Edwards v. CSX Transp.
| Docket Number | 7:18-CV-169-BO,7:18-CV-178-BO |
| Decision Date | 27 July 2023 |
| Parties | JIMMY EDWARDS, ROBERT HUNT, DOLORES HUNT, CLIFFORD MCKELLAR, JR., and EMMA MCKELLAR, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant. WEST LUMBERTON BAPTIST CHURCH, CURRIE CHAIN SAW, INC., C.J.M. VENTURES INC., WILLIAM LOCKLEAR d/b/a STRICKLAND'S BARBERSHOP, TBL ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY, INC., SAMMY'S AUTO SALES, INC., and ERIC CHAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
This consolidated action is before the Court on defendant CSX Transportation's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiffs have responded, defendant has replied, and the motion is ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
The parties are well-familiar with the factual and procedural background of this consolidated action, and the Court provides only a summary here. In January' 2019. the Court consolidated three putative class actions which alleged claims against CSX Transportation (“CSX”) arising from flooding in and around the City of Lumberton. North Carolina as a result of Hurricanes Matthew and Florence. This Court dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint on CSX's motion. Plaintiffs appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed this Court's dismissal of plaintiffs' tort claims but reversed its dismissal of plaintiffs' single breach of contract claim. [DE 58].
Following remand, CSX answered the amended complaint and the parties engaged in a period of discovery. [1] CSX then filed the instant motion for summary' judgment on plaintiffs' remaining breach of contract claim and plaintiffs moved to certify the Rule 23 class. The Court subsequently granted CSX's motion to stay or postpone class certification proceedings pending its resolution of CSX's motion for summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If that burden has been met, the non-moving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts in dispute to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, a trial court views the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party 's position is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S 242, 252 (1986). “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party and [a] fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Speculative or conclusory allegations will not suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645,649 (4th Cir. 2002).
The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. [DE 138, 142]. The Lumber Ri ver flows through the City of Lumberton, North Carolina (“the City” or “Lumberton”), from northwest to southeast. Neighborhoods on the north and east side of Lumberton are on somewhat elevated terrain, while neighborhoods on the south and west sides are in low-lying areas. A levee system was constructed from approximately 1975 to 1977 to address flooding caused by the Lumber River in the southern part of Lumber ton.
A rail line operated by CSX and its predecessors runs parallel to the Lumber River, with Interstate 95 crossing over both the rail line and the river at a particular point, In June 1978, CSX's predecessor, the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company (“Seaboard”), the City, and the Robeson County Drainage District No. 1 (“Drainage District”) entered into an agreement which has been referred to as the Tri-Party Agreement (“TPA”). The TPA states that, for consideration of one dollar, Seaboard granted the City and the Drainage District a license to construct and maintain an earthen dike, according to specifications, at or near Lumberton, specifically 760 feet southeastwardly from Milepost SE-295, and adjacent to Seaboard's railroad tracks. [DE 127-1], The TPA gave the City the “right and privilege” to close “said dike across said track” only in the event of imminent danger of flooding. TPA ¶ 8(a). Seaboard was required to be given a minimum of twelve hours' notice prior to the City closing the dike. Id. The City agreed that it would open the dike once the flooding had receded and that all expenses incident to the closing of the dike would be borne by the City. Id. ¶ 8(b). None of the plaintiffs is a party to the TPA nor were they involved in the formation, negotiation, or execution of the TPA. Plaintiffs were not consulted regarding the terms or existence of the TPA. No plaintiffin a residential home owned their property7 at the time of the execution of the TPA.
CSX's rail line through Lumberton is part of the U.S. Military 's Strategic Rail Corridor Network, which allows the Department of Defense to access rail infrastructure in the event of military and national defense emergencies. The U.S. Military thus monitors CSX's rail line through Lumberton and has influence over CSX's decisions to close the line.
Hurricanes Matthew and Florence struck in 2016 and 2018, respectively, and caused the Lumber River, which divides the City, to overflow its banks and flood portions of Lumberton. At the times of these hurricanes, the City had not constructed the dike contemplated by the TPA.
CSX argues first that plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is impliedly preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101, et seq. (“ICCTA”). The court of appeals has determined that plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is not expressly preempted by ICCTA, but that it “might still be impliedly preempted,” leaving the issue open for CSX to raise on remand. Edwards v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 983 F.3d 112, 121 n. 11 (4th Cir. 2020).
“[T]he generally accepted test for ICCTA implied or conflict preemption [asks]: does the enforcement action unreasonably interfere with rail transportation?” PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 220-21 (4th Cir. 2009) (). In examining whether plaintiffs' tort claims were expressly preempted by ICCTA, the Fourth Circuit held that it was “hard to view [plaintiffs'] claims as anything other than direct attempts to ‘regulate' railroading.” Edwards, 983 F.3d at 122. This holding applies equally to plaintiffs' TPA contract claim and is further supported by the undisputed record evidence.
First, the plain language of the TPA expressly confers on the City “the right and privilege of closing” the dike which the City was permitted to build adjacent to CSX's rail track with proper notice to the railroad, resulting in the closure of the rail line and any rail activities. The City is further provided with the unfettered discretion to determine when the rail tracks can be reopened and CSX can thus resume its business. The TPA permits the City to interfere with rail transportation, and the question is thus whether this interference is unreasonable. Whether interference is unreasonable “requires a factual assessment of the effect of providing the claimed remedy.” PCS Phosphate, 559 F.3d at 221.
In some instances, a voluntary agreement entered into by a rail carrier may reflect “the carrier's own determination and admission that the agreement[] would not unreasonably interfere with interstate commerce.” The Twp. of Woodbridge, NJ, et al., 5 S.T.B. 336 (2000). However, in this case, the language of the TPA implicates “conduct which is clearly encompassed by the plain language of [ICCTA].” Edwards, 983 F.3d at 123. The TPA permits the City to at certain times control the operation of the subject rail line and CSX's routes and services in and through Lumberton: each of those activities has been designated as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board provided by ICCTA. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b).
CSX's evidence supports the conclusion that the TPA unreasonably interferes with rail transportation. CSX's Wilmington Subdivision consists of approximately 120 miles of track which runs through Lumberton. [DE 127-10] Dilday Decl. ¶ 5. There are approximately twelve to thirteen trains moving commodities and shipments across the Wilmington Subdivision per day, and the Wilmington Subdivision is further critical to the movement of emergency supplies and hazardous materials from the Port of Wilmington, North Carolina. Id. ¶¶ 8-9; see also [DE 127-9] Johnson Depo. at 81; [DE 127-11] Dillard Depo. At 156-57. Closure of the Wilmington Subdivision track at Lumberton would result in “considerable disruption,” including delays and train traffic diversion resulting in congestion and additional delays. Dilday Decl. ¶ 11. Finally, the United States military has influence over any closure decisions that would impact the Wilmington Subdivision due to its inclusion in STRACNET. Id. ¶ 13.
Plaintiffs have not proffered...
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