Edwards v. Desbien
Decision Date | 15 April 2015 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-cv-00333-GPG |
Parties | LUCAS EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. LARRY DESBIEN, Director, Colorado State Child Support Services, REGGIE BUCHA, Executive Director, Child Enforcement Services, and CHERYL TERNES, Child Support Services, Arapahoe Branch Director, and RANDA ALSHAMI, Legal Technician, Arapahoe Branch, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Plaintiff, Lucas Edwards, is detained in the Arapahoe County Detention Facility, in Centennial, Colorado. He initiated this action by filing, pro se, a Prisoner Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Edwards has been granted leave to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
On March 2, 2015, Magistrate Judge Gallagher reviewed the Complaint and determined that it was deficient because Plaintiff could not maintain a § 1983 action against former Defendant Jones, the non-custodial parent1; the allegations of the Complaint failed to state an arguable due process claim against Defendants Desbien and Bucha; and, Plaintiff does not have a private right of action under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b, that is enforceable under § 1983.Magistrate Judge Gallagher ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint, within thirty (30) days of the March 2 Order, to allege additional facts that would support an arguable due process claim against the individual Defendants. Mr. Edwards filed an Amended Complaint on March 31, 2015. (ECF No. 12).
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Subsection (e)(2)(B) of § 1915 requires a court to dismiss sua sponte an action at any time if the action is frivolous or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A legally frivolous claim is one in which the plaintiff asserts the violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist or asserts facts that do not support an arguable claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
The Court construes the Amended Complaint liberally because Mr. Edwards is not represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be the pro se litigant's advocate. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated below, this action will be dismissed.
Mr. Edwards alleges in the original Complaint that in 2005, the Arapahoe County District Court, in Case No. 05DR2718, granted him full custody of the child he shared with Courtney Jones, and ordered Ms. Jones to pay $275.00 per month in child support. He further alleges that Colorado Child Enforcement Services is required by law to locate, enforce and collect (distribute) child support payments, but has failed to locate, and collect payments from Ms. Jones. According to Plaintiff, Colorado State Child Support Services, which oversees Child Enforcement Services, "closed" the case in2013 "due to the non-custodial parent not being located in the last three years." (ECF No. 1, at 3, 9). Mr. Edwards asserts that the Defendants, who are agents or employees of the state agencies, violated his federal due process rights, and engaged in "misrepresentation or fraud" by failing to adhere to the agencies' child support enforcement obligations. (Id. at 5, 8, 15). For relief, Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Defendants to re-open his child support collection case, and that he be paid all past due child support payments, as well as punitive damages.
Mr. Edwards does not re-assert the allegations of the original Complaint in the Amended Complaint.2 Instead, he alleges why the two new Defendants, Ternes and Alshami, are responsible for the administrative closure of his child support collections case. He further alleges that the closure of his case deprived him of his entitlement to receive the court-ordered child support payments from Ms. Jones because the state court entered a restraining order against him which prevented him from engaging in his own collection efforts. Plaintiff further states that his child was 19 years old at the time the state agencies closed his case administratively, which is beyond the age when child support payments are ordered, so that he is only entitled to child support payments for the five years preceding the administrative closure.
The Court first considers the issue of Mr. Edwards' standing to pursue his § 1983 claims. See Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2009) (). To possess Article III standing, a plaintiff must "establish (1) that he or she has suffered 'an injury in fact'; (2) that the injury is 'fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant'; and[ ](3) that it is 'likely' that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1120 (10th Cir. 2012) ( ).
In Colorado, the inherent right to child support belongs to the child, but is enforceable by the custodial parent, acting on behalf of the child. See In re Marriage of Murray, 790 P.2d 868 (Colo. App. 1989) (citing McQuade v. McQuade, 358 P.2d 470, 472 (1960)). Once a child attains nineteen years of age, the non-custodial parent's obligation to pay child support terminates. See COLO. REV. STAT. (C.R.S.) § 14-10-115(1.5)(a). See also In Re Marriage of Johnson, ___, P.3d ___, 2014 WL 5370023, at *2 (Colo. App. 2014) ( ).
Mr. Edwards alleges in the Amended Complaint that his child was 19 years old at the time the state agencies administrative closed his child support collection case. Notwithstanding, relevant case law suggests that Plaintiff has standing to pursue an action for past due child support. See Zimmerman v. Starnes, 35 B.R. 1018, 1022 (D.Colo.1984) ( ); In re Marriage of Paul, 978 P.2d 136, 139 (Colo. App. 1998) ( )(quoting State ex rel. Utah State Department of Social Services v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah 1996)). Accord Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 11, 12 (1975) ( ).
Accordingly, the Court will review the merits of Mr. Edwards' § 1983 claims against the Defendants.
Mr. Edward purports to sue the Defendants, in their official capacities, for what he characterizes as "p[ro]spective injunctive relief." (ECF No. 12, at 33). Official capacity claims against state officials, for prospective injunctive relief, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 631 (10th Cir.1998) (). However, the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff is to remedy past wrongs, rather than an ongoing violation offederal law. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) ( )(Internal quotation omitted). As such, the individual Defendants, sued in their official capacities, are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir.1998) ( ); Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157, 1159 (10th Cir. 2012) ( ).
To hold the individual Defendants liable under § 1983, in their individual capacities, Mr. Edwards must allege facts to show that each Defendant was personally involved in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). For the supervisor Defendants, there must be an affirmative link between the alleged constitutional violation and each defendant's participation, control or direction, or failure to supervise. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir.2009) (citations and quotations omitted); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1200-1201 (10th Cir. 2010). A supervisor can only be held liable for his own deliberate intentional acts. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Serna v. Colo. Dep't of...
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