EDWARD C v. CITY of ALBUQUERQUE

• Decision Date: 03 September 2010
• Docket Number: 907,31,No. 31,917.
• Parties: EDWARD C. and Janis C., individually and as parents of Emilio C., Rachel C., and Cassandra G., minor children, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Defendant-Petitioner. Edward C. and Janis C., individually and as parents of Emilio C., Rachel C., and Cassandra G., minor children, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, L.L.C., d/b/a Albuquerque Isotopes, Defendant-Petitioner.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

148 N.M. 646

241 P.3d 1086

2010 NMSC 043

EDWARD C. and Janis C., individually and as parents of Emilio C., Rachel C., and Cassandra G., minor children, Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Defendant-Petitioner.

Edward C. and Janis C., individually and as parents of Emilio C., Rachel C., and Cassandra G., minor children, Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.Albuquerque Baseball Club, L.L.C., d/b/a Albuquerque Isotopes, Defendant-Petitioner.

Nos. 31,907, 31,917.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. 3, 2010.

Robert M. White, Michael I. Garcia, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner City of Albuquerque.

Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C., S. Carolyn Ramos, Sean E. Garrett, Emily A. Franke, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner Albuquerque Baseball Club, L.L.C.

Vigil Law Firm, P.A., Jacob G. Vigil, L. Helen Bennett, P.C., L. Helen Bennett, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondents.

Michael B. Browde, Law Office of William E. Snead, William E. Snead, Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae, New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association.

McNerney, Page, Vanderlin & Hall, Benjamin E. Landon, Williamsport, PA, for Amicus Curiae, Little League Baseball, Incorporated.

Miller Stratvert P.A., Ruth Fuess, Albuquerque, NM, Holme, Roberts & Owen, L.L.P., Steven B. Smith, Brent E. Rychener, Colorado Springs, CO, for Amicus Curiae, Pacific Coast League of Professional, Baseball Clubs, Inc. Geiger Law Offices, P.C., Mark P. Geiger, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae, The New Mexico Activities Association.

OPINION

CHÁVEZ, Justice.

{1} In this case, it is alleged that a child was struck in the head by a baseball during pregame batting practice at Isotopes stadium. The child was seated in the picnic area beyond the left field wall in fair ball territory with his family for a pre-game Little League party. The child had just begun to eat his food when, without warning, pre-game batting practice began and a baseball struck him, fracturing his skull. Plaintiffs sued the Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC d/b/a Albuquerque Isotopes (Isotopes), the City of Albuquerque (City), Houston McLane Co. d/b/a Houston Astros (Astros), and Dave Matranga, the player who batted the ball that struck the child (collectively “Defendants”).

{2} The question we must answer is what duty do owner/occupants of commercial baseball stadiums have to protect spectators from projectiles leaving the field of play. The district court applied the most limited duty, which is followed in a minority of jurisdictions, commonly referred to as the “baseball rule.” The district court held that the duty was limited to providing screening for the area of the field behind home plate for as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire such protection. Because Isotopes stadium has such screening, the district court granted summary judgment to Defendants.

{3} On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment regarding the City and the Isotopes “on the ground that, under the particular circumstances alleged, there are issues of material fact precluding summary judgment” and rejected application of a limited-duty baseball rule, holding instead that these Defendants owed a duty to exercise ordinary care. Crespin v. Albuquerque Baseball Club, LLC, 2009-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 1, 13, 147 N.M. 62, 216 P.3d 827. We granted certiorari to decide whether New Mexico should recognize a limited duty for owner/occupants of commercial baseball stadiums.

{4} Considering the nature of the sport of baseball, which involves spectator participation and a desire to catch balls that leave the field of play, contrary to the Court of Appeals majority opinion, we believe that a limited-duty rule, albeit not the one argued for by Defendants, is warranted by sound policy considerations. Accordingly, we hold that an owner/occupant of a commercial baseball stadium owes a duty that is symmetrical to the duty of the spectator. The spectator must exercise ordinary care to protect himself or herself from the inherent risk of being hit by a projectile that leaves the field of play and the owner/occupant must exercise ordinary care not to increase that inherent risk.

