Edwards v. Galveston-Texas City Pilots, 01-CV-347.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-CV-347.,01-CV-347.
• Citation: 203 F.Supp.2d 759
• Parties: Johnnie EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. GALVESTON-TEXAS CITY PILOTS and GALTEX PILOTS SERVICE CORP., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

203 F.Supp.2d 759

Johnnie EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. GALVESTON-TEXAS CITY PILOTS and GALTEX PILOTS SERVICE CORP., Defendants.

No. 01-CV-347.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

May 8, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Reginald E. McKamie, Sr., Attorney at Law, Houston, Tx, for Plaintiff.

James T. Brown, Legge, Farrow, Kimmitt and McGrath, Houston, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KENT, District Judge.

Plaintiff Johnnie Edwards ("Edwards") brings this lawsuit against Defendants Galveston-Texas City Pilots ("the Pilots") and Galtex Pilots Service Corporation ("Galtex") (collectively "Defendants"), alleging that they discriminated against him by not selecting him as a maritime deputy pilot on two separate occasions. Edwards specifically avers causes of action under Titles 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, 1988, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab.Code § 21.001 et seq., as well as state law claims for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy to violate a constitutional right to contract. On March 1, 2002, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons below, Defendants' Motion is hereby GRANTED.

I.

Plaintiff Edwards is a licensed maritime officer with five years of harbor tug experience in Galveston Bay and eleven years of deep-sea experience aboard ocean faring vessels. Defendants are a group of maritime pilots, collectively known as Galveston-Texas City Pilots, and a corporation of which they are all shareholders, Galtex Pilots Service Corporation. The Pilots are maritime ship pilots who provide local nautical knowledge about Galveston and Texas City navigational waters to ship captains of seagoing vessels. They assist seagoing captains with the arrival and departure of their ships from the Galveston sea buoy to various berths in Galveston County. Galtex is a corporation owned by the Pilots and alleged to employ deputy pilots, own property, pay employees, sign leases, and conduct other day-to-day business for the Pilots.¹

Edwards, an African-American, unsuccessfully applied for a deputy pilot position with the Pilots on two separate occasions, once in 1999 and again in 2000. Edwards alleges that the Pilots did not select him for the position in both instances on the basis of race, thereby giving rise to his various federal and state law discrimination claims. The first instance of discrimination allegedly occurred in 1999. Early in that year, the Pilot Board approved four deputy pilot vacancies. In accordance with their standard procedure, the Pilots commenced accepting applications for these vacant positions. From this pool of applications, each pilot nominated two candidates to a "short list." This short list was then forwarded to the Pilot Board, which, although taking into consideration the Pilots' recommendations, fashioned a final and more circumscribed list of qualified candidates. The Pilot Board's approved list was then presented to the Pilots for voting, and the first four candidates who received two-thirds of the Pilots' votes were slated to fill the vacant positions. In 1999, Edwards submitted an application to the Pilots for the deputy pilot position. Although Edwards was nominated to the short list by Captain John Lane ("Lane"), he was subsequently excluded from the Pilot Board's final approved list. Edwards was allegedly notified of his exclusion from the approved list by Captain William Kern ("Kern"), who also told Edwards that the Pilot Board refused to tell the Pilots why Edwards and other individuals were omitted from the final list. Based upon this information, Edwards filed a lawsuit against the Pilot Board in state court. Edwards successfully sought an injunction requiring the Pilot Board to place him on the approved list, and the Pilot Board acted accordingly. Notwithstanding this injunctive relief, Edwards nevertheless was not selected to fill one of the four vacant deputy pilot positions. According to Edwards, he garnered as many as six votes during the final voting process (one vote shy of meeting the two-thirds requirement), but was effectively blocked from obtaining the requisite additional votes by the "Aggie Pilots,"² a group of pilots who Edwards claims were unwilling to support an African-American candidate.

Edwards' allegations of discrimination with regard to the 2000 application process are markedly similar, except that Edwards was not nominated to the short list by any pilot. In March of 2000, Edwards applied for one of two vacant deputy pilot positions. Captain Wendy Morrison ("Morrison"), who was charged with collecting and processing the applications, noticed that Edwards' application was incomplete because Edwards had failed to provide contact phone numbers for his previous employers. Morrison called Edwards for permission to fill in the required information, and then forwarded the corrected application to the Pilot Board. In the 2000 application process, the Pilots interviewed four African-American candidates for the deputy pilot positions, including Edwards, Darwin Peguese ("Peguese"), Graylin Gant ("Gant"), and David Manney ("Manney").³ The Pilot Board later provided the Pilots with a list of sixty-seven individuals who were qualified to serve as deputy pilots. Peguese and Gant were disqualified from the list, leaving Edwards and Manney as the only African-American candidates that could be considered for nomination to the short list. Many pilots nominated Manney to the short list, but no pilot nominated Edwards. After the short list was compiled, each Pilot was permitted to cast one vote for one of the nominees on the short list until two of the candidates received a two-thirds majority of the votes. During the first round of balloting, all eight of the alleged Aggie Pilots voted for Manney, as well as Christos Sotirelis ("Sotirelis"), a Caucasian-American candidate. Thus, Manney and Sotirelis were awarded the two vacant deputy pilot positions.

On the basis of these events, Edwards filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against the Pilots on February 6, 2001, alleging that the Pilots failed to select him as a deputy pilot in 1999 and in 2000 because of his race, and that the Pilots had been engaging in a pattern and practice of discriminating against African-American pilot applicants. The EEOC then mailed Edwards a notice of his right to sue the Pilots. On June 6, 2001, Edwards brought the instant lawsuit against Defendants, alleging causes of action under Titles 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, 1988, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), Tex. Lab.Code § 21.001 et seq., as well as state law claims for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy to violate a constitutional right to contract. On March 1, 2002, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, to which the Court now turns.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When a motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Issues of material fact are "genuine" only if they require resolution by a trier of fact. See id., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. See id., 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. If the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment should not be granted. See id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 799 F.Supp. 691, 694 (S.D.Tex.1992) (noting that summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence could lead to different factual findings and conclusions). Determining credibility, weighing evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences are left to the trier of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56; Wise v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 58 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir.1995). The Court must accept the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56. However, to meet its burden, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," but instead, must "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id., 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

III.

Defendants urge this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's lawsuit on the following principal grounds: (1) Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination relating to the 1999 deputy pilot...