Edmonds v. New Orleans City
| Decision Date | 19 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-298 SECTION "B"(3) |
| Parties | ZEPPORIAH EDMONDS v. NEW ORLEANS CITY, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court are several motions filed by the parties.
First is the "City Defendants' Motion to dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) & 12(c) or alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56." Rec. Doc. 60.1 Plaintiff timely filed an objection (Rec. Doc. 73)2 and a response memorandum (Rec. Doc. 74). Defendants then requested (Rec. Doc. 76), and were granted (Rec. Doc. 77), leave to file a reply memorandum (Rec. Doc. 78).
Second is "Plaintiff Zepporiah Edmonds' Rule 60 Motion to Reinstate Age Discrimination Claims dismissed from the Plaintiff's Original Petition by this Court due to Mistake included within the Court's Order and Reasons Issued July 27, 2016 - Document 38." Rec. Doc. 62. Defendants timely filed an opposition memorandum. Rec. Doc. 70.
Third is "Plaintiff Zepporiah Edmonds' Motion to Remove and Replace Defense Counsel Elizabeth Robins as Defendants' Counsel in the Matter Due to Her Being Included by the Plaintiff as a Vital Material Witness." Rec. Doc. 63. Defendants timely filed an opposition memorandum. Rec. Doc. 71. For the reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' motion (Rec. Doc. 60) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Rule 60 motion (Rec. Doc. 62) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to disqualify counsel (Rec. Doc. 63) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
This case arises out of the termination of Zepporiah Edmonds ("Plaintiff") on January 11, 2016. Rec. Doc. 1 at 4. She was a parking administrator in the parking division of the Department of Public Works ("DPW") and therefore employed by Defendant New Orleans City ("New Orleans"). Id. In her original complaint,Plaintiff claimed that, beginning in 2012, she was "targeted . . . for harassment . . . ." Id. She believed that the harassment started after Mayor Mitch Landrieu was elected in 2010 and appointed non-African American supervisors with insufficient city government experience, including Defendant Mark D. Jernigan ("Jernigan"). Id. at 4, 6. Defendant Linda Copeland ("Copeland"), the human resources manager for the DPW, allegedly participated in the harassment. Id. at 7. Plaintiff also believes that the harassment only started after she reported potential misconduct to the Office of Inspector General ("OIG") and various other entities and supervisors in 2012. Id. at 7, 9. She claims that the city retaliated against her for making these complaints by no longer recognizing her as the curb management expert, dismissing her work product, and undermining her authority. Id. at 10-11. Because of this "hostile work environment," Plaintiff went on sick leave on June 22, 2015. Id. at 15. She was eventually terminated on January 11, 2016. Rec. Doc. 53 at 10.
From 2014 through 2016, Plaintiff filed three separate complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On October 13, 2015, she received a right to sue letter for the first complaint (filed with the EEOC on November 4, 2014 and alleging race and age discrimination and retaliation, see Rec. Doc. 60-4 at 1); the right to sue letter gave her until January 18, 2016 to file a lawsuit. Rec. Doc. 1 at 17.
Thus, on January 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against New Orleans, Copeland, and Jernigan, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), and various state and federal whistleblower laws, in addition to defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rec. Doc. 1 at 2-3, 17-18, 20-21.
On January 19, 2016, Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining Defendants from terminating her employment. Rec. Doc. 5. This Court denied the motion, reasoning that "[t]he position that plaintiff hope[d] to maintain [was] no longer the status quo as her termination has already taken effect, meaning a [temporary restraining order was] no longer an appropriate remedy." Rec. Doc. 6 at 2.
On March 3, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 18. On July 27, 2016, this Court granted the motion in part. Rec. Doc. 38. Plaintiff's first EEOC complaint averred that Defendants retaliated against her, discriminated against her based on her race and age, and created a hostile work environment. Id. at 1-2, 8 (citing Rec. Doc. 35-2 at 2). In her second EEOC complaint, filed on July 15, 2015, Plaintiff alleged retaliation. Id. at 2 (citing Rec. Doc. 18-2 at 2); see also Rec. Doc. 60-4 at 1. Before filing the instant suit, Plaintiff only received a right to sue notice for the firstcomplaint. Rec. Doc. 38 at 2-3. Because a party must first exhaust his or administrative remedies before filing suit, this Court found that Plaintiff could raise claims for retaliation, race discrimination, and hostile work environment based on the first EEOC complaint. Id. at 8. She could have also raised age discrimination claims, but these claims were not included in Plaintiff's original complaint. Id.3 Plaintiff alleged disability discrimination and wrongful termination in her original complaint, but she did not allege these claims in her first EEOC charge, so the Court lacked jurisdiction over such claims. Id. at 9, 11-12. The Court further found that Plaintiff failed to state a valid whistleblower claim. Id. at 11. Thus, the Court granted the motion in part to dismiss the disability, age, whistleblower, and wrongful termination claims. Id. at 12.
In response, Plaintiff filed a "motion for new trial," asking this Court to reinstate the dismissed claims under state law. Rec. Doc. 39. This Court construed it as a motion for reconsideration and denied because Plaintiff failed to cite to any applicable Louisiana law. Rec. Doc. 41 at 8.
On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint. Rec. Doc. 45. Plaintiff's motion was referredto Magistrate Judge Daniel Knowles, who granted it as unopposed on December 21, 2016. Rec. Doc. 52.
In her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she received right to sue letters for her second and third EEOC complaints. See Rec. Doc. 45-2 at 1-2 (). She stated that in her third EEOC complaint, filed on April 13, 2016, she alleged retaliation, wrongful termination, hostile work environment, and race and disability discrimination. Rec. Doc. 53 at 5; see also Rec. Doc. 60-8 at 1. Nonetheless, Plaintiff removed all references to whistleblower claims and added claims under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. See Rec. Doc. 53 at 26. Otherwise, save for a few minor changes, Plaintiff's amended complaint largely reflected her original complaint.
On May 16, 2017, the parties filed the instant motions. Rec. Docs. 60, 62-63.
Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim, as it relates to her demand for an injunction4 and reinstatement, and that Plaintiff has otherwise failed to state a valid claim forrelief, such that they move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Rec. Doc. 60 at 1-2, 4.
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)); see also TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002). A genuine issue exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant must point to "portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If and when the movant carries this burden, the non-movant must then go beyond the pleadings and present other evidence to establish a genuine issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
However, "where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competentsummary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial." Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994). Conclusory rebuttals of the pleadings are insufficient. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enter., Inc., 7 F.3d 1203, 1207 (5th Cir. 1993).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's demand for reinstatement is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Louisiana Civil Service Commission ("CSC"). Rec. Doc. 60-1 at 4. Apparently, the CSC conducted several hearings regarding Plaintiff's case from April 2016 through January 2017. Id.5
In response, Plaintiff admits that she is a classified civil service employee and that the CSC rules limit the claims of such employees. Rec. Doc. 74 at 3. She specifically admits that the CSC has "exclusive authority as it involves reinstatement appeals after termination, or restoration to particular employment positions," but argues that the CSC does not have exclusive jurisdiction over her damages claims. Id. at 7. To that end, she argues that neither the Louisiana Constitution nor the CSC rules prohibit judicial litigation for "racial and age and disability discrimination, ADA violations, hostile work environments,intentional infliction of...
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