{5} In this case, it is alleged that the injured child was not in an area dedicated solely to viewing the game, but was in the picnic area with tables positioned perpendicular to the field of play. This type of area can be described as a multi-purpose area. It is alleged that, without warning, batting practice commenced when the child was hit by a baseball that left the field of play. Given the scope of duty that we define today and Plaintiffs' allegations, we conclude that, on the record before us, Defendants did not make a prima facie showing entitling them to summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

{6} Plaintiffs and their four-year-old son, Emilio, two-year-old daughter, Rachel, and ten-year-old daughter, Cassandra, were attending a Little League party at Isotopes stadium. The City owns the stadium, which is leased by the Isotopes. Plaintiffs were in the stadium's picnic area, located beyond the left field wall in fair ball territory. They “had just sat down with [their] hot dogs and drinks” and had “just begun to eat [their] meals, when without a warning from anyone at the ball park a baseball struck Emilio in the head.” During pregame batting practice, New Orleans Zephyrs player Dave Matranga batted a ball out of the park into the picnic area, striking Emilio “in the upper right portion of his head fracturing his skull.” The picnic tables in the left field stands are arranged in alignment with the left field foul line, so that seated individuals are not directly facing the field of play, but face perpendicular to the action. Isotopes stadium has a screen or protective netting between home plate and the seats behind home plate, but has no screen or protective netting between home plate and the seats beyond the left field wall.

{7} Plaintiffs allege that injury to Emilio was foreseeable and Defendants owed a duty to exercise ordinary care for his safety. Plaintiffs contend that the central issue is whether Defendants breached the duty of ordinary care by not screening the picnic area, when that area was designed so that patrons are not focused on the game or pre-game activities, and by failing to warn Plaintiffs that batting practice had begun. Under these facts, Plaintiffs argue, “the issue of negligence ... should be reserved for the jury to determine with reference to the facts of the particular case,” and to compare Defendants' fault with any fault that might be attributable to Plaintiffs.

{8} Defendants contend that before the question of breach of duty can be addressed, the court must determine the scope of duty. They argue that baseball is a unique spectator sport and “justifies a specific definition of the duty owed by operators of baseball facilities.” They explain that “baseball subjects spectators to an inherent risk of being struck by a batted ball ... [yet m]ost spectators ... prefer to sit in an area where they can watch the game without the obstruction of a screen ... [and have] the opportunity to ... catch a ... ball [that leaves the playing field].” (Citations omitted.) Because proprietors of ball parks have a legitimate interest in catering to these desires, their duty should be limited.

{9} Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals conferred upon the jury, not the courts, “the power to decide the legal question of what duty of care exists in the context of a baseball game” (emphasis omitted) when it applied the duty of ordinary care. “It left the question unanswered as to where an owner or operator's duty begins.” The result, Defendants claim, is that “[t]here would be no predictability as to how one might satisfy an ever-changing duty that different fact finders might decide.”

{10} Defendants urge this Court to adopt a limited-duty baseball rule that is satisfied when the owner/occupant of a baseball stadium provides a screened area behind home plate with adequate seating for those seeking protection. “Where a spectator rejects the protected seating and opts for seating that is not, or is less, protected the owner or operator is not liable.” As will be discussed infra, the baseball rule proposed by Defendants and adopted by the district court is the most limited and is followed only by a minority of jurisdictions in this country.

{11} Plaintiffs contend that the baseball rule proposed by Defendants does little to promote safety because it offers “little incentive to examine new methods of keeping fans safe.” “Where, as in this case, the attending public is specifically invited not to give their full attention to the field, the baseball rule cannot fairly be applied.” Plaintiffs also contend that the baseball rule is inconsistent with New Mexico's system of pure comparative fault because the rule is a “species” of the assumption of risk defense, which was abolished in New Mexico along with other “all or nothing” defenses. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

{12} Defendants respond by contending that there is nothing inconsistent with our comparative fault system “because where the duty ends, there can be no negligence to impute.” “The baseball rule specifically defines the duty of ordinary care owed in the limited context of what protection must be provided to spectators from baseballs that leave the field of play.” Therefore, nothing about the rule conflicts with comparative negligence and “many of the twenty plus states to adopt the baseball rule have done so by defining the duty of ordinary care owed in the context of a comparative negligence setting.” Finally, Defendants argue that “failure to adopt the baseball rule ... will isolate New Mexico from almost every other jurisdiction to consider the issue and have a significant, adverse social and economic impact on citizens of this State.”

{13} The district court was persuaded by Defendants' argument and granted summary judgment in their favor, concluding that New Mexico would adopt...