Edwards v. Dothan City Schs.

• Decision Date: 28 February 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACT. 1:21cv248-ECM [wo]
• Parties: PHYLLIS EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. DOTHAN CITY SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

PHYLLIS EDWARDS, Plaintiff,
v.
DOTHAN CITY SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACT. No. 1:21cv248-ECM [wo]

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Southern Division

February 28, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Now pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Dothan City Schools and Dothan City Board of Education (together referred to as “the Board”), and Michael Shmitz, Brenda Guilford, Franklin Jones, Susan Vierkandt, Brett Strickland, Amy Bonds, and Chris Maddox (collectively referred to as “the Board members”). (Doc. 22).

Plaintiff Phyllis Edwards (“Edwards”) filed a complaint in this Court bringing a claim for violation of due process (count one), for conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1985 (count two), and a state-law breach of contract claim (count three). Edwards is alleged to be a citizen of Florida and the Defendants citizens of Alabama. The complaint seeks a specific amount, $584, 032.67, in damages, and invokes diversity subject matter jurisdiction.^[1]

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Based upon a review of the record and the applicable law, and for the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is due to be GRANTED.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations that are merely “conceivable” and fail to rise “above the speculative level” are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id.

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may be a factual or facial attack on subject matter

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jurisdiction.^[2] Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2002). A factual attack permits the district court to weigh evidence outside the pleadings to satisfy itself of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Id. at 1237. However, a facial attack merely questions the sufficiency of the pleading. Id. Under a facial attack, as here, the district court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and need not look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

II. FACTS

The facts as alleged in the complaint are as follows:

Edwards was hired on January 16, 2018, as the Superintendent of the Dothan City Schools in Dothan, Alabama. Her employment contract with the Board was for a term of five years and four months, until June 30, 2023

The complaint alleges that during her tenure, Edwards was subject to criticism and accusations by Board members outside of called Board meetings. Therefore, the complaint alleges, on September 8, 2020, Edwards submitted an “intent to resign” letter to the Board, consistent with her employment contract. (Doc. 1 para. 17).

The Defendants have attached Edwards' employment agreement to the motion to dismiss. It provided in relevant part as follows:

Dr. Edwards may terminate this contract with or without cause by giving the Board notice in writing of her desire and election not to continue this contract at least 120 days before the effective date of the termination. In that event Dr. Edwards shall be entitled to compensation, remuneration and/or benefits

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that have been accrued or earned as of the effective date of termination.

(Doc. 22-1 at 13).^[3]

The Defendants also have attached Edwards' intent to resign letter to the motion to dismiss. In the letter Edwards stated, “I intend to tender my resignation to the Dothan City School Board. Please let me know who I should deal with to iron out the details.” (Doc. 22-2). The complaint alleges that because this was only an intent to resign, Edwards did not give a date on which she planned to leave...