Edmonds v. State

• Decision Date: 19 September 1968
• Docket Number: No. 364,364
• Citation: 5 Md.App. 132,245 A.2d 618
• Parties: Jerome Powell EDMONDS a/k/a Jerome Powell and Henry Garfield Stanley v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 132

5 Md.App. 132

245 A.2d 618

Jerome Powell EDMONDS a/k/a Jerome Powell and Henry Garfield Stanley v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 364.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 19, 1968.

H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Baltimore, for appellants.

Fred Oken, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Samuel A. Green, Jr., Robert A. DiCicco and Clewell Howell, Jr., State's Atty., and Asst. State's Attys., respectively, on brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

Appellants were convicted by the court sitting without a jury of (a) breaking a specified outhouse (storehouse) of Goodyear Service Stores with intent to steal goods of the value of $100.00 and upwards, and (b) with breaking into said premises and stealing therefrom designated goods of a value of $5.00 and upwards. Each appellant was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. On this appeal they jointly contend (1) that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence their fingerprint records on file with the Baltimore County Bureau of Identification since they contained their past criminal histories, and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to justify their convictions.

There was evidence adduced at the trial showing that sometime between the hours of 12:15 a. m. and 7:50 a. m. on June 10, 1967, the Goodyear Service Store in Baltimore County was broken into and goods of a value in excess of $2,200.00 were stolen. Entry had been made by breaking out a 22 33 pane of glass in a ground level overhead-type door. ¹ The broken glass had been neatly stacked in a pile alongside the door. An office within the building, partially enclosed by glass, had also been entered by cutting out a pane of glass. A piece of cut glass was found on the office desk. Both the outer door and the interior office were located in areas accessible to and used by the general public.

Corporal Edward Vanik of the Baltimore County Crime Laboratory processed the crime scene shortly after 9:00 a. m., at which time he lifted a number of latent fingerprints from the broken glass fragments. Testifying with reference to the prints which he obtained from the broken glass found at the outer door, Vanik stated that the prints were so located 'that whoever removed the glass deposited these prints on same, because I received prints from both sides of the glass at the edge in a way that it would have to have been placed on there by the subjects who removed the glass from the door.' Vanik further testified to lifting fingerprints from the glass fragment found on the desk in the interior office. The officer also stated that all of the latent fingerprints lifted by him on both sides of the broken glass were less than a day old.

Sergeant William D. Krause, a fingerprint expert, testified that he compared the latent prints on the broken glass found at the outer door and in the building office 'with the known set of fingerprints.' When asked the results of that comparison, the appellant Stanley objected on the ground that 'there's no basis for what he is comparing to,' so that 'he cannot now testify as to whether there was a likeness or non-likeness.' The court sustained appellant Stanley's objection. Sergeant Krause then testified without objection that he compared the latent fingerprints with 'two sets of fingerprint cards,' (containing ink rolled impressions) one belonging to each appellant and identified by their Baltimore County Bureau of Indentification number. Asked as to his conclusions following these comparisons, appellant Stanley again objected on the ground that introduction of the fingerprint card would be prejudicial since it would indicate that the subject of the card had been arrested. The court did not directly rule on the objection, but permitted Sergeant Krause to testify that appellant Stanley had been fingerprinted on February 25, 1963, March 20, 1966, and August 20, 1967. Appellant Stanley again objected on the ground that such testimony indicated the existence of a prior criminal record, noting at the same time that the fingerprint cards in question, together with photographs and police cards, were 'spread out' before Sergeant Krause four or five feet from the bench, 'all of which is to the absolute prejudice of the defendant.' Appellant Edmonds expressly waived any objection on the same ground. The court, after noting that testimony as to a prior criminal record of the accused is generally inadmissible, then stated:

'* * * I don't see how the mere fact that they have a card of this nature you can infer or assume that there have been convictions. I think all it would show, at most, would be an arrest and maybe not even that much, because, they can obtain a card on a voluntary basis, or a print on a voluntary basis.'

