Edwards v. Ault
| Decision Date | 20 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. C03-4073-MWB.,C03-4073-MWB. |
| Citation | 340 F.Supp.2d 979 |
| Parties | William Simpson EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. John AULT, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
William Simpson Edwards, Anamosa, IA, pro se.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION REGARDING MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ON THE MERITS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .......................................981
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ....................................................983
A. Standard Of Review Of Magistrate's Report And Recommendation... 983
B. Exhaustion And Procedural Default ..............................984
C. Merits .........................................................987
1. Standards of review .........................................988
a. General standards for § 2254 relief .................988
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims .................988
2. Magistrate's conclusions ....................................990
3. Edwards's objection .........................................991
4. Resolution ..................................................992
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY .....................................993
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................993
In December 1989, petitioner William Simpson Edwards ("Edwards") was charged with the first-degree murder and third-degree sexual assault of a thirteen-year-old girl. As DNA evidence was a component of the State's case against Edwards,1 in preparation for trial, Edwards procured expert witness Dr. Randell T. Libby ("Libby"). At one point Libby and Michael K. Williams ("Williams"), one of Edwards's trial attorneys, traveled to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") in Maryland to review certain records. FBI agent John Stafford ("Stafford") remained in the room with Libby and Williams while the records were reviewed. At trial, Libby testified that DNA records maintained by the FBI excluded Edwards as the perpetrator. In rebuttal, the State called Stafford, who testified that while Williams and Libby were reviewing the records in his presence, Williams told Libby he must use the term "exclusion" somewhere in his testimony. Stafford's direct testimony prompted Gregory E. Jones ("Jones"), Edwards's other trial attorney, to request a recess during which he could determine whether Williams should withdraw and be called as a witness. Following the recess, Jones advised the court that Williams would not withdraw or testify, and Williams proceeded to cross-examine Stafford. On cross, Williams attempted to elicit testimony from Stafford to the effect that he knew that the statement had been made as a joke. However, on redirect, Stafford testified that Williams's demeanor at the time he advised Libby to use the word "exclusion" did not appear to be jovial or humorous. On November 1, 1990, a jury found Edwards guilty of first-degree murder and third-degree sexual assault, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment and ten years.
Following his conviction, Edwards filed a direct appeal in which he raised the following three issues:
(1) the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for change of venue, (2) his constitutional right to a fair trial by a cross-section of the community was violated, and (3) he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because of his attorney's failure to object to what he contends were inflammatory statements made by the county attorney in closing arguments.
State v. Edwards, No. 2-583 / 90-1913, at 2, 502 N.W.2d 175 (Iowa App. Dec. 29, 1992). The Iowa Court of Appeals rejected Edwards's contentions and affirmed his conviction on all grounds. Id. Edwards filed a request for reconsideration — which was denied. Procedendo issued March 12, 1993.
Edwards then proceeded to file a post-conviction relief ("PCR") application in Woodbury County, Iowa. In his application, Edwards raised several grounds for relief, but pursued only the issue of whether his trial counsel "was ineffective in discussing possible trial testimony of the defense expert in the presence of an FBI agent." Edwards v. State, No.1999-561 (9-822) / 99-158, at 3 ) ("PCR Appeal I"). The State moved for summary judgment and for dismissal of the petition, claiming that Edwards had failed to show the was prejudiced from any alleged ineffective assistance of trial, or appellate, counsel. The District Court for Woodbury County granted the State's motion. Id. Edwards appealed this ruling to the Iowa Court of Appeals. The Iowa Court of Appeals, upon finding a genuine issue of material fact, reversed and remanded the matter for "the limited purpose of developing a further record as to whether original appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim and whether there was `sufficient reason' to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim for the first time in a postconviction proceeding." Id. at 8.
On remand, following the submission of further evidence, the District Court for Woodbury County dismissed Edwards's PCR application. See Edwards v. State, No. 01-1596, at 2 (Iowa Ct.App. Jan. 29, 2003) ("PCR Appeal II"). Edwards again appealed. The Iowa Court of Appeals found that Edwards's trial counsel's actions had raised a potential conflict of interest, but that trial counsel's mistake in judgment did not have an adverse effect on trial counsel's performance at trial and did not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial. Id. Having found that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective, appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness likewise was not erroneous. The Iowa Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the denial of PCR relief. Id. Edwards's further requests for review were denied, and procedendo issued April 23, 2003.
On August 1, 2003, Edwards filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a proposed writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with this court. (Doc. No. 1). Edwards's application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted, and his habeas petition was officially filed September 3, 2003. (Doc. No. 4).
On October 6, 2003, Respondent John Ault ("Ault") filed an Answer (Doc. No. 5) and a Motion to Dismiss "Mixed" Petition. (Doc. No. 7). On October 14, 2003, Edwards filed a pro se resistance, entitled Motion To Resist (Doc. No. 9), together with a motion for appointment of counsel. Edwards filed a pro se "submission of state court documents" on October 17, 2003 — to which he attached copies of two briefs that were filed in his action for postconviction relief in the Iowa District Court in and for Woodbury County. (Doc. No. 10). Edwards's motion for appointment of counsel was granted on October 23, 2003, and Jeffrey M. Lipman ("Lipman") was appointed to represent Edwards in this action. (Doc. No. 11). When Edwards and Lipman failed to see eye to eye on how this action should proceed, Edwards filed a motion to withdraw Lipman from the case and proceed pro se. (Doc. No. 20). Lipman concurred with Edwards's assertion that they had irreconcilable differences of opinion regarding the case. (Doc. No. 24). On January 28, 2004, following a telephonic hearing, the court granted Edwards's motion and withdrew Lipman from the case. (Doc. No. 23). Also at this time, the court granted Edwards an extension of time to file a supplemental resistance to Ault's motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 23). Edwards filed his supplemental brief in resistance to Ault's motion to dismiss on February 9, 2004. (Doc. No. 26).
The motion to dismiss was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On July 12, 2004, Judge Zoss filed his Report and Recommendation, which recommended that Ault's motion to dismiss be denied and that Edwards's petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied on the merits. (Doc. No. 30). On July 26, 2004, Edwards filed his objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. No. 31). The matter is now fully submitted and the court will now undertake the necessary review of Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation.
Pursuant to statute, this court's standard of review for a magistrate judge's report and recommendation is as follows:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) provides for review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation on dispositive motions and prisoner petitions, where objections are made, as follows:
The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that it is reversible error for the district court to fail to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report where such review is required. See, e.g., Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 306 (8th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 860, 117 S.Ct. 164, 136 L.Ed.2d 107 (1996); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Belk v....
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