Edwards v. Arizona

• Decision Date: 11 September 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 20-54 (TJK)
• Citation: Edwards v. Arizona, Civil Action No. 20-54 (TJK) (D. D.C. Sep 11, 2020)
• Parties: STEPHEN S. EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ARIZONA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

STEPHEN S. EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ARIZONA et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-54 (TJK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 11, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Stephen S. Edwards challenges the outcome of state-court proceedings related to the foreclosure of his home, which was sold at a sheriff's auction after an Arizona state court entered a judgment foreclosing a lien on the property in 2018.He also asserts claims challenging his designation as a vexatious litigant in that state-court action, which prohibited him from filing further pleadings without leave of court.Proceeding pro se, he sues the State of Arizona and the United States, alleging a violation of his civil rights, a conspiracy to deny him access to the Arizona state courts, and abuse of Arizona's foreclosure and vexatious-litigant laws.

The State of Arizona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which limits federal courts from exercising appellate review over state-court decisions, as well as on the grounds of sovereign immunity, failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), judicial immunity, and improper venue.For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and sua sponte dismiss the complaint against the United States for lack of service.Thus, the entire action will be dismissed.

I.Background

Plaintiff's homeowners' association, the Lakewood Community Association(the "Association"), filed a case in Maricopa County Superior Court against Plaintiff to foreclose on a lien secured by Plaintiff's home.ECF No. 4-1at 7.In connection with the foreclosure proceedings, the Association moved to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant.ECF No. 4-3at 31.The Maricopa County Superior Court held a hearing, at which Plaintiff did not appear, in September 2018.Id. at 32-33.The court found that Plaintiff had been a party in forty-one lawsuits and "consistently used litigation in this Court in order to harass and to publish scandalous, nonsensical and completely baseless insults . . . for the sole purposes of increasing his opponents' litigation costs and harassing his opponents."Id. at 43.Consequently, the court recommended to the Presiding Judge for Maricopa County Superior Court that Plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant.Id.After review, the Presiding Judge did just that and prohibited Plaintiff from filing further pleadings without seeking leave of court.Id. at 52-53;see alsoECF No. 1("Compl.")¶¶ 13, 26, 38.

The court granted summary judgment for the Association in January 2019, thereby foreclosing on the lien.ECF No. 4-3at 10-11;see alsoCompl.¶¶ 13, 17, 26.The next month, the court issued a writ of special execution, ordering the sheriff to sell the property.ECF No. 4-3at 19.Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff's motion to extinguish the lien was denied, id. at 22-23, and his home was sold in April 2019, id. at 25-27.In August 2019, the court denied Plaintiff's motion to quash the writ of special execution, explaining that Plaintiff had not challenged the terms of the original judgment and had therefore waived any objection.Id. at 29.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this suit in January 2020.He asserts what appear to be various statutory and constitutional claims against the State of Arizona as a result of theforeclosure on his home and the vexatious-litigant order.He also alleges violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the United States.

II.Legal Standards

To survive a Rule 12(b)(1)motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has jurisdiction.Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561(1992).The Court must subject factual allegations to a higher level of scrutiny in resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving one under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because it has an "affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority."Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21(D.D.C.2003)(citation omitted).The Court need not limit itself to the complaint when assessing subject matter jurisdiction; it "may consider relevant materials outside the pleadings to determine whether it has jurisdiction."Bank of Am., N.A. v. FDIC, 908 F. Supp. 2d 60, 78(D.D.C.2012).While a pro se complaint must be construed liberally, pro se plaintiffs must still show that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction.James v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 3d 58, 63(D.D.C.2014).

It is the plaintiff's responsibility to serve a defendant within 90 days after a complaint is filed, unless the defendant waives service.Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).If the plaintiff does not do so, then absent a showing of good cause, the court"must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time."Id.To serve the United States, the plaintiff must serve both the Attorney General of the United States and the United States attorney "for the district where the action is brought."Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A)-(B);see alsoWarren v. Central Intelligence Agency, 210 F. Supp. 3d 199, 202(D.D.C.2016).A party's pro se status does not relieve it of the obligation to comply with the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure or this Court's local rules.SeeAkers v. Liberty Mut. Grp., 274 F.R.D. 346, 349(D.D.C.2011).

The Court considers a plaintiff's pro se complaint in light of all filings in the record.Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152(D.C. Cir.2015);see alsoStrumsky v. Wash. Post Co., 842 F. Supp. 2d 215, 217(D.D.C.2012)(court may consider documents referenced in complaint without converting motion to dismiss into motion for summary judgment).

III.Analysis

A.Claims Against the State of Arizona(Counts I-V)¹

This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims against the State of Arizona because those claims are requests to review state-court judgments in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The doctrine "prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court."Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119(D.C. Cir.2002);seeRooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416(1923)("The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.");District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476(1983).It applies to cases that are "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review of those judgments."Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284(2005).

Three criteria govern a Rooker-Feldman analysis."First, '[t]he party against whom the doctrine is invoked must have actually been a party to the prior state-court judgment.'"Bradley v. DeWine, 55 F. Supp. 3d 31, 41(D.D.C.2014)(quotingLance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 462(2006)).Second, "the claim raised in the federal suit must have been actually raised or inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment."Id.(quotingLance, 546 U.S. at 462).A claim is "inextricably intertwined" with a prior state-court judgment if "success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it."Araya v. Bayly, 875 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4(D.D.C.2012)(citation omitted), aff'd, No. 12-7069, 2013 WL 500819(D.C. Cir.Jan. 18, 2013);see alsoJung v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 18-962 (RC), 2018 WL 6680579, at *5(D.D.C.Dec. 19, 2018).Third, "the federal claim must not be parallel to the state-court claim."Bradley, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 42(quotingLance, 546 U.S. at 462).A claim is parallel if the plaintiff brought the federal claim before a state court entered the relevant judgment.Exxon, 544 U.S. at 293.

Plaintiff's claims against the State of Arizona easily satisfy the first and third prongs of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The first is fulfilled because the plaintiff here was also the plaintiff in "the prior state-court judgment[s]."Bradley, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 41;seeECF No. 4-3at 8.The third is met because Plaintiff sued in January 2020, after the state court entered those judgments.SeeECF No. 1;ECF No. 4-3at 10-11, 52-53.

The second prong is also satisfied as to the claims against the State of Arizona.These claims were "actually raised" or "inextricably intertwined" with the state-court judgments because, through them, Plaintiff asks this Court to determine that the state court wrongly decided issues before it through the foreclosure judgment and vexatious-litigant order.In Count I, Plaintiff claims that the judges of Maricopa County violated his Sixth- and Fourteenth-Amendment rights by finding him vexatious and denying him access to the courts and courthouse.SeeCompl.¶¶ 13-17.Along similar lines, in Count II, Plaintiff claims that the Arizona state judges conspired to deny him that access.SeeCompl.¶¶ 19-22.This Court lacksjurisdiction over these claims because determining whether Plaintiff was erroneously declared vexatious or improperly denied access to the state courts would require this Court to "review and reject" findings in the state-court order regarding Plaintiff's litigation conduct "in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine."SeeMagritz v. Ozaukee County, 894 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39(D.D.C.2012).

The same goes for Count III of Plaintiff's complaint.In Count III, the core of Plaintiff's claim appears to be that the State of Arizona violated his civil rights by "illegally and wrongfully" assisting in the wrongful foreclosure of his home.Compl.¶ 26(c).Again, the second prong of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is satisfied because Plaintiff is effectively seeking to collaterally attack...