Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, No. 28541.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: WALTERS, Justice.
• Citation: 75 P.3d 733,139 Idaho 172
• Parties: Michael J. EDMONDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHEARER LUMBER PRODUCTS, a division of Bennett Lumber Products, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Respondent.
• Docket Number: No. 28541.
• Decision Date: 23 July 2003

75 P.3d 733
139 Idaho 172

Michael J. EDMONDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHEARER LUMBER PRODUCTS, a division of Bennett Lumber Products, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Respondent

No. 28541.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2003 Term.

July 23, 2003.

Rehearing Denied September 4, 2003.

75 P.3d 735

Starr Kelso, Coeur d'Alene, argued for appellant

Keller W. Allen, Spokane, WA, argued for respondent.

WALTERS, Justice.

This is a wrongful termination of employment case. The employee appeals from the district court's dismissal of the action upon the employer's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

75 P.3d 736

FACTS

Michael Edmondson was employed by Shearer Lumber Products for twenty-two years at the company's Elk City mill. In 1999, he became a salaried employee and on his most recent performance review, he received a rating of "very good." However, on February 15, 2000, the plant manager, David Paisley, following directions from his superiors fired Edmondson, by reading a statement that informed Edmondson: "Because of your continued involvement in activities that are harmful to the long term interests of Shearer Lumber Products, we are terminating your employment immediately."

It was well known at Shearer Lumber that Edmondson was extensively involved in the community and regularly attended public meetings concerning matters of public interest and concern, such that he was recognized with the Idaho GEM Citizen Award by then Governor Batt. In January of 2000, Edmondson attended a public meeting of a group known as Save Elk City. One of the leaders of the group was the resource manager at Shearer Lumber, Dick Wilhite, who at the group meetings encouraged public support for the proposal that Save Elk City had submitted to the Federal Lands Task Force Working Group for consideration as to how best to manage the Nez Perce National Forest. Edmondson attended the group meetings, but he made no comments on the group's proposal. Nor did he discuss his opinions regarding the Save Elk City proposal at work with other employees.

Shearer Lumber did not openly campaign for the Save Elk City proposal, but Edmondson later learned from Wilhite that the proposal submitted in the name of Save Elk City was the project of Shearer Lumber's owner, Dick Bennett. At that time, Wilhite and Edmondson discussed the various outstanding proposals that might be competing for the Task Force's recommendation to the State Land Board, but Edmondson did not declare a preference for any of the proposals.

Shearer Lumber obtained information that Edmondson had attended meetings of the Task Force, had contacted someone in the administration of the Task Force, and was opposed to the collaborative project that Shearer had sponsored and submitted on behalf of the Save Elk City group. Edmondson was twice called into meetings at Shearer Lumber, where he claimed he was subjected to intimidation and pressure from Wilhite, Paisley, and John Bennett, Shearer's general manager. It was made clear that Edmondson was not to form any opinions on or make any statements to the Federal Lands Task Force. In effect, Edmondson was warned that any opposition to the collaborative project that was contrary to Shearer's interest would lead to serious consequences. Edmondson was informed at the February 2, 2000, meeting that Shearer Lumber wanted all of its employees to support the projects the mill was involved in, if they wanted to avoid serious consequences that would result if the project was derailed or negatively impacted.

John Bennett testified in his deposition that the reason Edmondson was terminated was that Edmondson was opposing the project that Shearer Lumber Products supported, in direct conflict with the company's goals that could ultimately jeopardize a Task Force decision favorable to Shearer's interests. Bennett also attributed to Edmondson contact with the Task Force administration, although it was Edmondson's wife, Jamie, who had made inquiries to the Task Force. Edmondson speculated further as to the reason for his termination, which occurred the day after federal agents impounded some logs stored on the Shearer Mill site, as part of a U.S. Forest Service investigation in which Jamie Edmondson had also played a role. However, John Bennett testified that the logs belonged to a third party, and Shearer had no interest in how the logs were handled.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Edmondson brought an action against Shearer Lumber for wrongful termination of employment and demanded a jury trial. Edmondson moved for partial summary judgment on the claim of termination of employment, asserting breach of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.

75 P.3d 737

Shearer Lumber moved for summary judgment, claiming that Edmondson, who was at all times material to the complaint an employee-at-will, had no legally cognizable claim regarding his termination

On August 2, 2001, the district court heard the cross-motions for summary judgment, along with Edmondson's motion to amend the complaint. The district court awarded summary judgment to Shearer, holding that Edmondson's allegations did not fall within the limited public policy exception recognized in Idaho. The district court denied Edmondson's motion to amend the pleadings and denied Edmondson's motion to reconsider its summary judgment decision. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is only appropriate when genuine issues of material fact are absent and the case can be decided as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Moss v. Mid-American Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 302, 647 P.2d 754, 758 (1982). In determining whether material issues of fact exist, all allegations of fact in the record and all reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239, 240, 16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000). When a jury is to be the finder of fact, summary judgment is not proper if conflicting inferences could be drawn from the record and reasonable people might reach different conclusions. State Dep't of Fin. v. Res. Serv. Co., Inc., 130 Idaho 877, 880, 950 P.2d 249, 252 (1997).

DISCUSSION

I.

Edmondson argues that summary judgment was improperly granted because issues of material fact exist that must be resolved by a jury, such as which meetings he attended, which proposal he endorsed, and which of his actions constituted the "continued involvement in activities harmful to the long term interests of Shearer." No dispute of fact is "material," however, unless it relates to an issue that is disclosed by the pleadings. Harms Memorial Hospital v. Morton, 112 Idaho 129, 730 P.2d 1049 (Ct. App.1986), citing Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 691 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App.1984). The tendered factual issues as to the reasons for Edmondson's discharge are not material to Edmondson's claims because, as the district court held, Edmondson was an at-will employee, who could be terminated by his employer at any time for any reason without creating liability. See Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989); MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hospital, 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 (1985). The alleged factual issues concerning the circumstances of the firing, if they establish that Edmondson has asserted a policy exception to the at-will doctrine, are questions of law. See Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 P.2d 695 (1997). Thus, we freely review whether the record shows, without a genuine dispute of fact, that the public policy asserted by Edmondson is appropriate as a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine.

A. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the claim of breach of public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

In Idaho, the only general exception to the employment at-will doctrine is that an employer may be liable for wrongful discharge when the motivation for discharge contravenes public policy. MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp., supra; Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 112 Idaho 461, 469, 732 P.2d 699, 707 (Ct.App.1987). The purpose of the exception is to balance the competing interests of society, the employer, and the employee in light of modern business experience. Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175, 178, 16 P.3d 272, 275 (2000). The public policy exception has been held to protect employees who refuse to commit unlawful acts, who perform important public obligations, or who exercise certain legal rights or privileges. Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990).

75 P.3d 738

Public policy of the state is found in the constitution and statutes. Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Challis Independent School Distr. No. 1, 46 Idaho 403, 268 P. 26 (1928). "In the absence of case law or statutory language ..., the Court finds no basis for expanding the Idaho law that defines the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine." Lord v. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc., 203 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1180 (D.Idaho 2002)

Courts have recognized that public policy expressed in the constitution and the statutes of the state may serve as a basis for finding an exception to the employment at-will doctrine. See generally 82 Am.Jur.2d Wrongful Discharge § 19, at 692 (1992). The First Amendment prohibits the government from restraining or abridging freedom of speech and assembly. Article I, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution also guarantees the right of free speech: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Article I, § 10 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees the right of freedom of association: "The people shall have the right to assemble in a peaceful manner, to consult for their common good; to instruct their representatives, and to...