Edmons v. Depot
| Decision Date | 14 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 09-987-AC |
| Parties | WILLIAM C. EDMONS, Plaintiff, v. HOME DEPOT, U.S.A., INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Introduction
Plaintiff William C. Edmons ("Edmons") purchased a ladder from Defendant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. ("Home Depot"). Edmons alleges that, while using the Krause Multimatic Ladder ("the ladder"), he fell and, as a result of the ladder's defective design, sustained serious injuries. Edmons asserts a claim of strict products liability against Home Depot, as the retail seller of the ladder.
Home Depot moves to both strike the supplementary report submitted by Edmons's expert witness and for summary judgment for failure to establish defective design and causation. For the reasons set forth below, Home Depot's motions to strike and for summary judgment are granted in their entirety.
Edmons submitted the expert report of Keith M. Cronrath of Cronrath & Tompkins, Forensic Engineers, P.S.1 ("Cronrath") to opposing counsel on April 28, 2010. (Ewing Declaration ("Decl.") Exhibit ("Ex.") 3.) The report states that Cronrath reviewed both "a written report, photographs, and video regarding the incident ladder prepared by Talbott Associates, Inc. of Portland, Oregon" ("the Talbott report") and Edmons's deposition. Id. at 2. In his report, Cronrath summarized Edmons's deposition testimony and explained that after reviewing the Talbott report, he "ha[s] determined that there are several defects that could have caused or contributed to the accident that Mr. Edmons was involved in." Id. at 3-5.
In his report, Cronrath describes each identified defect and a potential alternative to remedy each defect:
1. Defect: "the wire release bar can be pulled in and remain in next to the rung when the locks are actually in the unlocked position, " leading a user to believe that the locks are in place when they are not. Id.
Alternative: "The design of the wire release bar should have been such that when the locking bolts were in the unlocked position the wire release bar is always held out away from the rung in a clearly identifiable unlocked position and if the wire release bar was pushed back against the rung (as shown in the Talbott Associates video) and the lock bolts are unlocked, the wire release bar should spring back out to indicate that the lock bolts were in the unlocked position." Id. at 5-6.2. Defect: "the redlock bolts always give an indicator of the color red regardless whether they are in the locked or unlocked position." Id. at 6.
Alternative: "to have the red exposed only in one of the positions of the lock and in the other position there is either a different color or a complete absence of red." Id.
3. Defect: "a lack of instruction on the warning labels to clearly instruct the user as to what position the wire release bar needs to be in when the joint is locked." Id.
Alternative: the label "would be less confusing if it said 'To Lock: Stop holding the bar before the lock gets to the desired lock location...." Id. (emphasis in original).
4. Defect: the ladder legs "can be folded out into a position that is over center or past the lock position, " as shown in the Talbott report. Id.
Alternative: Id. at 7.
5. Defect: 2 "a lack of warning that the ladder joints can go past the lock position (such as shown in the Talbott Associates video and as described by Mr. Edmons) and go into an always unlocked position that will not snap into the lock position as previously discussed in defect number four." Id.
Alternative: if the defect "could not be designed out, then proper engineering design safety protocol would be to either guard against the defect (which is probablynot practical in this instance) or to warn of the defect or the danger of this condition if it cannot be deisnged out or guaded." Id.
Cronrath wrote that "[a]ny or all of the five above named and discussed defects in the ladder could have caused or contributed to this accident where Mr. Edmons fell when the hinges collapsed." Id. He also wrote that, to the extent Edmons's testimony is credible, "the defects noted above caused or contributed to the collapse of the ladder at the time Mr. Edmons was using it." Id. at 8.
Cronrath subsequently testified at deposition that he based his expert report on photos and videos and not on a physical inspection of the ladder. (Ewing Decl., Ex. 4 at 2.) He testified that he had no experience in the design of "an articulating ladder" or "a hinge lock mechanism for an articulating ladder[.]" Id. at 2-3. Cronrath admitted that he did not create a diagram or a prototype of his alternative designs, explaining: Id. at 10. Cronrath argued that the simplicity of the design and proposed alternatives obviated the need for a prototype or diagram, or anything more than a conceptual description of the proposed alternative. Id. at 12. Cronrath also testified that "all of [his] opinions in this case [were] the product of litigation." Id. at 20.
Cronrath's curriculum vitae states that he received an Applied Science degree from Spokane Community College in 1975 and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Oregon State University in 1983. Cronrath has authored or co-authored several articles and conducted "special studies" on a wide variety of topics in engineering, the bulk of which concern automobile accidents and the techniques of reconstruction. Cronrath's materials also indicate that he has giventestimony in approximately thirty court cases.
In his response materials, Edmons includes a "Handwritten Supplemental Report of Keith Cronrath, " the handwritten notes of Cronrath upon inspection of the ladder in question on June 11, 2010. The notes primarily address the ease with which a user of the ladder could inadvertently move the release bar and release all of the locks from their locked position. Edmons also submits a supplementary declaration by Cronrath in which Cronrath posits three possible scenarios giving rise to the accident in question: First, Edmons may have been careless and failed to ensure that the locking pins were in the locked position. Second, unbeknownst to Edmons, the locking mechanism may have come unlocked. Third, Edmons may have been mistaken in thinking the ladder was locked when it was not, despite a reasonable review of the ladder's instructions and warnings.
Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 702 provides that expert testimony may be presented where "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]" Fed. R. Evid. 702. An expert must be "qualified... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" and may testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." Id.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) ("Daubert I"), the Supreme Court clarified the role of the district court in the admission of expert testimony. Referring specifically to scientific evidence, the Court wrote that "under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at 589. Daubert I set forth factors to guide the court in determining whether expert testimony is admissible:
District court judges are to consider not only (1) whether the method has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, but also (2) whether the method has been peer-reviewed, (3) whether the method "can be (and has been) tested, " and (4) whether there is a "known or potential rate of error."
Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Daubert II") (on remand from Daubert I)). Daubert I was a notable opinion, in part, because it departed from a previously articulated standard, as first stated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which provided that an expert's testimony "is inadmissible if it is based on a method that has not gained 'general acceptance' in the relevant scientific community." Lust, 89 F.3d at 597 (citing Daubert I). The general acceptance standard was thus abandoned.
Courts have since interpreted the Daubert I inquiry more flexibly. No single factor is dispositive but, where one factor is absent, other factors may be applied more stringently. For example: "That the expert failed to subject his method to peer-review and to develop his opinion outside the litigation is not dispositive, but if these guarantees of reliability are not satisfied, the expert 'must explain precisely how [he] went about reaching [his] conclusions and point to some objective source... to show that [he has] followed the scientific method, as it is practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in [his] field.'" Lust, 89 F.3d at 597 (quoti...
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