Edmonds by James v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp. Radiology Associates of Western Pennsylvania P.C.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1992
• Citation: 414 Pa.Super. 567,607 A.2d 1083
• Parties: , 60 USLW 2721 Louis EDMONDS, a Minor By Taneika JAMES, Mother and Natural Guardian, and Taneika James, in her own right, Appellants, v. The WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATES OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA P.C., Neal B. Simmons, M.D., and Harvey L. Neiman, M.D. Louis EDMONDS, a Minor by Taneika JAMES, Mother and Natural Guardian, and Taneika James, in her own right, Appellants, v. Wynne COOPER, M.D.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1083

607 A.2d 1083

414 Pa.Super. 567, 60 USLW 2721

Louis EDMONDS, a Minor By Taneika JAMES, Mother and Natural Guardian, and Taneika James, in her own right, Appellants, v. The WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATES OF

WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA P.C., Neal B. Simmons, M.D.,

and Harvey L. Neiman, M.D.

Louis EDMONDS, a Minor by Taneika JAMES, Mother and Natural Guardian, and Taneika James, in her own right, Appellants, v. Wynne COOPER, M.D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 16, 1992.

Filed April 30, 1992.

Bruce S. Gelman, Pittsburgh, for appellants (at 83 and 146).

Richard Federowicz, Pittsburgh, for Western Pennsylvania Hosp., appellee (at 83).

Bernard R. Rizza, Pittsburgh, for Neiman, appellee (at 83).

Elaine S. Nace, Pittsburgh, for Cooper, appellee (at 146).

Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND and HESTER, JJ.

HESTER, Judge:

This is a consolidated appeal from orders entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on November 30, 1990, and January 2, 1991. Those orders, which respectively sustained certain preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and granted Wynne Cooper, M.D., judgment on the pleadings, disposed of actions arising from circumstances related to the pregnancy of Taneika James and the birth of her physically impaired son, Louis Edmonds. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

The procedural history of the first appeal, number 00083 Pittsburgh, 1991, may be summarized as follows. On September 25, 1990, Ms. James, on behalf of herself and her son, filed a complaint against the Western Pennsylvania Hospital, Radiology Associates of Western Pennsylvania, P.C., Neal B. Simmons, M.D., and Harvey L. Neiman, M.D. In that complaint, Ms. James asserted that a sonogram taken during her pregnancy revealed a fetal abnormality, alleged that she was not informed of that condition in a timely fashion, and implied that she would have sought an abortion had she been so informed. Consequently, Ms. James requested damages arising from both the pregnancy and the birth of her son. In addition, she sought damages on behalf of her son for the pain and complications associated with his impairment as well as the treatment it rendered necessary.

Shortly after initiating the action, appellants amended their complaint to clarify the relationship between the individual and institutional medical providers. Thereafter, appellees, relying upon the statutory prohibition against causes of action premised upon a claim that a person should not have been born, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305, filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. ¹ On November 30, 1990, the trial court entered the challenged order sustaining those objections. Appellants subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.

We now turn to appeal number 00146 Pittsburgh, 1991. On January 3, 1989, appellants initiated proceedings against Wynne Cooper, M.D., by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons. Subsequently, following the reissuance of the writ and the effectuation of service, they filed a complaint which contained allegations substantially similar to those previously described. The parties then filed additional pleadings and proceeded with discovery. On September 11, 1990, after appellants requested a jury trial, Dr. Cooper moved for judgment on the pleadings contending that the causes of action asserted by appellants were barred by 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305. Four months later, the trial court entered the order granting the requested relief. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, and we consolidated the action with appeal number 00083 Pittsburgh, 1991, for argument and disposition.

It has long been clear that we have an obligation to consider the appropriateness of each appeal and that such consideration may be undertaken sua sponte. Gatten v. Merzi, 397 Pa.Super. 148, 579 A.2d 974 (1990) (per curiam ). Moreover, we note that absent a specific statutory provision to the contrary, any appeal determined to be interlocutory must be quashed. Id. With these principles in mind, we sua sponte address the propriety of the present appeals.

