Edwards v. Baltimore

• Decision Date: 28 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2299, Sept. Term, 2004.,2299, Sept. Term, 2004.
• Citation: 176 Md. App. 446,933 A.2d 495
• Parties: Calvin B. EDWARDS, Jr., et al. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

933 A.2d 495

176 Md. App. 446

Calvin B. EDWARDS, Jr., et al. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

No. 2299, Sept. Term, 2004.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

September 28, 2007.

Robert A. Suls of Towson, for appellant.

Kurt Heinrich (Ralph S. Tyler, City Solicitor, William R. Phelan, Jr., Principal Counsel on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before KENNEY, WOODWARD, LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

WOODWARD, J.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County that appellee, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("the City"), is not required to defend or indemnify appellant, Calvin B. Edwards, Jr., in relation to a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 8, 2002, while appellant was operating a City-owned vehicle. Appellant sought relief from the City in the circuit court based on an earlier judgment for monetary damages entered against him in the District Court for Baltimore County, wherein the district court found that appellant was negligent in the operation of the City-owned vehicle at the time of the accident.

On appeal, appellant presents four questions¹ for our review, which we have distilled into a single question:

Did the circuit court err in failing to declare that the City, as the self-insurer of a City-owned vehicle operated by appellant at the time of the motor vehicle accident, had a duty to indemnify appellant?

We answer that question in the affirmative, and accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

On April 8, 2002, appellant was employed by the City as a Captain in the Baltimore City Fire Department ("BCFD"). On that date, appellant was scheduled to work his regular shift from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. At approximately 4:30 p.m., while driving a City-owned vehicle, appellant picked up his children from school. At approximately 4:50 p.m., as appellant was driving his children home to feed them dinner, appellant's vehicle collided with the rear of a vehicle operated by Daniel Caulk. At the time of the impact, Caulk was lawfully stopped at a traffic signal on the westbound side of Liberty Road, near the intersection with Burmont Road, in Baltimore County.

On May 13, 2003, Erie Insurance Group ("Erie"), as subrogee of Caulk, filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County against both appellant and the City.² In its complaint, Erie alleged, inter alia:

For that on or about April 8, 2002, the Defendant, Calvin B. Edwards, Jr., while acting as the agent, servant and/or employee of the Defendant, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, negligently and carelessly struck the vehicle owned by Daniel Caulk, whose vehicle was lawfully and properly stopped for traffic on Westbound Liberty Road near the intersection with Burmont Road in Baltimore County. And the damages to Daniel Caulk's vehicle were caused by the negligence of the Defendant, Calvin B. Edwards, Jr., in that he failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to yield right of way and generally operated his vehicle in a negligent and careless manner thereby colliding with the Caulk vehicle.

The Defendant, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, was negligent in that he entrusted the vehicle to the Defendant, Calvin B. Edwards, Jr., who operated the vehicle as the agent, servant and/or employee of the Defendant, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and the Defendant, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, as the owner of the vehicle is vicariously liable for the conduct of the Defendant, Calvin B. Edwards, Jr. his agent, servant and/or employee, who was driving the vehicle.

Thereafter, on June 30, 2003, appellant received a letter from the City's Law Department, which informed him of the City's intent to deny coverage for the April 8, 2002 accident. Specifically, the letter advised appellant that the City would not defend him in the district court lawsuit or indemnify him if a judgment was rendered against him, because the allegations in the complaint placed him "outside the scope of [his] employment" and "not acting within [his] authorized official capacity at the time of the incident."

On August 26, 2003, a trial was held in the district court. At the conclusion of the trial, the court (Wilson, J.) gave an oral opinion from the bench:

This court must be guided by the law with respect to whether indeed on this occasion there was agency between Captain Edwards at the time and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore with respect to an accident which occurred on April the [8]th of 2002.

It is true to be certain that there is a presumption of agency as stated by counsel. State Farm verses Martin Marietta does presume an agency between principal and agent, which is rebuttable, but evidence [was] produced to the contrary.

Before me I have the testimony and Mr. Edwards acknowledges that on the date and time in question he had picked up his two children from school and was transporting them to his house with the intention of preparing a dinner meal for them to feed them before he again returned to a work assignment at the community action meeting to be held in Mondawmin. The accident occurs while Mr. Edwards is in the process of transporting his two minor children home.

* * *

The court must look to see that if at the time of the event the defendant, Mr. Edwards, was furthering the business of his employer, or as counsel stated, acting in furtherance of his own personal goals. If he [was] acting in furtherance of his own personal goals there is no agency, he is beyond the scope of his duties as a fire department employee and therefore there would be no coverage extended to him through the Mayor and City Council for Baltimore City.

The testimony is that at the time of this accident he was transporting his children home for the purpose of preparing dinner. The chief testified that that was not in furtherance of any fire department business. It very well may have been a common practice that individuals who were assigned these cars used them for many purposes occasionally beyond the scope of their employment, but it is for this court to consider on this occasion whether this defendant, Mr. Edwards, was outside the scope of his employment, as he was not engaged in the business of the Mayor and City Council for Baltimore City. He was not furthering the business of the fire department. On the date and time of this event he was beyond the scope of his employment by transporting his children in the nonemergency service vehicle to his home for the purpose of preparing their dinner.

There was no evidence to suggest that the Mayor and City Council for Baltimore in any way ratified his actions or took any steps to accept or adopt as their responsibility his course of action in taking his children home for dinner on the date and time this accident occurred.

Upon those findings, the district court entered judgment in favor of the City as to Erie's claim. With respect to Erie's claim against appellant, the district court entered a judgment against him in the amount of $8,094.84 for property damage and car rental expenses, plus $40.00 in court costs. Appellant did not appeal the district court judgment.

On January 29, 2004, appellant assigned to Erie his claim for indemnification against the City. On March 8, 2004, appellant, to his own use and the use of Erie, filed a complaint for declaratory relief against the City in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County seeking, inter alia, indemnification for the judgment entered against him by the district court.³ Of importance to this appeal, appellant alleged in the complaint that the City was self-insured pursuant to Md.Code (1977, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 17-103 of the Transportation Article ("Trans.Art."), that the City failed to defend appellant in the district court litigation, and that the City failed to indemnify appellant for the judgment entered against him and in favor of Erie. Appellant asserted that "[a]n actual controversy therefore exists between [appellant] and [the City] as to whether the [City], a self-insured, can disclaim its obligation to indemnify [appellant] for the judgment entered against him."

The City answered, asserting that appellant failed to allege an actionable controversy, that appellant was acting outside the scope of his employment when the accident occurred, and that, as a result, the City was under no duty to defend or indemnify appellant in the district court action under the Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"). See Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), §§ 5-301-5-304 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.

In response to appellant's request under the Public Information Act, the Motor Vehicle Administration produced the self-insurance documentation for the City-owned vehicle that appellant was operating when the accident occurred on April 8, 2002. The documentation revealed that, on the date of the accident, the City-owned vehicle was insured for the mandatory minimum limits for bodily injury and property damage liability as required by Trans. Art. § 17-103(b). Later, in response to a Request for Admissions propounded by appellant, the City admitted that neither its self-insurance application nor the guarantee in effect on April 8, 2002, contained a permissive user clause. In general, a permissive user clause excludes liability insurance coverage when a motor vehicle is not operated within the scope of permission.

On November 1, 2004, the circuit court held a hearing on the merits of the declaratory judgment action. Thereafter, on November 29, 2004, the circuit court ruled that the City had no duty to defend or indemnify appellant, because the district court had "conclusively determined" that appellant was acting outside the scope of his employment with the City at the time of the accident. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order, the circuit court provided the...