Edmonds v. U.S.

Decision Date22 April 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-1613,80-1613
Citation642 F.2d 877
PartiesDean S. EDMONDS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants-Appellees. *
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

William Shaw McDermott, Boston, Mass., with whom Thayer Fremont-Smith and Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.

Franklin N. Cunningham, Boston, Mass., with whom Christopher E. Nolin, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for defendant-appellee Avemco Ins. Co.

Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, WINTER, * Circuit Judge, and SKINNER, ** District Judge.

SKINNER, District Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court granting summary judgment for defendant-appellee Avemco Insurance Company ("Avemco") against plaintiff-appellant Dean S. Edmonds, Jr. We affirm the District Court's judgment, 492 F.Supp. 970.

The following facts are essentially undisputed. Edmonds is a licensed pilot who resides in Massachusetts. Avemco is an aircraft insurance company incorporated under the laws of Maryland with its principal place of business in Bethesda, Maryland. On May 14, 1974, Edmonds purchased a Beech Baron Aircraft. Avemco subsequently issued an aircraft insurance policy to Edmonds effective May 15, 1974 for a period of one year ("1974-75 policy"). The 1974-75 policy insured Edmonds against personal injury and property damage while operating the aircraft. Item 7 of the "DECLARATIONS" section stated:

PILOTS: This policy applies when the aircraft is in flight, only while being operated by one of the following pilots, while such pilot is holding a valid and effective Pilot and Medical Certificate:

(a) Dean S. Edmonds

The 1974-75 policy also contained a section entitled "EXCLUSIONS" and one entitled "CONDITIONS". Neither section set out a requirement that Edmonds undergo a periodic review of his piloting skills in order to qualify for coverage.

In 1974 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amended Part 61 of the Federal Air Regulations by inserting therein § 61.57, 14 C.F.R. § 61.57 (1980), which provides, in part:

§ 61.57 Recent Flight experience:

Pilot in command.

(a) Flight Review. After November 1, 1974, no person may act as pilot in command of an aircraft unless, within the preceding 24 months, he has

(1) Accomplished a flight review given to him, in an aircraft for which he is rated, by an appropriately certified instructor or other person designated by the Administrator; and

(2) Had his log book endorsed by the person who gave him the review certifying that he has satisfactorily accomplished the flight review.

Edmonds successfully completed a biennial flight review under the supervision of an FAA-certified instructor on November 24, 1974.

Prior to the expiration date of the 1974-75 policy, Avemco sent Edmonds an "Aircraft Policy Renewal Information" form ("policy renewal form"). The form stated, in part:

Your present AVEMCO Aircraft Insurance Policy expires on the date indicated. So that we may serve you better and have current information on both your aircraft and flying experience, please take a moment to complete and return this postage paid card. As soon as we receive this completed form, we will immediately send you our renewal quotation for your consideration.

Note: If you do not return this completed

card within 10 days, we will forward

our renewal quotation based upon

your estimates of flying time and aircraft

value from information in our

files.

DO ALL PILOTS HAVE:

Current Biennial Flight Review

( )Yes ( )No

Current Medical Certificate

( )Yes ( )No

Edmonds checked the box indicating that he had a current biennial flight review and mailed the form to Avemco, which issued Edmonds a renewal policy for the term May 15, 1975 to May 15, 1976 ("1975-76 policy"). Edmonds later received a new "DECLARATIONS" section. Item 7 of that section had been amended to read:

Item 7. PILOTS: This policy applies when the aircraft is in flight, only while being operated by one of the following pilots (indicated by (X) below) who, (1) holds a valid and effective Pilot and Medical Certificate, (2) has a current biennial flight review and (3) if carrying passengers, has completed at least three Take-Offs and Landings within the preceding 90 days in an aircraft of the same make and model as the insured aircraft.

In March of 1976, Avemco again sent Edmonds a policy renewal form. Edmonds replied that he had a current biennial flight review and mailed the form to Avemco, after which he received a renewal policy for the term May 15, 1976 to May 15, 1977 ("1976-77 policy").

