Edwards v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 92-8446

Decision Date21 September 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-8446,92-8446
Citation2 F.3d 382
Parties62 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1509, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,550, 85 Ed. Law Rep. 46 William H. EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Jack T. Brinkley, Jr., Columbus, GA, for plaintiff-appellant.

Elaine S. Newell, State of GA Law Dept., Jennifer L. Hackemeyer, Atlanta, GA, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:

This age discrimination case involves a dispute over the jury's damages award to plaintiff. The district court concluded that the award was factually unsupported or legally inconsistent and granted defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We vacate that judgment.

I. Facts and Background

William Edwards worked as a teacher of Speech and Theatre at Columbus College of the University of Georgia. Edwards claims that, because of his age, his department, in early 1987, allowed him to teach only one class. An older teacher, closer to retirement, was given preferential treatment and allowed to teach two classes, Edwards says. Teachers were paid according to the number of classes they taught. At the time, Edwards was 40 years old and therefore eligible for the legal protection of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 1

After bringing an informal complaint with the department head, Edwards was assigned a second class--though not the one he originally had hoped to teach. Over the next several years, the department removed Edwards as an instructor from other classes and gave him lower percentage raises than other faculty. Edwards attributed these acts to retaliation for his age discrimination complaint, but the Board of Regents of the University of Georgia ("Board") claimed that the acts resulted from Edwards' failure to comply with department procedures and to teach his classes well.

When Edwards invoked the College's grievance procedure, the College's Grievance Committee agreed with the Board on these larger retaliation claims, but unanimously found that there had been "recrimination in petty matters," including the untimely sharing of information with Edwards and a hastily called department meeting to which Edwards was not invited. The Grievance Committee also faulted the school administration for causing an undue delay in Edwards' grievance proceedings.

Edwards sued the Board, charging that the school had violated his rights under ADEA and also that the school had retaliated against Edwards for complaining about this discrimination. After trial and instruction, the jury returned a verdict, which read, in its entirety:

We, the jury, find for the Plaintiff and award damages for back pay in the amount of $6085.00.

We determine that the Plaintiff is not entitled to be awarded liquidated damages.

This 18th day of March, 1992.

The jury, however, did not specify which of Edwards' claims it found to be meritorious. Defendant did not object to the jury instructions or to the form of the verdict before the jury was discharged.

The district court later granted the Board's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 2 The district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of actual age discrimination.

The district court went on to consider the possibility that the verdict was based upon the retaliation claim, but concluded that the jury's failure to award liquidated damages meant that no willful act of wrongdoing had occurred and that the jury therefore had not based its award on a finding of retaliation. 3 Concluding that there was neither discrimination nor retaliation, the court ordered that judgment be entered for defendant. 4

Edwards seeks reinstatement of the jury's award.

II. Discussion

In reviewing an order granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court must view the evidence

in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motion is proper.

Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

We agree that the record will not, in fact, support a case of age discrimination, even assuming that the ADEA might protect a younger person from an employer's discrimination in favor of an older person on an employment matter. We, however, do not decide the question of whether this kind of reverse discrimination is, as a matter of law, ever covered by the ADEA.

The record will, in fact, support a finding of retaliation. There was, for example, evidence of lower salary increases and lost teaching opportunities following Edwards' complaints about the Board favoring an older teacher in class assignments. Under the circumstances, the jury could have found that these adverse acts were retaliatory.

That the jury did not award liquidated damages for this retaliation possibly may be an error, but it is not an error which harmed defendant or about which defendant can properly complain. In this case, we only look--and, on the motion for a j.n.o.v., the district court only should have looked--at the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict for plaintiff.

Because there was evidence to support a finding of retaliation and, therefore, to support damages for defendant, any inconsistency in the verdict does not affect the disposition of this appeal. We need not (and do not) reach the question of whether retaliation under the ADEA must always be a willful wrong for which liquidated damages should be awarded. 5 No such damages were awarded against the defendant in this case, but plaintiff has not complained about the lack of liquidated damages.

Defendant notes that Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b) allows the court to grant a j.n.o.v. "[w]hen the answers [to interrogatories] are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict." Defendant suggests that the first jury determination (that plaintiff is entitled to $6085 in damages) is the general verdict and that the second determination (that plaintiff is entitled to no liquidated damages) is the answer to an interrogatory. Because the "general verdict" is inconsistent with the "answer to interrogatory," argues defendant, the district court was free to disregard the former and grant defendant judgment pursuant to the latter, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b).

We disagree. As defined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b), a "written interrogatory" asks a question "upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict." Because the second sentence of the jury's verdict in this case is not a written interrogatory, Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b) does not apply. See, generally, Austin-Westshore Construction Co. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 1217, 1221-25 (11th Cir.1991) (discussing what count as interrogatories under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49). 6

The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for an entry of judgment in accord with the jury verdict.

HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting mildly:

I find myself in disagreement with our opinion in this case although the substance of my...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Jennings v. Jones
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • March 7, 2007
    ...see Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1057 n. 1 (7th Cir.1991).33 The Eleventh Circuit, in Edwards v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, 2 F.3d 382, 384 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1993), likewise held that, where the "[a]ppellee failed to pursue its motion for a new trial with the di......
  • McDonnell v. Cisneros
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • May 20, 1996
    ...cases, notably Passer v. American Chemical Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C.Cir.1991), reject this limitation. See also Edwards v. Board of Regents, 2 F.3d 382 (11th Cir.1993). Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 702-04 (7th Cir.1987), another of our cases, straddles the divide, by defining the......
  • Goldsmith v. Bagby Eleator Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • January 17, 2008
    ...address any issues about Goldsmith's alternative claim that his termination was based on his race. See Edwards v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 2 F.3d 382, 383-84 (11th Cir.1993) (where sufficient evidence supported a general verdict on retaliation claim, court did not need to review clai......
  • Kusens v. Pascal Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • May 9, 2006
    ...813, 84 S.Ct. 44, 11 L.Ed.2d 49 (1963); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 507 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1974); Edwards v. Board of Regents, 2 F.3d 382, 384 n. 6 (11th Cir.1993); Arenson v. Southern University Law Center, 43 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1995). Where the moving party did not press u......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT