Edmonds v. Dillin

• Decision Date: 02 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. C79-702.,C79-702.
• Citation: 485 F. Supp. 722
• Parties: Walter N. EDMONDS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Patrolman Vincent DILLIN et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

485 F. Supp. 722

Walter N. EDMONDS et al., Plaintiffs, v.Patrolman Vincent DILLIN et al., Defendants.

No. C79-702.

United States District Court, N. D. Ohio.

January 2, 1980.

Jay B. White, White, Milano & Miller, Cleveland, Ohio, William T. Wuliger, Wuliger, Jacob & Fadel, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiffs.

John S. Polito, Donald F. Black, Asst. Directors of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, D. John

Travis, Janet R. Beck, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants.

Joseph C. Domiano, Cleveland, Ohio, for City of Warrensville Hts.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM K. THOMAS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this action for alleged violations of their civil rights against the City of Warrensville Heights, its police department, and several of its police officers, and against the City of Cleveland, its police department, and several of its police officers.Plaintiffs seek to bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983and1985 and directly under the Fourteenth Amendment.Numerous motions have been filed and will be ruled on by the court in the following order:¹

1. a motion to dismiss the Cleveland Police Department as a partydefendant;

2. a motion of plaintiffs for leave to file an amended complaint, considered together with a motion of the City of Cleveland for judgment on the pleadings;

3. a motion of the City of Cleveland to strike the prayer for punitive damages; and

4. a motion by defendants for a protective order staying discovery.

I.

The City of Cleveland moves to dismiss the Cleveland Police Department as a party on the ground that it is "not a legal entity but merely one arm of the municipal corporation's government structure" and is therefore not a "person" for the purposes of section 1983.Plaintiffs urge that Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611(1978), authorizes suits under section 1983 not only against municipalities, but also against "other local government units," including municipal police departments.They further contend that the police department can be sued eo nomine in a direct cause of action brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The debate over whether the police department is a separate entity subject to suit appears to be academic.If, as the police department claims, it is a part of the city itself, the department's policies are the city's policies; since the city is liable to suit under Monell, naming the police department as a party in addition to the city is superfluous.Even if the department is made a party, any recovery against the department will ultimately come from the city.In short, the city is not only the real but the only party in interest.SeeMayes v. Elrod,470 F.Supp. 1188(N.D.Ill.1979).

Therefore, the Cleveland Police Department is dismissed as a party to this action.

II.

The City of Cleveland moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(c).The city maintains that because the complaint does not allege that the city's acts were undertaken pursuant to an official custom or policy, the city, under Monell, is not liable to plaintiffs.

In partial response to the city's motion, plaintiffs moved for leave to file an amended complaint.Although defendants object to this motion on the ground that they were not served with a copy of the proposed amended complaint, the court in the interest of expediency will address the allegations of both the complaint and the proposed amended complaint in assessing their validity under Monell.Defendants' specific objection is discussed below.

The original complaint and the general allegations of the proposed amended complaint seek to impose liability on the city on the basis of respondeat superior.Monell holds, however, that a municipality cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior under section 1983.²The same reasoning would preclude such liability under section 1985.Owens v. Haas,601 F.2d 1242(2d Cir.), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407(1979).Therefore, any allegations that the city is liable on the basis of respondeat superior are clearly insufficient to state a claim against the city.

A.Liability Under Section 1983

Monell makes clear that a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 unless "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers," or the "constitutional deprivations were visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels."436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2036."It is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under section 1983."Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2038.The original complaint does not satisfy Monell.The charge that the city "engages in a willful and/or malicious policy of racial harrassment sic" is conclusory and, therefore, absent any supporting factual statement, is insufficient to state a Monell-type claim against the city.

Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint, however, expands upon the sparse allegations of the original complaint.In their proposed first cause of action plaintiffs allege that the city and its police department "acted willfully, and/or maliciously and/or negligently and/or in reckless disregard for plaintiffs' right to be free from unlawful search and seizure as guaranteed by the 4th Amendment."This allegation fails to specify a policy or custom on the part of the city that caused the constitutional violations plaintiffs allege.It therefore fails to state a claim under section 1983.The proposed second cause of action, claiming a denial of plaintiffs' right to counsel and due process, suffers a similar deficiency, and for that reason also fails to state a claim.

The proposed third cause of action alleges:

25.DefendantsCity of Cleveland and Warrensville Heights and their respective Police Departments have a duty to establish and enforce adequate rules and regulations governing the training qualifications, cities sic and conduct of police officers and their respective cities, and to establish adequate training education and instruction of police officers subsequent to their initial employment.

26.Failure of defendant municipalities to establish and/or enforce the aforementioned rules, regulations, policies, programs and procedures resulted in the arbitrary and capricious enforcement of the law by defendant police officers . . by reason of which plaintiffs have been deprived of the right to be free from unlawful search and seizure, right to counsel and the right to due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourth, Sixth, and 14th Amendments . . . .

Plaintiffs further allege that the city acted "arbitrarily, and/or capriciously, and/or maliciously, and/or unreasonably."

The liability of supervisory officials for inadequate training of subordinates has raised considerable debate, and the liability of a city for such inadequacy is, if anything, still more problematic.Recent cases considering claims of negligent hiring, training, or supervision of police officers have held that mere negligence on the part of a municipality is not actionable under section 1983.The source case is Leite v. City of Providence,463 F.Supp. 585(D.R.I.1978).In Leitethe court considered allegations that the City of Providence was liable for verbal and physical abuse visited upon him by five Providence policemen because the city "`was negligent in hiring, training, continuing to employ and/or failing to discipline and/or supervise its employees.'"Id., at 588.

The court noted that "aside from plaintiffs' respondeat superior claims"(not permissible under Monell), plaintiff"only alleges that the city was negligent in its training and hiring of the police force."The court concluded that "such allegations of simple negligence do not state a claim under section 1983."

Abjuring simple negligence as the standard, the court searched for a higher "degree of culpability a municipality must exhibit in order to be liable under section 1983" for inadequate police training.Recognizing that "a municipality can only act through its high level, supervisory officials," but that "a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior,"the court determined that "a municipality may be held liable if it acts `directly' through those officials who set and supervise municipal policy."The court then reasoned:

Because a municipality acts through its high level officials and occupies a supervisory position, this Court may determine the scope of municipal liability by relying upon those precedents which discuss the degree of culpability required under section 1983 by one in a supervisory position.

463 F.Supp. at 589.

With respect to the degree of culpability required when supervisory officials are sued under section 1983, the court drew this standard from the precedents considered:

The supervisory official must have participated in some way in the alleged constitutional deprivation or acted in such a way as to exhibit a "deliberate indifference" to the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Id., at 590.The court cited as support for the requirement of participation in the unconstitutional act Rizzo v. Goode,423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561(1976).³The court took the "deliberate indifference" formulation from Estelle v. Gamble,429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251(1976).⁴Combining Estelle's "deliberate indifference" and Rizzo's "authorization or approval" standards, the court eventually achieved this formulation:

If a municipality completely fails to train its police force, or trains its officers

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