Edwards v. Gilbert

• Decision Date: 28 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-3348,88-3348
• Citation: 867 F.2d 1271
• Parties: Willie T. EDWARDS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dustin Wade Molbert, on behalf of the Estate and on behalf of the Survivor, Willie T. Edwards, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry GILBERT, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Okaloosa County, and Leon Blackshear, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1271

867 F.2d 1271

Willie T. EDWARDS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dustin Wade Molbert, on behalf of the Estate and on behalf of the Survivor, Willie T Edwards, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry GILBERT, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Okaloosa County, and Leon Blackshear Defendants-Appellants.

No. 88-3348.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Feb. 28, 1989.

Julius F. Parker, Jr., Parker, Skelding, McVoy & Labasky, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellants.

Randall C. Berg, Jr., Florida Justice Institute, Peter M. Siegel, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and GIBSON ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:

We reverse the district court's order denying summary judgment to defendants in their individual capacities in this 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action brought on behalf of a juvenile who committed suicide in prison; we conclude defendants are immune from suit.

Dustin Molbert, a juvenile, was tried as an adult and convicted of sexual assault on a child under the age of eleven years. While he was being held in the Okaloosa County Jail awaiting sentencing, he committed suicide in his cell by hanging himself with a bedsheet. Molbert had never threatened or attempted suicide before his successful attempt.

According to plaintiff's affidavits, adult inmates who occupied cells close to Molbert's cell or who passed by his cell often verbally abused and threatened him about what would happen to him when he got to state prison. Four days before the suicide, a jail nurse wrote that she had placed Molbert's name on the psychologist's list as requested by "C.O. and inmate." The nurse could not remember whether Molbert saw the psychologist. The jail logs indicate that Molbert was observed, as required by Florida Jail Regulations every fifteen minutes, from the time he was checked into the jail until 3:45 a.m. on the morning of his death, when he and the other juvenile inmate who shared his cell were found to be sleeping. After 3:45 a.m., Defendant Correctional Officer Leon Blackshear went to help in the jail kitchen. When he checked Molbert's cell at approximately 4:30 a.m., Molbert was dead.

Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated Molbert's eighth and fourteenth amendment rights through deliberate indifference to Molbert's special needs as a juvenile housed in an adult jail--as manifested by failure to comply with state laws regulating the housing of juveniles in adult jails, failure to take suitable suicide precautions, and failure to staff the jail adequately. Defendant Larry Gilbert, as Sheriff of Okaloosa County, was responsible for the operation of the jail. Defendant Blackshear was in charge of monitoring Molbert on the night Molbert died. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting a qualified immunity defense. The district court denied the motion.

I. Qualified Immunity

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. In so holding, the Court established an objective standard to make summary judgment an appropriate device to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims...." Id.; Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir.1989).

Once a defendant advances a defense of qualified immunity, he is entitled to summary judgment unless "the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions...." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). "The words 'clearly established ... constitutional rights' may not be used to read the defense of immunity out of federal tort law by the facile expedient of stating constitutional rights in the most general possible terms...." Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir.1986). The Supreme Court has stressed that "the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

An official will be immune if "the law with respect to [his] actions was unclear at the time the cause of action arose" or if " 'a reasonable officer could have believed ... [his actions] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information ... [the officer] possessed.' " Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 879, 880 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3040). For purposes of qualified immunity, an abstract mandate to act "with care" or "reasonably" is too vague; "generalities are just not helpful." Muhammad v. Wainwright, 839 F.2d 1422, 1424 (11th Cir.1987); see Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d at 881, 882 (proper inquiry is "fact-specific"; officer who shot and killed fleeing prisoner immune because "[n]o case ha[d] expressly held that an officer has to first shoot to maim before shooting to kill"). In sum, "the qualified immunity defense ... provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

II. Section 1983 Cause of Action

Plaintiff asserts a cause of action under the eighth amendment and also under the fourteenth amendment. ¹ At the outset, we reject any procedural due process claim. Plaintiff never contends that the jailers' actions in placing Molbert in that particular cell or in failing to observe him for an interval of more than fifteen minutes could have been proper if some sort of hearing had preceded the events surrounding Molbert's suicide.

Plaintiff does contend that the due process claim arises from defendants' violation of state laws regulating physical conditions of imprisonment. Of course, state law can give rise to procedural due process claims. See Taylor by and through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.1987) (in case involving foster child, court left for trial court to determine scope and extent of duties owed plaintiff). In prison cases, however, the Supreme Court has been conspicuously reluctant to recognize state laws as creating rights protected by the federal constitution. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-70, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869-71, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).

The Court has recognized such rights only where the state has used mandatory language to specify procedures which must be used or findings which must be made before benefits are taken away or burdens are placed on individual prisoners. See id. (where state created careful procedural structure to regulate prison administrative segregation, using mandatory language in statutes and regulations requiring specific findings before prisoner could be placed in segregation, federal due process required hearing); Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir.1987) (where detailed regulations made prisoners' removal from general prison population and placement in limited confinement dependent on individual prisoners' conduct, federal due process required hearing). Here none of the cited statutes or regulations governing the daily operations of Florida's jails vested Molbert, a prisoner, with a federal due process right to an administrative hearing prior to defendants' acts or omissions. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (no procedural due process violation because prisoner was shot had no due process right to hearing before or after shooting), reversing but approving in part 546 F.Supp. 726, 732 n. 1 (D.Ore.1982) ("[N]o regulation or statute was cited which would give plaintiff an expectation of a due process hearing prior to the alleged deprivation of liberty"); Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir.1980) (no procedural due process violation where state law made no distinctions based on prisoner's conduct and did not confer benefit and specify how benefit could be lost). ²

Invocation of fourteenth amendment substantive due process also adds nothing to plaintiff's case. If Molbert is entitled to protection under the eighth amendment, then Molbert is afforded "no greater [substantive] protection" by the due process clause. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 1088. We need not decide whether Molbert, as a convicted but not yet sentenced inmate, is protected by the eighth amendment as a prisoner or the fourteenth amendment as a pretrial detainee because in Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir.1985), we held that "in regard to providing pretrial detainees with such basic necessities as food, living space, and medical care the minimum standard allowed by the due process clause is the same as that allowed by the eighth amendment for convicted persons."

In a prisoner suicide case, to prevail under section 1983 for violation of substantive rights, under either the eighth or fourteenth amendment, the plaintiff must show that the jail official displayed "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's taking of his own life. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 1088; State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir.1983). In addition, once the defense of qualified immunity is raised, the plaintiff must persuade the court that the law was clearly established that the defendant's conduct in the circumstances amounted to "deliberate indifference." Se...