidence of petitioner's guilt, but relied solely on circumstantial evidence.
A detective testified he told petitioner in response to petitioner's questions following his arrest several days after the burglary that someone had told police where to find him. Petitioner, who had been drinking shortly before his arrest, replied, The detective acknowledged that petitioner, in a more sober condition, later denied making such a statement. The detective testified, On cross-examination, the officer testified that petitioner invoked his right to remain silent and he "honored that right."
In her closing argument while describing the detective's testimony, the prosecutor stated, "And then the very next day [after his arrest] [petitioner] invoked his right to counsel, smartly enough."
Petitioner's trial counsel did not object to the detective's testimony or the prosecutor's argument. Throughout the trial and in his closing argument, counsel emphasized the circumstantial nature of the evidence. Counsel also suggested the real culprit was the former husband of petitioner's wife—a man who allegedly had access to the car used in the burglary and matched the description of the person seen walking in front of the victim's home the evening the burglary occurred. Petitioner did not testify at trial.
At the PCR hearing, petitioner testified that he and his wife left the hospital to visit her son at her former husband's home. The former husband borrowed the car while they were there. The former husband knew the location of the victim's home because petitioner previously had taken the former husband there to meet an ex-girlfriend. Petitioner claimed he went to a video arcade, where he remained for a couple of hours after unexpectedly meeting a female acquaintance. Petitioner's wife offered testimony corroborating petitioner's version of events.
Petitioner asserted his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to improper references to the invocation of his constitutional rights to remain silent and be represented by counsel during the detective's testimony and the prosecutor's closing arguments. Petitioner's trial counsel testified he did not know why he failed to object to the testimony or comments. The PCR judge denied petitioner's PCR application.
Does any probative evidence support the PCR judge's denial of petitioner's claim that the detective's testimony and the prosecutor's closing argument violated his constitutional rights to remain silent and be represented by counsel?
Petitioner contends the PCR judge erred in denying his claim that the detective's testimony and prosecutor's closing argument violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV; S.C. Const. art. I, §§ 3 and 12. He further argues the error was prejudicial. We agree.
It is improper for the State to refer to or comment upon a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987). Such comments may not be made either directly or indirectly. State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31 (1980), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991)
; State v. Rouse, 262 S.C. 581, 206 S.E.2d 873 (1974).
In particular, the State may neither comment upon nor present evidence at trial of a defendant's decision to exercise his right to remain silent or be represented by an attorney. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)
( ); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) ( ); State v. Cockerham, 294 S.C. 380, 365 S.E.2d 22 (1988) ( ); State v. Hawkins, 292 S.C. 418, 423, 357 S.E.2d 10, 13 (1987) (, )overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); State v. Woods, 282 S.C. 18, 20, 316 S.E.2d 673, 674 (1984) ( ); State v. Holliday, 333 S.C. 332, 509 S.E.2d 280 (Ct.App.1998) ( ).
These principles are rooted in due process and the belief that justice is best served when a trial is fundamentally fair. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717, 123 L.Ed.2d 353, 367 (1993)
; Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291, 106 S.Ct. 634, 638, 88 L.Ed.2d 623, 630 (1986); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The obvious purpose is to try to prevent jurors from improperly inferring the accused is guilty simply because he exercised rights guaranteed him by the state and federal constitutions. Such an inference is constitutionally impermissible because the burden at all times remains upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a crime with which the accused is charged. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); State v. Schrock, 283 S.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 450 (1984).
In a direct appeal, the admission of comments or evidence of the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right is a "trial error" subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 530-31, 466 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1996); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263-65, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 329-32 (1991)
(. )
In this PCR proceeding, petitioner must meet the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Johnson v. State, 325 S.C. 182, 186, 480 S.E .2d 733, 735 (1997) (citing Strickland, supra). Thus, a PCR applicant must show both error and prejudice to win relief in a PCR proceeding. Scott v. State, 334 S.C. 248, 513 S.E.2d 100 (1999).
The burden is on the applicant in a PCR proceeding to prove the allegations in his application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). An appellate court must affirm the PCR court's decision when its findings are supported by any evidence of probative value. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989). However, an appellate court will not affirm the decision when it is not supported by any probative evidence. Holland v. State, 322 S.C. Ill, 470 S.E.2d 378 (1996).
We conclude the PCR judge erred in denying petitioner's claim because no probative evidence supports his decision. Petitioner has shown error in counsel's failure to object to the detective's testimony and the prosecutor's comments, as explained by the above cases.
We further conclude petitioner has shown that the error prejudiced him. In Johnson, supra, we held that coun...
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