Edwards v. Arizona, No. 79-5269

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWHITE
Citation68 L.Ed.2d 378,451 U.S. 477,101 S.Ct. 1880
PartiesRobert EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. State of ARIZONA
Decision Date18 May 1981
Docket NumberNo. 79-5269

451 U.S. 477
101 S.Ct. 1880
68 L.Ed.2d 378
Robert EDWARDS, Petitioner,

v.

State of ARIZONA.

No. 79-5269.
Argued Nov. 5, 1980.
Decided May 18, 1981.
Rehearing Denied June 22, 1981.

See 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128.

Syllabus

After being arrested on a state criminal charge, and after being informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, petitioner was questioned by the police on January 19, 1976, until he said that he wanted an attorney. Questioning then ceased, but on January 20 police officers came to the jail and, after stating that they wanted to talk to him and again informing petitioner of his Miranda rights, obtained his confession when he said that he was willing to talk. The trial court ultimately denied petitioner's motion to suppress his confession, finding the statement to be voluntary, and he was thereafter convicted. The Arizona Supreme Court held that during the January 20 meeting he waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel when he voluntarily gave his statement after again being informed of his rights.

Held: The use of petitioner's confession against him at his trial violated his right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, as declared in Miranda, supra. Having exercised his right on January 19 to have counsel present during interrogation, petitioner did not validly waive that right on the 20th. Pp. 481-487.

(a) A waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked, not only must be voluntary, but also must constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Here, however, the state courts applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver by focusing on the voluntariness of petitioner's confession rather than on whether he understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. Pp. 482-484.

(b) When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to police-initiated interrogation after being again advised of his rights. An accused, such as petitioner, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused has himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Here, the interrogation of petitioner on January 20 was at the in-

Page 478

stance of the authorities, and his confession, made without having had access to counsel did not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible. Pp. 484-487.

122 Ariz. 206, 594 P.2d 72, reversed.

Michael J. Meehan, Tucson, Ariz., for petitioner.

Crane McClennen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case, 446 U.S. 950, 100 S.Ct. 2915, 64 L.Ed.2d 807 (1980), limited to Q 1 presented in the petition, which in relevant part was "whether the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require suppression of a post-arrest confession, which was obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult counsel before further interrogation . . . ."

I

On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against Edwards in Arizona state court charging him with robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder.1 An arrest warrant was issued pursuant to the complaint, and Edwards was arrested at his home later that same day. At the police station, he was informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Petitioner stated that he understood his rights, and was willing to submit to questioning. After

Page 479

being told that another suspect already in custody had implicated him in the crime, Edwards denied involvement and gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense. He then sought to "make a deal." The interrogating officer told him that he wanted a statement, but that he did not have the authority to negotiate a deal. The officer provided Edwards with the telephone number of a county attorney. Petitioner made the call, but hung up after a few moments. Edwards then said: "I want an attorney before making a deal." At that point, questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to county jail.

At 9:15 the next morning, two detectives, colleagues of the officer who had interrogated Edwards the previous night, came to the jail and asked to see Edwards. When the detention officer informed Edwards that the detectives wished to speak with him, he replied that he did not want to talk to anyone. The guard told him that "he had" to talk and then took him to meet with the detectives. The officers identified themselves, stated they wanted to talk to him, and informed him of his Miranda rights. Edwards was willing to talk, but he first wanted to hear the taped statement of the alleged accomplice who had implicated him.2 After listening to the tape for several minutes, petitioner said that he would make a statement so long as it was not tape-recorded. The detectives informed him that the recording was irrelevant since they could testify in court concerning whatever he said. Edwards replied: "I'll tell you anything you want to know, but I don't want it on tape." He thereupon implicated himself in the crime.

Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated when the officers returned to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel. The trial court initially granted

Page 480

the motion to suppress,3 but reversed its ruling when presented with a supposedly controlling decision of a higher Arizona court.4 The court stated without explanation that it found Edwards' statement to be voluntary. Edwards was tried twice and convicted.5 Evidence concerning his confession was admitted at both trials.

On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards had invoked both his right to remain silent and his right to counsel during the interrogation conducted on the night of January 19.6 The court then went on to determine, however, that Edwards had waived both rights during the January 20 meeting when he voluntarily gave his statement to the detectives after again being informed that he need not answer questions and that he need not answer without the advice of counsel: "The trial court's finding that the waiver and confession were voluntarily and knowingly made is upheld."

