Edwards v. Cabrera

Decision Date20 June 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-3205,94-3205
Citation58 F.3d 290
PartiesWalter E. EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Veronica CABRERA and Harry T. Redmond, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Gregory E. Kulis (argued), Kathleen T. Coyne, Chicago, IL, for Walter E. Edwards.

Marshall L. Blankenship, Jeffrey E. Schiller (argued), Michael F. Braun, Schuyler, Roche & Zwirner, Chicago, IL, Barbara M. Meyer, Mark S. Stein, Office of Corp. Counsel, Village of Skokie, Skokie, IL, for Veronica Cabrera, Harry T. Redmond.

Before RONEY, * BAUER, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Walter Edwards brought this Sec. 1983 action against two officers of the Skokie (Illinois) Police Department claiming that he was falsely arrested, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Edwards also included a state law claim for false imprisonment. Both parties moved for summary judgment on both counts. The district court held that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Edwards; it also held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted Edwards' motion for summary judgment and denied the officers' motion with respect to this count. The district court denied both parties' motions regarding the second count. The officers filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the holding below regarding the false arrest count. Because we believe that the officers had probable cause to arrest Edwards, we reverse.

On the evening of May 13, 1992, the Skokie Police Department received a call from a dispatcher for PACE, a suburban Chicago public bus transit agency. The dispatcher reported that a PACE bus driver thought he had seen a drug transaction involving five black men at the Greyhound bus station in Skokie; the dispatcher did not provide the police with the bus driver's name. Veronica Cabrera, a Skokie police officer who was in uniform and patrolling the area in her squad car, arrived at the bus station within three minutes of the dispatcher's call.

When she arrived, Cabrera saw four black men standing together outside the bus station. One was Walter Edwards and another was his brother Eugene Edwards. The group disbanded as Cabrera arrived. Eugene boarded a bus, and Walter walked toward a parked car. As Walter walked toward the car, Cabrera approached him and asked if she could speak with him. Walter agreed and told Cabrera that he was at the bus station to drop off his brother who had boarded a bus destined for Forest City, Arkansas. Cabrera then asked Walter to accompany him to the bus, which he did.

Cabrera boarded the bus and asked Eugene, by name, to step off the bus, which he did. Cabrera suspected that Eugene was nervous about this encounter; she noticed a wet spot on the front of his trousers which she attributed to Eugene urinating as a result of his nervousness. At this point, Harry Redmond, also a Skokie police officer, arrived at the bus station in his squad car.

Cabrera then asked both brothers for identification. In response, Eugene fetched a garment bag and produced his identification. Cabrera asked Eugene if she could search his bag and he consented. Inside Eugene's garment bag, Cabrera found two self-sealing plastic bags containing an unspecified amount of a substance that appeared to be marijuana. Apparently, Eugene had good reason to be nervous.

Cabrera and Redmond then arrested Eugene and also arrested Walter. The officers transported the Edwards brothers to the Skokie police station, but Walter was released some time thereafter without being charged. It is the propriety of Walter's arrest that is at issue here.

Walter alleged in the first count of his complaint that the officers had falsely arrested him; count two alleged a state law tort of false imprisonment. The district court denied both parties' summary judgment motions with respect to the second count, but granted Edwards' motion for summary judgment on count one. It held that not only did the officers lack probable cause to arrest Edwards, they were not entitled to qualified immunity from Edwards suit because no reasonable officer in their shoes would have believed that Edwards' arrest was supported by probable cause.

The officers filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's grant of summary judgment to Edwards on the issue of qualified immunity with respect to the count alleging false arrest. We have jurisdiction to hear such an appeal, Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)), and finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Edwards, we reverse.

"Qualified immunity shields [officers] from suit for damages if 'a reasonable officer could have believed [Edwards' arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the officers possessed.' " Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In this case, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they had probable cause to arrest Edwards. The officers had probable cause " 'if the facts and circumstances within their knowledge ... were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing' [Edwards] had violated the law." Id. (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). We determine whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Edwards based on the information available to them at the time they made the arrest. Id.; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Even if probable cause was lacking with respect to this arrest despite the officers' subjective belief that they had probable cause, they are entitled to immunity as long as their belief was objectively reasonable. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227, 112 S.Ct. at 536 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815).

There has been some tension identified in our cases with respect to the proper standard of review in qualified immunity cases in which probable cause is at issue. See Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 555-56 n. 7 (7th Cir.1994) (criticizing Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir.1992)). In this case, however, there is no question as to the standard of review. Since we are reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the issues are ones of law which we review de novo.

In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court rejected a rigid, rule-based approach to determining probable cause in situations in which the police officers receive a report of criminal activity by an informant. In that case, police received a letter from a completely anonymous informant detailing certain criminal activities (not surprisingly, drug offenses) about to be perpetrated by a married couple. Under the two-pronged test advanced by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), this anonymous tip would have been excluded from the determination of probable cause. The first prong of the test required that the police establish the informant's "reliability," "veracity," and "basis of knowledge;" if they could not do so, the tip could not support a finding of probable cause. Obviously, police cannot establish any of these three characteristics with respect to an anonymous tipster.

The Court overruled Aguilar and Spinelli and instead held that the proper approach is an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances in cases such as these to determine probable cause. Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. The Court directed that not only are the informant's "reliability," "veracity," and "basis of knowledge" to be considered, but also the degree to which the investigating officers can corroborate the tip. Id. at 244-45, 103 S.Ct. at 2335; United States v. Towns, 913 F.2d 434, 440 (7th Cir.1990). The import of Gates is that whether officers had probable cause to arrest is to be considered in light of all information available to them at the time of the arrest, including the tip itself together with knowledge of the informant, any corroboration of the tip, and any other information uncovered by or related to the arresting officer.

In its order, the district court traversed much of the substantial...

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