Edwards v. Chandler

• Decision Date: 16 October 1866
• Citation: 14 Mich. 471
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: William S. Edwards v. Samuel Chandler

14 Mich. 471

William S. Edwards v. Samuel Chandler

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 16, 1866

Heard July 11, 1866 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Error to Hillsdale circuit.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.

A. Blair, for plaintiff in error:

1. When a party making a communication as well as the party receiving it, have an interest in it, it has never been doubted that it was privileged: 16 N. Y., 373; 22 Wend. 414.

The letter declared upon in this case was clearly of this class. It was written by the plaintiff in error to the general agent of the U. S. express company in pursuance of a conversation and a request of said agent. The plaintiff in error being a customer of the company, both parties were interested in the subject matter of the letter. It was therefore clearly privileged.

It was so recognized and treated by the court and counsel on both sides: 30 N. Y., 25.

2. The letter being privileged, the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff in the court below, to establish express malice, or want of good faith in writing the letter.

The gist of the action was the malicious intention of the writer of that letter, and the plea of the general issue put that question directly in issue. It was competent, therefore, for the defendant below to disprove the charge of malice under the plea of the general issue; and proof of the truth of the charges, or statements contained in the letter, or of the defendant's belief that they were true, was a complete defense to the action: 2 Greenl. Ev., §§ 421-428; 12 Pick. 163; 3 Met. 197, 198; 22 Wend. 423.

But the notice under the general issue was sufficient to let in proof of the truth of the matters stated in the letter. Though the notices undertook to detail the evidence or particular circumstances going to show the truth of the statements, that was unnecessary; and they furnish sufficient notice to the plaintiff, that the defendant would justify upon the trial, by showing the truth of the alleged libel: 8 Mich. 351; 6 Id. 514.

It does not cure this error, that the court did allow some such facts in mitigation of damages, because evidence in mitigation involved an admission of the falsity of the charge: 2 Greenl. Ev., § 425.

3. The court erred in overruling the objection to the testimony of the witness, Calvin Cone, because it appeared that there was better evidence of his authority, to wit: the articles of association and by-laws of the company.

These should have been produced. It is not to be believed that a subordinate like Cone had the power to fix the rate of charges for this company.

4. The court erred in charging the jury that "they would be warranted in inferring from the language contained in the letter a charge of embezzlement, or of misapplying or appropriating the funds of the express company or their customers, to his (the plaintiff's) own use."

This construction of the letter is not warranted. The whole purport of it is that the plaintiff had misused and wronged the defendant, and he wished him removed for that reason. There is nothing that can be fairly construed into a charge of wronging the express company.

The letter was confidential, and was made public by the plaintiff himself. It simply asked the company to look into the conduct of its agent towards the defendant Edwards.

These privileged communications are to be construed liberally: 16 N. Y., 371; 2 Greenl. Ev., p. 398, note 1.

Johnson & Higby, for defendants in error:

1. The first and second errors assigned are substantially the same, and are in substance that the court erred in not allowing plaintiff in error to show, under the general issue, particular facts tending to prove the truth of the matter in the declaration charged as libelous.

We regard the rule as settled, that particular facts cannot be given in evidence under the general issue, either by way of justification or in mitigation of damages: 2 Stark. on Slander, 89-99; 4 Mich. 409; 1 Am. L. Cas., 178; 11 Mich. 20.

2. The third error assigned is, that the court erred in allowing the witness, Cone, to prove, by parol, his authority as agent to issue the printed regulations which were given in evidence.

The objection was not well taken. It was a general objection. It did not point out in what respect the evidence was inadmissible. It is therefore no error: 11 N. Y., 442-482.

3. The last error assigned is, that the court erred in charging the jury substantially, that the letter charged the plaintiff below with embezzlement, or misapplication of the funds of the company.

This involves a construction of the letter, and presents a question that is not much aided by authorities. An examination of the whole letter, and the facts and circumstances under which it was written, furnish pretty strong proof that the court gave a proper construction to the letter.

Besides, if the judge erred in his charge in that respect, the judgment ought not to be disturbed, provided the whole letter, taken together, was a libel. As to what constitutes a libel, see 7 Cow. 620.

OPINION

Campbell J..

Chandler sued Edwards upon a charge of libel, in writing to Henry Kip, superintendent of the United States express company, a letter reflecting upon the character of Chandler, as agent of that company, at the village of Hillsdale, and complaining of his conduct in such agency.

Edwards pleaded the general issue, and with it gave notice that the letter was of such a character, and written under such circumstances, as to make it a privileged communication. The notice also set forth several facts going to prove the truth of many of the allegations in the letter, but not purporting to cover all of them.

As the letter...