Because the use of Edwards' confession against him at his trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, we reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court.7

Page 481

II

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against compelled self-incrimination required that custodial interrogation be

Page 482

preceded by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of an attorney. 384 U.S., at 479, 86 S.Ct., at 1630. The Court also indicated the procedures to be followed subsequent to the warnings. If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent, "the interrogation must cease." If he requests counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id., at 474, 86 S.Ct., at 1627.

Miranda thus declared that an accused has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Here, the critical facts as found by the Arizona Supreme Court are that Edwards asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent on January 19, but that the police, without furnishing him counsel, returned the next morning to confront him and as a result of the meeting secured incriminating oral admissions. Contrary to the holdings of the state courts, Edwards insists that having exercised his right on the 19th to have counsel present during interrogation, he did not validly waive that right on the 20th. For the following reasons, we agree.

First, the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver where the accused has specifically invoked his right to counsel. It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case "upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.

Page 483

387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).

Considering the proceedings in the state courts in the light of this standard, we note that in denying petitioner's motion to suppress, the trial court found the admission to have been "voluntary," App. 3, 95, without separately focusing on whether Edwards had knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court, in a section of its opinion entitled "Voluntariness of Waiver," stated that in Arizona, confessions are prima facie involuntary and that the State had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. The court stated that the issue of voluntariness should be determined based on the totality of the circumstances as it related to whether an accused's action was "knowing and intelligent and whether...

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6334 practice notes
  • Maryland v. Shatzer, No. 08-680.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • October 5, 2009
    ...opinion of the Court. We consider whether a break in custody ends the presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 I In August 2003, a social worker assigned to the Child Advocacy Center in the Criminal Investigation Division......
  • Miller v. Fenton, No. 83-5530
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • September 28, 1984
    ...waiver is not inculpatory; rather, it is an agreement to accede to questioning until the permission is withdrawn. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The policies requiring independent federal review of confessions exacted during police ......
  • People v. Johnson, No. 1-16-2999
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 26, 2019
    ...his statements on the ground that the police questioned him after he had invoked his right to counsel in violation of Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and (2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his trial counsel was ......
  • Arizona v. Roberson, No. 87-354
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 15, 1988
    ...704 ARIZONA, Petitioner v. Ronald William ROBERSON. No. 87-354. Argued March 29, 1988. Decided June 15, 1988. Syllabus Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, held that a suspect who has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6349 cases
  • Maryland v. Shatzer, No. 08-680.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • October 5, 2009
    ...opinion of the Court. We consider whether a break in custody ends the presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 I In August 2003, a social worker assigned to the Child Advocacy Center in the Criminal Investigation Division......
  • Miller v. Fenton, No. 83-5530
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • September 28, 1984
    ...waiver is not inculpatory; rather, it is an agreement to accede to questioning until the permission is withdrawn. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The policies requiring independent federal review of confessions exacted during police ......
  • People v. Johnson, No. 1-16-2999
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 26, 2019
    ...his statements on the ground that the police questioned him after he had invoked his right to counsel in violation of Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and (2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his trial counsel was ......
  • Arizona v. Roberson, No. 87-354
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 15, 1988
    ...704 ARIZONA, Petitioner v. Ronald William ROBERSON. No. 87-354. Argued March 29, 1988. Decided June 15, 1988. Syllabus Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, held that a suspect who has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Law Enforcement Case Law
    • United States
    • Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 30-2, September 2005
    • September 1, 2005
    ...Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 (1994).Doran v. Eckold, 362 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 04-06-04).Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).282 Crimi......
  • Criminal Justice Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 2009 Term
    • United States
    • Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 35-4, December 2010
    • December 1, 2010
    ...560 U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. — (2010).Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195 (1989).Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. — (2010).Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. —, 13......
  • A Comparative View of the Law of Interrogation
    • United States
    • International Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 17-1, March 2007
    • March 1, 2007
    ...New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Ma / Law of Interrogation 23 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).Ehrmann, H. W. (1976). Comparative legal cultures. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Esmein, A. (1913). A history of constitutional cri......
  • Miranda in Actual Juvenile Interrogations
    • United States
    • Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 41-1, March 2016
    • March 1, 2016
    ...and Psychological Measurement,20, 37–46. doi:10.1177/001316446002000104Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981).Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).Feld, B. C. (2006). Juveniles’ competence to exercise Miranda rights: An empirical study of pol......

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