Edmondson v. American Motorcycle Ass'n, Inc.
| Citation | 54 F.Supp.2d 544 |
| Decision Date | 10 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 1:96CV235.,CIV. 1:96CV235. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Roger EDMONDSON, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN MOTORCYCLE ASSOCIATION, INC., an Ohio not for profit corporation, a/k/a American Motorcyclist Association; and Paradama Productions, Inc., an Ohio corporation, d/b/a AMA Pro Racing, Defendants. |
George Ward Hendon, Martin K. Reidinger, Adams, Hendon, Carson, Crow & Saenger, P.A., Asheville, NC, David S. Atlas, Red Bank, NJ, for plaintiff.
John H. Hasty, Waggoner, Hamrick, Hasty, Monteith & Kratt, PLLC, Charlotte, NC, Edward A. Matto, Elizabeth Watts, Bricker & Eckler LLP, Columbus, OH, for defendants.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants' post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittur. The Plaintiff opposes the motions which, for the reasons stated herein, are denied.
After a six day trial, the jury found the Defendants converted a mailing list owned by the Plaintiff, wrongfully interfered with Plaintiff's contractual rights in 1995, converted business assets brought to a 1994 joint venture, and breached their fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff. The jury also answered issues concerning the Plaintiff's claim for unfair competition in his favor. The Court subsequently found the conduct stated in the issues constituted unfair competition in violation of North Carolina law. The jury awarded Plaintiff punitive damages of $1 million, but he elected to have his damages trebled pursuant N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75, et seq. Judgment was entered on December 30, 1998, for $2,790,000 in favor of the Plaintiff.
Judgment as a matter of law is proper "when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment." In reviewing the district court's decision, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to render a verdict in the nonmovant's favor.
Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 143 F.3d 828, 831 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 444, 142 L.Ed.2d 399 (1998) (citations omitted). In making that assessment, all reasonable inferences are given the nonmovant and no decision may be based on materially contradictory evidence. Al-Zubaidi v. Ijaz, 917 F.2d 1347, 1348 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 960, 111 S.Ct. 1583, 113 L.Ed.2d 648 (1991).
On review of a motion for new trial, we are permitted to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses. A new trial will be granted if "(1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict."
Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.1998) (quoting Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir.1996)).
The standard of review for allegedly inconsistent verdicts is well established. When the use of a special verdict form leads to apparently conflicting jury findings, the court has a duty under the seventh amendment to harmonize the answers, if it is possible to do so under a fair reading of them. The Supreme Court has stated: "We must therefore attempt to reconcile the jury's findings, by exegesis if necessary, ... before we are free to disregard the jury's verdict and remand the case for a new trial." In attempting to reconcile special verdicts, a court should look beyond the face of the interrogatories to the court's instructions.
Gosnell v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 782 F.2d 464, 466-67 (4th Cir.1986) (quoting Gallick v. B & O R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963)) (other citations omitted).
"`[J]ury determinations of factual matters such as ... the amount of compensatory damages will be reviewed ... by determining whether the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence or based on evidence which is false.'" Cline, 144 F.3d at 305 (quoting Atlas Food Sys., 99 F.3d at 594).
Plaintiff's first cause of action was for conversion of a mailing list which he had developed in the context of his business, Championship Cup Series (CCS). This list contained not only past participants in races sponsored by CCS but potential participants in future events, including amateur racers who might become professional. Defendants argue the complaint alleged conversion of a trade secret in the form of a mailing list. However, they complain, the jury was never instructed on the North Carolina law of trade secrets.1
In the first claim for relief alleged in the Plaintiffs complaint, the mailing list was described as both a business asset and a trade secret under North Carolina law. However, the cause of action was based on conversion of the business asset which took the form of the mailing list; the claim was not based on conversion of a trade secret. Complaint, at ¶'s 53-55 ( ) (emphasis added). At no point does the complaint seek relief for conversion of a trade secret.
Moreover, the evidence at trial related to efforts taken by the Defendants to obtain the list. Roy Jansen, AMA's director of competition, testified by video deposition that without the mailing list, AMA would have to start from "Square One." As a result, an AMA official who worked at the CCS offices was to obtain the information, including the name of amateur racers, by downloading the list from the Plaintiff's field computer. And, the Defendants finally obtained the list when the Plaintiff turned over a set of mailing labels with the understanding the labels would not be duplicated. The labels, obviously, were the mailing list. Plaintiff moved at the close of his evidence to conform his pleadings to the evidence produced at trial; a motion which was granted. The issue thus became whether he had proved evidence that the Defendants converted the mailing list, not a trade secret. The jury, which was instructed on the law of conversion, found first, that the Plaintiff owned a business asset called a mailing list and second, that the list was converted by the Defendants. The trade secret status of the list was not in issue and was not an essential element of the claim.
Defendants next repeat an argument rejected in their summary judgment motion: the information in the mailing list was available to them by reviewing software jointly owned by the parties; thus, there could be no conversion. And, they argue that since the Plaintiff voluntarily turned over the mailing labels, there could be no conversion. The jury heard both versions of the evidence and obviously believed the Plaintiff's version as well as his evidence concerning the value of the list. Nor does Defendants' argument justify a new trial.
The Defendants also claim the evidence does not support the jury's finding that they interfered with Plaintiff's contractual rights in 1995. Defendants' argument is that the race track owners made independent decisions about what was best for their businesses; the fact that they determined not to do business with the Plaintiff does not rise to the level of interference with contract rights.
John Szymanski's video deposition was introduced at trial. He was the marketing manager of the Mid-Ohio Race Track, one of the premiere road-racing tracks in the United States. He testified that when the track owners heard of the dispute between the Plaintiff and AMA, they told AMA officials how important they felt the Plaintiff was to the industry. Later, they learned that AMA was forcing the Plaintiff out and became disenchanted with AMA. As a group, they decided to do business with the Plaintiff. Thereafter, the motorcycle manufacturers called to say they would not do business with the tracks unless the owners gave their business to AMA instead of to the Plaintiff. Suddenly, AMA planned events during the same weeks as Plaintiff's events were scheduled and sponsors were lost. As a result, Mid-Ohio had no choice but to go with AMA instead of the Plaintiff.
The manager of Brainerd International Raceway testified he also had planned to do business with the Plaintiff but once Mid-Ohio went back to AMA, he had no choice but to do the same. AMA was setting up races for the same dates as the races scheduled with the Plaintiff. And, they could not hold races without the manufacturers' participation. The manager of Road America Race Track reiterated this testimony. To accept the Defendants' arguments and grant judgment as a matter of law would substitute the Defendants' theory of the case for the jury's credibility decisions. That may not be done. And, as noted above, Defendants' theories do not warrant a new trial.
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