Against this background, Sergeant Krause was then asked on direct examination as to the results of such comparison and appellant Stanley again objected, this time on the ground that the fingerprint cards had not been admitted in evidence. The court ruled, in effect, that there was no necessity to put the cards in evidence and that 'they're not going to be allowed in evidence, I don't think.' Sergeant Krause then testified that the latent prints were those of appellants Stanley and Edmonds.

On cross-examination appellant Stanley's counsel asked Sergeant Krause in effect to explain the nature of the Baltimore County Police Bureau fingerprint cards, counsel inquiring specifically of Krause:

'What would those records indicate to you, I don't have any idea, we haven't seen them, they haven't been introduced in evidence, would you tell his Honor what the records are, what they mean?'

Krause replied that on a certain day fingerprint impressions of the subject are ink rolled on the card. Krause was then asked by Stanley's counsel whether the card indicated that the subject was a member of 'the postal service, or were they in the armed forces, or was this a security check to get a job with the Government or what?' Krause responded that the subjects were either arrested for investigation or were charged with some offense. Appellant Stanley's counsel then directed Krause to read what was on the card and Krause said:

'One card indicates August 20, 1967, investigation of breaking and entering, and on February 25, 1963, it has larceny of guns, in parenthesis, shoplifting laws. March 20, 1966 it has on it the charge of grand larceny.'

Following these self-induced testimonial revelations concerning the nature of the fingerprint cards, and of the offenses with which Stanley had been charged, he then objected thereto on the ground that the card indicated that he had a prior police record. On redirect examination of Sergeant Krause, the State introduced without objection appellant Edmonds's fingerprint card dated August 23, 1967; and also introduced, over objection, appellant Stanley's card dated March 20, 1966.

Neither appellant testified and no evidence was offered on their behalf. The court found each appellant guilty on the evidence of their fingerprints found at the scene of the crime considered in the light of all the attendant circumstances.

I

Appellants contend that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it admitted into evidence their Baltimore County Police Bureau fingerprint cards which contained their criminal histories, since they were thereby denied their constitutional right to a fair trial.

As to appellant Edmonds, when his fingerprint card was offered in evidence, his counsel examined it and offered to stipulate that Edmonds was arrested on August 23, 1967. No objection was entered at any time during the trial to the fingerprint card or to any testimony concerning it. Since the contention that Edmonds's fingerprint card was erroneously admitted was not raised or decided below, it is not properly before us for appellate review. See Maryland Rule 1085. The admissibility of Edmonds's fingerprint card is thus not an issue within the scope of this appeal. Baker v. State, 3 Md.App. 251, 238 A.2d 561; Anthony v. State, 3 Md.App. 129, 238 A.2d 130; Bell v. State, 2 Md.App. 471, 235 A.2d 307.

As to appellant Stanley, it is entirely clear from the record that Sergeant Krause's testimony concerning the existence of appellants' fingerprint cards among the records of the Baltimore County Bureau of Identification came in without objection on the State's direct examination and as a result of Stanley's insistence that a proper foundation be laid before the Sergeant could be permitted to testify as to his identification of the latent fingerprints found at the crime scene as being those of appellants. We think it plain that the State's only purpose in making reference to appellants' fingerprint cards was to identify the basis upon which Sergeant Krause predicated his conclusion that the latent prints found at the scene of the crime were those known to belong to the appellants. It was not the State, but the appellant Stanley who produced the testimony showing that the fingerprint cards contained a notation that he, Stanley, had been charged with criminal offenses. Appellant Stanley introduced this testimony at a time when it was questionable whether the State would offer the cards in evidence, and despite the fact that the court had previously indicated that it did not view the mere existence of a fingerprint card as meaning that the subject of the card had a criminal record. Indeed, it was appellant Stanley's position, on the one hand, that the cards must be placed in evidence it Sergeant Krause was to make any reference to them, and, on the other hand, Stanley contended that the cards were inadmissible since they contained prejudicial information indicating a prior criminal record. Under these circumstances, the State's subsequent introduction of appellant Stanley's fingerprint card of March 20, 1966 was less than anticlimactic and we do not think that its admission...