Our review of the record relating to appeal number 00146 Pittsburgh, 1991, clearly establishes that it was taken from a final order and that it is properly before us for disposition. See Indiana County Hospital Authority v. McCarl's Plumbing & Heating Co., 344 Pa.Super. 226, 496 A.2d 767 (1985) (per curiam) (order granting judgment on the pleadings is a final order and therefore, appealable). With respect to the remaining appeal, we note that the order sustaining the preliminary objections of the various medical providers did not dismiss appellants' complaint or explicitly dispose of the action; however, it effectively terminated the proceedings. Therefore, we find that order also to be final and appealable. See Hudock v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Co., 438 Pa. 272, 264 A.2d 668 (1970) (order which sustains preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer without explicitly terminating the action is final and appealable if it effectively terminates action). Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the two appeals.

The standards utilized in reviewing the propriety of decisions either sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer or entering judgment on the pleadings are well-established. With respect to the former decisions, we note:

It is axiomatic in the law of pleading that preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer admit as true all well and clearly pleaded material, factual averments and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959); Byers v. Ward, 368 Pa. 416, 84 A.2d 307 (1951). Conclusions of law and unjustified inferences are not admitted by the pleading. Lerman v. Rudolf, 413 Pa. 555, 198 A.2d 532 (1964). Starting from this point of reference the complaint must be examined to determine whether it sets forth a cause of action which, if proved, would entitle the party to the relief sought. If such is the case, the demurrer may not be sustained. On the other hand, where the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is properly sustained.

Greenspan v. United Services Automobile Assn., 324 Pa.Super. 315, 318, 471 A.2d 856, 857-58 (1984), quoting Rose v. Wissinger, 294 Pa.Super. 265, 439 A.2d 1193 (1982). In connection with the latter decisions, we have indicated:

Entry of judgment on the pleadings is permitted under Pa.R.C.P. 1034 which provides for such judgment after the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay trial. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer. Karns v. Tony Vitale Fireworks Corporation, 436 Pa. 181, 259 A.2d 687 (1969). It may be entered where there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gallo v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co., 328 Pa.Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984); Vogel v. Berkley, 354 Pa.Super. 291, 511 A.2d 878 (1986); Groff v. Pete Kingsley Building, Inc., 374 Pa.Super. 377, 543 A.2d 128 (1988). In determining if there is a dispute as to facts, the court must confine its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. DiAndrea v. Reliance Savings & Loan Association, 310 Pa.Super. 537, 456 A.2d 1066 (1983). The scope of review on appeal from the grant of judgment on the pleadings is plenary. We must determine if the action of the court below was based on a clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings which should properly go to the jury. Keystone Automated Equipment Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 369 Pa.Super. 472, 535 A.2d 648 (1988).

Kosor v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., 407 Pa.Super. 68, 71-72, 595 A.2d 128, 129-30 (1991). In the present cases, the various motions of appellees were premised upon the contention that appellants' claims supported no causes of action in light of 42 Pa.C .S. § 8305. Appellants' challenge to the trial courts' decisions on those motions concerns only the personal claims of Ms. James. In addition, we note that none of the parties question the fact that 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305 extinguished a previously recognized cause of action for wrongful birth or contend that its provisions are inapplicable to Ms. James's claims. Accordingly, resolution of the question of the propriety of the two contested orders hinges upon a determination as to the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305.

Appellants assert that 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305, by extinguishing causes of action for wrongful birth, interferes with a woman's abortion right by allowing a physician to both intentionally misrepresent and negligently fail to impart information impacting upon such a decision. Accordingly, they contend that 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305 impinges upon abortion rights and violates both the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. ² This issue, which is one of first impression, ^{3 3} is devoid of merit. ⁴

Preliminarily, we note that legislative enactments, such as the challenged statutory provision, enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. Dranzo v. Winterhalter, 395 Pa.Super. 578, 577 A.2d 1349 (1990). Consequently, all doubts relating to the constitutionality of such an enactment must be resolved in its favor. Id. Thus, it is clear that a party raising a constitutional challenge has a heavy burden of rebutting the presumption of constitutionality and demonstrating that the statute clearly, plainly, and palpably violates constitutional precepts. Id. Utilizing these principles, we must examine the contested provision and determine whether either the due process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment render it unconstitutional.

In pertinent part, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8305 (footnotes omitted) states:

(a) Wrongful birth.--There shall be no cause of action or award of damages on behalf of any person based on a claim that, but for an...