This renewal procedure was repeated again the following year. Avemco sent Edmonds a policy renewal form in March of 1977. Edmonds indicated that he had a current biennial flight review and mailed the form back to Avemco. Avemco subsequently issued a renewal policy covering the period May 15, 1977 to May 15, 1978. ("1977-78 policy"). As with the previous two policies, Item 7 of the "DECLARATIONS" section provided that the 1977-78 policy "applies when the aircraft is in flight, only while being operated by one of the following pilots (Edmonds) who (2) has a current biennial flight review " The 1977-78 policy also contained a new provision in the "EXCLUSIONS" section:

This policy does not apply:

(g) Under Coverages A, B and C, to any aircraft while in flight

(3) being operated by a pilot not meeting the requirements set forth in item 7 of the declarations

When Edmonds returned the policy renewal form to Avemco to obtain the 1977-78 policy, however, he did not have a current biennial flight review within the meaning of 14 C.F.R. § 61.57. His previous flight review took place on November 24, 1974, more than two years earlier. In 1977, Edmonds twice piloted an airplane accompanied by Gary Brigham, a demonstrator pilot employed by the Beech Air Company. Brigham later wrote to Avemco that Edmonds performed all of the maneuvers necessary to complete a biennial review during these flights. Brigham, however, was not an FAA-certified instructor, did not have authority to conduct biennial flight reviews, and did not enter his findings in Edmonds' log book.

On January 14, 1978, Edmonds had an accident at Hanscom Field in Bedford, Massachusetts. As he brought his plane down for a landing on Runway 23, it hit a mound of snow and crashed. The aircraft was extensively damaged. Edmonds promptly filed a claim under the 1977-78 policy. Avemco refused to honor his claim on the theory that by failing to maintain a current biennial flight review Edmonds breached a condition precedent to Avemco's contractual duty.

Edmonds then brought suit for damages against the United States, the Massachusetts Port Authority and Avemco. Count II, the only count before us on this appeal, alleged that Avemco breached its contract of insurance with Edmonds by refusing to cover the accident as required by the 1977-78 policy. Massachusetts law governs this claim since jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.

In the proceedings below, the District Court granted Avemco's motion for summary judgment on Count II. The Court ruled that Edmonds was bound by Item 7 of the "DECLARATIONS", that Item 7 incorporated the federal regulatory standard for flight reviews, and that Edmonds did not comply with Item 7. The District Court then turned to what it perceived as the more difficult question: whether Edmonds' failure to comply with Item 7 voided Avemco's obligations under the policy. The Court noted that under Massachusetts law it was necessary to characterize Item 7 as either a condition precedent, in which case Avemco's obligation was terminated, or a warranty or representation, in which case coverage could be avoided only if the breach contributed to the accident or increased the insurer's risk of loss. M.G.L. c. 175, § 186. In the District Court's view, the standard for determining whether Item 7 is a condition precedent is set out in Charles, Henry & Crowley Co. Inc. v. The Home Insurance Co., 349 Mass. 723, 726, 212 N.E.2d 240 (1965):

(A) statement made in an application for a policy of insurance may become a condition of the policy rather than remain a warranty or representation if: (1) the statement made by the insured relates essentially to the insurer's intelligent decision to issue the policy; and (2) the statement is made a condition precedent to recovery under the policy, either by using the precise words "condition precedent" or their equivalent.

The Court found that both branches of the standard were met in the instant case and ruled that Item 7 was a condition precedent. It held, accordingly, that Edmonds' failure to comply with Item 7 prevented Avemco's duty of covering the accident from arising.

Edmonds' first contention on appeal is that the District Court incorrectly ruled that the term "current biennial flight review" in Item 7 of the "DECLARATIONS" incorporated by reference the federal regulatory requirements set out in 14 C.F.R. § 61.57. He argues that it is impossible to determine from the face of the contract whether the parties intended that all of the technical requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 61.57 apply and, therefore, that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the meaning of Item 7.

Under Massachusetts law, interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a question of law for the court. Freelander v. G. & K. Realty Corp., 357 Mass. 512, 516, 258 N.E.2d 786 (1970). The circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement must be examined to determine the objective intent of the parties. Louis Stoico, Inc. v. Colonial Development Corp., 369 Mass. 898, 902, 343 N.E.2d 872 (1976). where the wording of the contract is unambiguous, the contract must be enforced according to its terms. Freelander v. G. & K. Realty Corp., 357 Mass. at 516, 258 N.E.2d 786. It is only where the contract contains ambiguities that a question of fact for the jury is presented. Trafton v. Custeau, 338 Mass. 305,...

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